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Investor Heterogeneity: Price Momentum and Trading




Investor homogeneity is an important assumption in the efficient market hypothesis.
However, viewing the financial markets from the eye of a professional trader, they are
never efficient. Financial markets are composed of heterogeneous investors with the
aims of speculation. Due to the large gap between theory and reality, many anomalies
often occur. Price momentum as one of the commonly seen anomalies attracts the most
attention from both scholars and practitioners. Prior finance literature documents that
momentum is caused by investors’ differential beliefs or investor heterogeneity.
Recognizing the importance of investor heterogeneity prompts scholars to incorporate it
into asset pricing models, but they face a series of challenges. The objective of this study
is to address the current challenges of quantifying and testing predictions on investor
heterogeneity. By analyzing investors’ compositions, I argue that foreign listed firms are
natural habitats of diverse investors. Compared with pure US firms, foreign listed firms
provide perfect market venues to study investor heterogeneity. Using stock data of
2,200 NYSE and NASDAQ firms from 2000 to 2017, I classified them into higher/low
order foreign listed firms and pure US firms. Momentum is tested by the Winner and
Loser strategy, while trading volume is modeled by a regression of absolute return on
volume turnover. This study finds that the three groups of firms have long term
momentum in decreasing order, and investor heterogeneity plays an important role in
price momentum.
From phenomenon to essence, this study constructs a novel paradigm to quantify and
forecast investor heterogeneity. It is also the first study to investigate the
microstructural explanation of momentum and trading volume, and to state the
relationship between liquidity and heterogeneity. The “Two Period Order Flow Model”
and the “Heterogeneous Market Hypothesis(HMH)” also have important implications
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and contributions in both academics and industry. The conclusions of this research can
benefit professional traders and option strategists in designing their trading strategies; it
can help researchers avoid using proxied variables to quantify investor heterogeneity,
build heterogeneous asset pricing models and create theoretical foundations for
technical analysis; the HMH is also an alternative theory in challenging the EMH; and it
can also help regulators better understand the financial markets.
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1. Introduction
Although investor homogeneity is a critically important assumption in classical finance theories,
there is a large gap between the investor homogeneity assumption and the market reality. This
poses a serious challenge to establish theoretical frameworks such as Capital Asset Pricing
Model. Many anomalies regularly occur in markets, but one of them attracts the most attention
and is a source of controversy: “the Momentum Effect”1 (Fama and French, 2007). The
Momentum Effect refers to the fact that, stocks with high returns over the previous year tend to
continue to have high returns in the following few months; similarly, low short‐term past
returns also tend to persist (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993). The momentum trading strategies
are widely used by traders. Scholars ascribe this anomaly to “differential beliefs” or “investor
heterogeneity” (Chui et al., 2010; Verardo, 2009; Hong and Stein, 2007;Fama and French, 2009).
Chui et al. (2010) show that there are significant cross‐country differences in momentum profits
that persist across time. The cross‐country differences are instigated by various characteristics
of investors such as their cultural orientation. Zhang (2006) documents that US stocks with
information uncertainty, measured by more dispersed analyst earnings forecasts, exhibit
stronger momentum and he attributes this to the higher individualism of US investors. It is
widely accepted that dispersed analyst forecasts are used as a proxy for investor heterogeneity.
1 Fama and French (2007) point out that there are two anomalies which attract the most attention and
controversy. They are the Value Effect and the Momentum Effect. The Value Effect refers to the fact that,
stocks with low prices relative to fundamentals like cash flow or book value have higher average returns
than predicted by the CAPM(Statman, 1980, Rosenberg, Reid, and Lanstein, 1985, Fama and French, 1992).
In this study, only the Momentum Effect is related with investor heterogeneity.
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Huynh and Smith (2013) find momentum exists in US, Europe Asia and Japan, and their
explanation of the momentum effect is centered on investors’ under‐reaction to news. This
conclusion is consistent with Hong and Stein’s (1999) “Gradual Information Diffusion Model”2
which provides a rationale for differential beliefs. Fama and French (2012) also point out the
pervasive nature of momentum effect in North America, Europe and Asia‐Pacific excluding Japan.
Although Fama and French do not provide an explanation why the Japanese stocks do not
exhibit momentum effect, a related study by Chui et al.(2010) provide a convincing explanation.
Chui et al. (2010) attribute the insignificance of momentum effect in Japanese stocks to the
collectivistic nature of the Japanese culture3. Using analysts’ forecast dispersion as a
heterogeneity proxy, Verardo (2009) shows that momentum profits are significantly larger for
portfolios4 characterized by higher heterogeneity of beliefs. On the other hand, considering the
momentum effect from the market microstructure perspective, the order flows supplied by
heterogeneous investors are in favor of forming and maintaining a price trend5. In sum,
momentum which is an observable phenomenon of investor heterogeneity, has established an
effective bridge for studying the heterogeneity of investors as higher level of heterogeneity
results in higher momentum.
Another manifestation of investor heterogeneity is trading volume. The generated trading
volume reflects traders’ agreement with the current value for exchange, but at the same time, it
2 Gradual Information Diffusion Model classifies investors into newswatchers and momentum chasers
who have different views.
3 Fama and French (2012) uses monthly returns, but Huynh and Smith (2013) use weekly returns, which
could be a possible explanation for the divergence of the result.
4 The original definition of momentum Jegadeesh and Titman(1993) refers to individual stocks, market‐
wide momentum is examined by forming a portfolio which consists of multiple stocks with certain
characteristics. See Section II Data and Methodology for the Winner and Loser Portfolio Construction.
5 This conclusion will be elaborated in this study. I compose a “two‐period order flow model” for the order
flows of the price breaking process, and support the view that investor heterogeneity supports
momentum formation. It will be elaborated in section II.
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also reflects their disagreement on the future value of the asset. Hence, trading volume exhibits
an already‐formed disagreement6, but as Garfinkel (2009) argues trading volume does not
capture the full extent of disagreement7. Kim and Verrecchia’s (1991) seminal study shows that
greater diversity of opinions caused by the differential processing of the information, leads to an
increase in trading volume. Harrison and Kreps (1978) suggest that abnormal trading volume
around corporate public announcements could be explained by the divergence of opinion
among traders. Kandel and Pearson (1995) predict that volume will be increasing in the diversity
of investor opinions around earnings events. Other empirical studies, including Bamber (1987),
De Long et al. (1990), Ajinkya, Atiase and Gift (1991), and Ajinkya et al. (2004), all confirm the
view that abnormal trading volume is positively associated with higher divergent opinions.
Trading volume reflects differential beliefs, and it is the most direct and observable evidence of
investor heterogeneity (Bamber et al., 2011; Bamber et al., 1999). The objective of this study is
to employ momentum and trading volume as alternative measures to quantify investor
heterogeneity, in response to the current issues in financial economics.
From the point of view of order flow8, investors with strong heterogeneity provide sufficient
buying and selling orders at different price levels on the limit order book (LOB)9. These non‐
marketable limit orders offer sufficient liquidity, which allows traders to easily find the counter
parties of the transactions, and this process leads to the change of price and the generation of
6 Many studies express trading volume as “agree to disagree”.
7 As section II suggests, Garfinkel (2009) surveys many measures of heterogeneity and summarizes that
the most effective measure of heterogeneity is constructed from the comprehensive data of order flows.
Using statistics from all submitted orders is the most direct and comprehensive delegate of investor
heterogeneity. Trading volume only represents part of investor heterogeneity, which is the
executed/transacted orders, the ones which are not executed are excluded.
8 This strand of literature can be classified into market microstructure.
9 Panayi et al. (2015) define LOB as the massive data structure outlining the buying and selling interest in
an asset.
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volume. Sufficient liquidity is manifested by continuous price levels with small spreads. On
average, the smaller the spreads are, the easier the formation of transactions is. In contrast, the
order flow provided by the investors with poor heterogeneity often causes price fractures on
the LOB, which makes it harder for trades to match. Under the extreme circumstances of
investor homogeneity, the orders are stacking merely on a single side of the LOB, resulting that
new traders could not find the counter parties for their transactions, this LOB state corresponds
to Milgrom and Stokey (1982)’s Pareto Optimality of the assets, also referred to as “No Trade
Theorem”. Poor investor heterogeneity hinders the formation of transactions, and thus hinders
price changes and the generation of trading volume. This is the reason why investor
heterogeneity is positively related with momentum and trading volume10.
Classical finance theories adopt the over restrictive assumption of investor homogeneity, which
sacrifices the realism for the sake of tractability (Karpoff, 1987; Bamber et al., 2011). This rigid
assumption of investor homogeneity imposes a serious limitation on the applicability of classical
financial theories. A case in point is the failure of returns predicted by CAPM (Statman,
1980;Rosenberg, Reid, and Lanstein, 1985;Fama and French, 1992). Under the assumption of
homogeneity, it will lead to no transactions in the market (Milgrom and Stokey, 1982). In reality,
each transaction reflects the disagreement of investors on the future value of the asset. The
greater the trading volume is, the stronger the heterogeneity of investors is. When academia
and industry widely use the theorems such as CAPM, the homogeneity assumption implied by
the theorems contradicts with the heterogeneous fact implied by the real returns. Because
when the real returns are used for estimation, people neglect the fact that these returns are
based on the transacted volume, which is caused by heterogeneity. On the other hand,
10 In section III, I construct a two‐period order flow model to explain this idea in detail.
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academics pays excessive attention on returns and ignores the trading volume, lowering down
the development of volume theory, it further exacerbates the neglect of investor heterogeneity
(Bamber, et al., 2011). Examining the joint behavior of return and volume can shed light on the
underlying heterogeneity among investors (Karpoff, 1987;Wang, 1994;Hong and Stein, 2007). In
recent years, scholars have begun to study the heterogeneity of investors for a while, mainly in
behavioral finance literature, but there are still some important issues that the extant research
has still not addressed.
Recognizing the importance of investor heterogeneity led scholars to develop asset models
incorporating the assumption of investor heterogeneity (Miller, 1977; Harrison and Kreps, 1978;
Jarrow, 1980; Mayshar, 1983; Hong and Stein, 2007; Fama and French, 2007). However, these
strands of research face the following challenges:
1). It is difficult to derive testable predictions (Anderson et al., 2005; Wang and Liu, 2014).
2). Lack of tangible data to reflect heterogeneity (Anderson et al., 2005; Fama and French, 2007;
Wang and Liu, 2014).
3). Existing tractable formulations of heterogeneous agent models are observationally
equivalent to representative agent models. (Anderson et al., 2005; Wang and Liu, 2014).
The first two challenges mainly come from the difficulty of measuring investor heterogeneity.
Investor heterogeneity, like liquidity, is hard to describe and even harder to quantify. Scholars
have designed a variety of indicators to measure investor heterogeneity. Some examples are the
liquidity based measures, market depth based measures, measures based on institutional
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investors’ fundamental data, volume based measures, and dispersion of analysts’ forecasts11
(Lerman, Livnat and Mendenhall, 2007; Alexandridis, Antoniou and Petmezas, 2007). Each
measure has its own merits and drawbacks and some drawbacks are critical. The fact that there
is no single widely accepted measure suggests that the current verification of heterogeneity
requires tangible data. On the other hand, sources of investor heterogeneity are mixed. They
could come from a variety of factors such as tax preference, risk tolerance, liquidity requirement,
private information (Wang and Liu, 2014), financial constraints, and non‐traded income (Wang,
1994). A relatively recent addition to the list is the culture: Chui et.al (2010) made a convincing
argument that the culture is an important driver of heterogeneity. However, in the absence of a
unifying theoretical framework and testable data, it is difficult to distinguish the original sources
of the divergence of opinion (Wang and Liu, 2014)12.
In order to address the third challenge, scholars begin with classifying investors into various
types and try to find out their trading incentive and strategies. It is difficult to extract the trading
behavior of diverse types of investors from historical transaction data. As noted by Bamber et al.
(2011), academics still has very limited understanding of different classes of traders and their
incentive to trade. Although these classifications are not mature, one common finding of the
studies on investor types is that, large price movement and the excessive trading volume are
ascribed to investors’ overconfident behavior (Odean, 1998). Benos (1998) models investor
behavior with rational and irrational traders, he shows that higher volume, larger depth and
more volatile and informative prices are generated by the overconfident irrational traders. Hong
and Stein (1999) classify traders into news‐watchers and momentum followers. News‐watchers
11 Although the dispersions of analysts’ forecasts are widely used, it still has critically important
weaknesses. See Section II.
12 Sources of investor heterogeneity and existing models will be discussed in Section II in detail.
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trade based on their analysis of firms’ fundamentals, while momentum followers only care
about the price patterns, they watch the price reactions and aggressively join if they find
momentum exists. Hong and Stein (1999) also conclude that large price turbulence is induced by
the overconfidence of momentum traders. Odean (1998) argues that overconfidence is
prevailing in the market, price‐taking traders, strategic‐trading insiders and risk‐averse market
makers could be all overconfident. Overconfidence increases expected trading volume,
increases market depth and decreases the expected utility of overconfident traders. Gervais and
Odean (2001) argue that traders are “learning to be overconfident” from the beginning of their
trading careers. Greater confidence leads to greater trading volume. Luo et al. (2018) argue that
momentum arises because late informed investors provide too much liquidity to early informed
traders. Both momentum and reversals emanate from overconfidence. Chui et al. (2010) classify
investors into individualistic and collectivistic, and point out that momentum is not explained by
risk models, but explained by individualistic investors’ overconfidence. DHS (1998) show that
momentum can be generated by investors’ overconfidence and self‐attribution bias, the
excessive trading volume is also generated by overconfidence.
Although overconfidence is of critical importance in the literature of Finance, its measurement
has rarely been documented in the literature of Psychology (Olsson, 2014)13, as it needs an
individual’s original expectation which is a non‐observable variable. Recently, finance scholars
started to address this issue by using individualism or collectivism scores from Hofstede’s
13 In the literature of psychology, overestimation, overplacement, and the calibration of subjective
probabilities are all considered as different forms of overconfidence (Olsson, 2014). There are only two
studies document that more than two measures of overconfidence, see Moore and Healy (2008) and
Larrick et al. (2007).
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cultural dimensions14. It is argued that individualistic people (such as the US) think positively
about themselves and focus on their own internal attributes (Markus and Kitayama, 1991). They
believe that they have better ability than average and tend to overestimate their abilities (Heine
et al., 1999). In contrast, people in collectivistic cultures (such as Japan) do not have this belief.
People from individualistic countries are likely to analyze and invest based on their own analysis
rather than consensus, and investors from individualistic countries are more likely to trade on
momentum (Chui et al., 2010). Individualistic cultures promote, whereas collectivistic ones
suppress skepticism (Luo, 1998). All else equal, when clienteles for equities in collectivistic
cultures shift to foreign ownership by individualistic cultures, momentum should increase. Using
the individualism index as a proxy for overconfidence is an effective option, as it is an
observable and measurable variable. It also avoids the difficulties in classifying investors. The
Individualism index has been used as an instrumental variable for classifying firms and investors
in recent studies (Chui et al, 2010; Verardo, 2009; Luo et al, 2018).
This study aims to address the first two issues by constructing a new paradigm on studying
investor heterogeneity. I argue that trading volume and price momentum are observable and
tangible variables, and they offer direct evidence of investor heterogeneity. Both of them can be
used as proper measures of investor heterogeneity. This argument alleviates the lack of tangible
data problem. Garfinkel (2009) and Wang and Liu (2014) compare current prevailing measures
14 Hofstede (2001) classifies cultures into five dimensions: individualism, masculinity, power distance,
uncertainty avoidance, and long‐term orientation. Among these five cultural dimensions, individualism is
the most closely related to overconfidence and self‐attribution bias. This index is regarded as the most
comprehensive in terms of both the range of countries and the number of respondents involved
(Kagitcibasi, 1997).
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of investor heterogeneity, they conclude that unexplained trading volume15 is the best measure.
But these and the subsequent studies do not have any predictions regarding investor
heterogeneity. Neither trading volume nor momentum has been applied. In order to address the
un‐testable predictions of investor heterogeneity, I adopt a completely new approach. That is,
first analyzing investor compositions on different market venues, then hypothesizing that
heterogeneity is higher in the markets with more diverse investors, and lower for less diverse
ones, and finally use trading volume and momentum reactions to test this hypothesis. Hence,
choosing the right market venues with diverse investor profiles ensures higher level of
heterogeneity, and it is the key to the current study.
Foreign listings, also named as International listing and cross‐listing16, are strategic choices made
by firms to list their shares on an overseas market. The globalization process including
technological advances, deregulation of capital markets and declining transaction costs, led to a
surge in foreign listings in the past three decades (Karolyi, 2006). According to a report from
World Federation of Exchanges (WFE), as of the end of 2016, there were total 2,409
international‐listed firms around the world, which was 5.22% of total 46,170 listed firms.
Foreign listed firms are distributed across the major markets around the world. Although recent
studies (Doidge, 2017; Ciccotello, 2014;Rosett and Smith, 2014;Grullon, Larkin, and Michaely,
2015) suggest that this process has slowed down17, foreign‐listing continues to be a viable
15 Garfinkel (2009) documents that both bid‐ask spread and unexplained volume are better proxies.
Analysts’ forecast dispersions have very weak explanatory power.
16 Technically speaking, cross‐listing refers to a firm which is double listed in two or more countries.
Foreign listing or international listing refers to a firm listed abroad, no matter it is listed domestically or
not. This study will use foreign listing, international listing and cross listing interchangablely.
17 From 2014 to 2016, total number of international‐listings firms are 2,452, 2,504, and 2409, which are
5.50%, 5.47% and 5.22% of all listed firms respectively. WFE (2016; 2015). Academics calls the delisting
phenomenon “listing gap”.
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choice for firms influencing capital raising and price discovery processes. It is an indispensable
and important force for the integration of global financial markets (Gagnon and Karolyi, 2010).
Foreign listed firms can attract investors all over the world, and they are natural habitats of
heterogeneous investors. There are four reasons that the investor compositions of foreign‐listed
firms and purely domestic firms are different:
First, firms are motivated by a variety of factors for listing their shares abroad, with broadening
shareholders’ base as one primary objective. Several surveys of managers conducted by
Mittoo(1992), Fanto and Karmel (1997) and Bancel and Mittoo(2001) document that broadening
shareholder base is a major objective of managers of the cross‐listed firms. By broadening the
stockholders’ base, these internationally listed firms not only can raise the funds they need
abroad but also reduce their cost of capital (Verrecchia, 2001; Lambert et al., 2006; Hail and
Leuz, 2006). More importantly, the foreign‐listing process may improve the firms’ visibility and
reputation in the destination country, which enhances its influences, and hence attracts more
traders to join. At the micro level, the increase in the diversity of shareholders brings the market
with a higher level of heterogeneity and liquidity. Second, from the perspective of investors,
Theory of Psychic Distance suggests that investors normally select stocks which have the similar
background as they do, especially for the foreign listed firms which have no counter‐parties
listed in their home markets. Both individual and institutional investors are affected by this
phenomenon (Nofsinger, 2012). Third, cross‐listed firms may generate opportunities for
arbitrage as revealed through large, actionable deviations from price parity between the
markets trading those same shares. These arbitrageurs are also a group of traders which are not
found in purely domestic firms. Fourth, foreign institutional holdings also demonstrate the
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higher level of heterogeneity of foreign listed firms18. Ng et al. (2011) point out that Foreign
Direct Investment (FDI) could lower the liquidity in the host countries19, while Foreign Portfolio
Investment (FPI) will improve the host countries’ liquidity. Due to the fact that liquidity and
heterogeneity are highly associated, and the prediction by Psychic Distance, FPI will also add
heterogeneity to the foreign listed firms.
In sum, foreign listed firms broaden investor heterogeneity both intuitively and theoretically,
but have not been used in empirical analysis of heterogeneity. Both International Business
theories and Finance theories support the view that foreign listed firms can maximize the
heterogeneity of investors in a relatively small market, which objectively provides an almost
perfect market venue for studying heterogeneity of investors.
The main premise of this study is to empirically explore the extent of investor heterogeneity in
the context of foreign listed firms by using a matching control sample of non‐foreign listed firms.
I use all listed firms from NYSE and NASDAQ, as the US has the highest individualism score of 90
in the world. Foreign listed firms are further categorized into higher‐order and lower order firms.
Higher order firms are those whose home countries’ individualism scores below 50, and lower‐
order firms are those whose home countries’ individualism scores above 50. This controlling
method ensures that each group of firms has distinct investor compositions. I assume that the
investor heterogeneity (IH) rank of the three groups of firms is:
𝐼𝐻ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠 𝐼𝐻𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠 𝐼𝐻𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑈𝑆 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠
18 See statistics in Section III.
19 Host country firms with FDI investors, who have superior information and control positions in the firms,
suffer from information asymmetry between insiders and outside uninformed investors. Further, these
foreign investors bring their unique skills, international expertise, and knowledge to the firms, and
domestic investors may be unfamiliar with such “foreign inputs." Thus, the presence of controlling FDI
investors induces an adverse selection problem, making the stock less liquid. FDI also reduces trading
activities, but FPI improves.
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Based on the relationship established between momentum and trading volume earlier, this
study employs both momentum and trading volume reactions to test this hypothesis.
One motivation of this research is to address the issue of measuring investor heterogeneity in
academic literature which has not been addressed because of lack of tangible data problem as
well as the problem of testable predictions. Starting with investors’ habitats, developing
hypothesis and then testing the momentum and trading volume reactions. This approach
alleviates the data problem and offers a new paradigm to predict and test investor
heterogeneity. It also avoids the multi‐type investor problem, adding new evidence to the
literature related to investor overconfidence and culture’s influences on stocks trading. The
findings of this study add new insights to the trading volume research in the financial economics
literature. The “Two‐Period Order Flow Model” demonstrates the positive relationship between
investor heterogeneity and momentum. To the best of my knowledge, there is no research
documenting this conclusion in the market microstructural literature. It also has important
implications on the price discovery process.
Additionally, my interest in this topic is partly motivated by a puzzle confronting the professional
traders and option strategists: what kinds of stocks are likely to be in trending and what kinds
are likely to be in consolidation patterns, as these two phases require completely different
trading strategies. Prior literature suggests that price momentum (trending) is likely to happen
more often in a market with wider differential beliefs or disagreement (Chui et al., 2010;
Verrardo, 2009), other studies argue that momentum characteristics differ by industrial
classification (Zhou and Shin, 2013; Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999). In this study, I argue that
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foreign‐listed firms are also appropriated for trend trading, because of their higher levels of
investor heterogeneity generate momentum and trading volume. These can be used as
confirmations. The “Two‐Period Order Flow Model” of the heterogeneous market ensures the
lower frequency of price reversals. Following this logic, professional traders and option
strategists can use foreign‐listing as a stock screening tool for their trading strategies, which
could largely increase the profitability of momentum and volatility strategies.
This research is organized as follows. Section Two reviews the literature, Section Three
introduces the Two‐Period Order Flow Model and the new Heterogeneous Market Hypothesis
which help to explain the linkage between momentum/volume and investor heterogeneity,
Section Four states the research question and hypothesis, Section Five describes the data and
methodology, Section Six discusses the empirical results and Section Seven concludes the study.
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2. Literature Review
2.1 Investor Homogeneity and Heterogeneity
2.1.1 Definition, Sources and Importance
The homogeneous expectation is an assumption made by Markowitz (1952) in his Modern
Portfolio Theory. It argues that all investors have the same expectations and make the same
choices given a particular set of circumstances. The most important milestone theories in
finance‐‐‐‐Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and Black‐Sholes option valuation model, as well
as many other equilibrium models, assume a certain degree of investor homogeneity (Levy and
Levy, 1996). Despite these differences and despite strong and persuasive arguments put
forward for including heterogeneity in finance and economics, the homogeneous representative
agent paradigm is still the leading structural approach to asset pricing. Without the assumption
of investor homogeneity, most financial theories collapse.
People often share common information yet disagree as to the meaning of this information, not
only in the evaluation of risky assets but also in the evaluation of economic policies, political
candidates, etc. The divergence of opinion is often defined as a type of investor heterogeneity in
financial economics, in which, investors’ valuation of a signal asset diverge from each other
because they hold different prior beliefs, or have different information process models (Wang
and Liu, 2014). Investor heterogeneity can come from tax preference, risk tolerance, liquidity
requirement, and private information (Wang and Liu, 2014), financial constraints, and non‐
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traded income (Wang, 1994). Limit of attention is another source of heterogeneity (Hong and
Stein, 2007). However, in the absence of a unifying theoretical framework and testable data, it is
difficult to distinguish the original sources of the divergence of opinion (Wang and Liu, 2014).
Ever since Keynes (1937) and Williams (1956), economists have recognized the differences in
investors’ preferences and proposed the marginal‐investor theory which emphasizes the
importance of divergence of opinion in the functioning of capital markets. Mayshar (1983)
points out that the divergence of opinion not only exists but is essential in determining asset
prices. It is essential because of its association with endogenous limitations on the number of
active market participants. The traditional models fail to recognize the fact that investors choose
not only the size of their holdings in each asset but also in which asset to invest. However, the
models do agree that when short sale constraints are present, an asset pricing model with
divergent opinions may differ from a model without divergent opinions.
In practice, professional traders never consider any market to be efficient, they view their
trading behavior as a speculation, rather than a value investment. One market can only exist, if
it was comprised of investors with different opinions, these different opinions are represented
by the buying and selling orders listed on limit order book. Because the instantaneous price of a
particular asset is the last transacted price, without different opinions, there will be no
transaction existing, and no deal would be made.
Investor heterogeneity is of particular importance, as it has a direct linkage with the behavior of
price and trading volume in a market. Scholars will be able to construct capital asset pricing
models according to heterogeneous investors. Traders will be able to adjust their trading
strategies when they find investor heterogeneity changes; policies regulators will be able to
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understand the market better if they know more about the differential understanding of
individual investors, and enact trading rules to protect public trading.
Although determining the sources or determinants of investor heterogeneity can be of great
help in asset modelling, it is particularly difficult because the individual’s original expectation is
not observable. This study aims to measure the level of investor heterogeneity from a novel
paradigm.
2.1.2 Classification of Asset Pricing Models with Investor Heterogeneity
Recognizing the importance of investor homogeneity/heterogeneity, scholars gradually release
this assumption to get more realistic models. There have been many models integrating investor
heterogeneity, Wang and Liu (2014) classify them into three categories:
1). Investors simply hold different beliefs. This includes Miller (1977), Jarrow (1980) and
Mayshar (1983), Harrison and Kreps (1978) and Van den Steen (2004),
2). Investors generate heterogeneous beliefs on the same public information due to their
different prior beliefs; Including Kandel and Pearson (1995), Kim and Verrecchia (1991) and
Grundy and McNichols (1989)
3). Investors have different opinions about the same information because they interpret the
information differently. Including Harris and Raviv (1993) and Anderson, Ghysels and Juergens
(2005).
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Wang and Liu (2014) concluded that the predictions from asset pricing models with investor
heterogeneity fit the pattern of trading volume, price changes, and return volatility better than
homogeneous beliefs. This is consistent with Hong and Stein (2007) and Fama and French (2007),
which emphasized the importance of the divergence of opinion in improving the traditional
asset pricing models built on the assumption of investor homogeneity.
2.1.3 Current Challenges in the Studies of Investor Heterogeneity
Recognizing the importance of investor heterogeneity led scholars to develop asset models
incorporating the assumption of investor heterogeneity (Miller, 1977; Harrison and Kreps, 1978;
Jarrow, 1980; Mayshar, 1983; Hong and Stein, 2007; Fama and French, 2007). However, these
strands of research face the following challenges:
1). It is difficult to derive testable predictions (Anderson et al., 2005; Wang and Liu, 2014).
2). Lack of tangible data to reflect heterogeneity (Anderson et al., 2005; Fama and French, 2007;
Wang and Liu, 2014).
3). Existing tractable formulations of heterogeneous agent models are observationally
equivalent to representative agent models. (Anderson et al., 2005; Wang and Liu, 2014).
The first two challenges mainly come from the difficulty of measuring investor heterogeneity.
Investor heterogeneity, like liquidity, is hard to describe and even harder to quantify. Scholars
have designed a variety of indicators to measure investor heterogeneity. Some examples are the
liquidity based measures, market depth based measures, measures based on institutional
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investors’ fundamental data, volume‐based measures, and dispersions of analysts’ forecasts20
(Lerman, Livnat and Mendenhall,2007; Alexandridis, Antoniou and Petmezas, 2007). Each
measure has its own merits and drawbacks and some drawbacks are critical. The fact that there
is no single widely accepted measure suggests that the current verification of heterogeneity
requires tangible data. On the other hand, sources of investor heterogeneity are mixed, further
adding measuring difficulties. In the absence of a unifying theoretical framework and testable
data, it is difficult to distinguish the original sources of the divergence of opinion (Wang and Liu,
2014).
2.1.4 Measures of Investor Heterogeneity
Although investor heterogeneity is of critical importance in the literature finance, there are no
consensus on how to measure it. A direct measure of investors’ beliefs is usually un‐observable
and the estimates are often difficult to get (Wang and Liu, 2014). Researchers in finance,
accounting, and economics have to rely on certain observable proxies. Traditional measures of
investor heterogeneity are all proxies. They include unexplained volume, dispersions of analysts’
forecasts, and bid‐ask spreads which is also a liquidity measure. Recently, new measures such as
institutional investors’ holding period, experience and capital percentage are used. These
measures have both advantages and disadvantages. This section gives a comprehensive review
of the measures of investor heterogeneity, each with merits and drawbacks.
20 Although the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts is widely used, but it still has critically important
weaknesses. See Section II.
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A. Analysts’ Forecasts Dispersion
The dispersion among analyst earnings forecasts can be viewed as a natural experiment of the
test on investor heterogeneity (Wang and Liu, 2014), it is calculated as the standard deviation of
analysts’ forecasted Earnings per Share (EPS). The theoretical support of analysts’ forecasts
being used as a proxy of investor heterogeneity is that, analysts express their unbiased opinion
in their earnings reports. Investors follow analysts’ unbiased forecasts, hence the dispersions of
analysts’ forecasts could be translated into levels of investor heterogeneity. Many studies adopt
this measure (Brown, Foster, and Noreen, 1985; McNichols and O’Brien, 1997; Lin and
McNichols, 1998; Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan, 2000; Lerman, Livnat and Mendenhall, 2007;
Alexandridis, Antoniou and Petmezas, 2007). Empirical evidence supports using analysts’
forecasts dispersion as a proxy for investor heterogeneity. Ajinkya, Atiase and Gift (1991) test
the link between the dispersion in financial analysts’ earnings forecasts and the abnormal
trading volume as a proxy of divergence of opinion. They show that the dispersion in analysts’
earnings forecasts is positively related to the abnormal trading volume following the annual
earnings announcements and is a proper proxy for agents’ differing beliefs about the firm’s
prospects, which is consistent with Varian (1985) and Karpoff (1986).
Analysts’ forecasts dispersion has two advantages: easy to understand and data is accessible.
Also, there are several drawbacks. First, the data which analysts use are probably biased. Second,
the forecast distributions may be truncated. Abarbanell, Lanen and Verrecchia (1995) show that
dispersions of analysts’ forecasts are insufficient to proxy investor uncertainty, the number of
forecasts and the periods could also affect the forecast dispersion. Third, favorableness of the
coverage is a potential problem (Garfinkel, 2009). Forth, this measurement cannot distinguish
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between the sources of investor heterogeneity, that is whether investor heterogeneity is caused
by investors’ prior belief or by the information processing model they use (Wang and Liu, 2014).
Bamber et al. (2011) argue that analysts’ forecasts are not the same as assessing the firm’s value.
A change in accounting methods may affect analysts’ forecasts of upcoming earnings without
changing investors’ expectations about the underlying value of the firm. Conversely, news that
the firm has signed a lucrative long‐term contract effective next period may affect investors’
expectations about firm value without changing analysts’ forecasts of this period’s earnings. In
addition, analysts are not representative of the full population of investors; analysts’ forecasts
likely reflect the expectations of sophisticated investors who have better information or better
information processing capability than the average investor.
B. Liquidity Measures
Liquidity measures21 the ease of trading a security. Bid‐ask spread is widely accepted as the
most popular liquidity measure, the smaller the spread is, the higher level of liquidity and more
easy to long or short the security. In the literature of market microstructure, the rationale of
liquidity that can be used as a heterogeneity measure is that it directly reflects the differential
beliefs of investors. In a trading environment of higher level of heterogeneity, traders with
different views are constantly submitting buying and selling orders to the limit order book,
21 Liquidity measures include bid‐ask spread, effective spread, absolute spread and Amihud (2002)’s
measure. Prior literature documents that a quote‐driven market system exists bid‐ask spread, it is
partially due to the adverse selection, inventory and labor costs of market makers. But this view is
eliminated as the prevalence of order‐driven system (George, Kaul, and Nimalendran, 1991).
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according to the time‐priority and price‐priority rule, this higher level of heterogeneity will
produce smaller bid‐ask spread. In addition, bid‐ask spread is a cost of information asymmetry
(Bagehot,1971), and investor heterogeneity is caused primarily by information asymmetry22.
Houge et al. (2001) use the opening bid‐ask spread as a proxy of divergence of opinion of
investors to test Miller (1977)’s hypothesis on IPOs. The authors argue that the bid‐ask spread
can be decomposed into three components, the order processing, adverse selection, and
inventory costs. Among them, the adverse selection component reflects the dispersion between
investors’ opinions. The same methodology has also been adopted by Handa, Schwartz and
Tiwari (2003).
The drawback of using spread liquidity measures as investor heterogeneity is that it only
captures the top most layer of the ordered book, neglecting the limit orders below the first layer
and the market orders. When investors submit orders into the limit order book, only limit orders
are displayed, and market orders will be executed as soon as they arrived, and then disappear.
The spreads created by market orders are not taken into account in spread liquidity measures.
In addition, the thickness of the limit order book (other limit orders) reflects different prices
levels traders want to trade, and hence their differential opinions, this is not captured in spread
measures. Bid ask spread creates attenuation bias (Garfinkel, 2009; Wang and Liu, 2014).
22 Many studies attribute investor heterogeneity to investors’ prior beliefs and information processing
models they used when new information arrives.
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C. Institutional Investor’s Four‐Dimensional Measure
A novel measure developed by Knyazeva et al. (2015)23, which uses a four‐dimensional variable
to measure investor heterogeneity: investor size, investor experience, institutional investor
holding length and local experience. This measure in heterogeneity is in the precision (accuracy)
of investor information rather than differences in specific beliefs about the firm’s earning
numbers. It captures the characteristics of institutional investors associated with the capacity to
process and acquire information in general as well as the precision of investor information
about a specific firm.
The main problem of this four dimensional measure is data availability and its coverage. Foreign
institutional investors’ hold data is not available for every firm. In addition, retail investors’
characteristics are not covered.
D. The Market Depth Measure
Garfinkel (2009) proposes a direct measure of investor based on submitted market and limit
orders. Its theoretical foundation is that buyers and sellers submit orders to the limit order book,
the prices they want to buy and sell directly reflect their view on the stock. This view is
consistent with Handa, Schwarz, and Tiwari (2003) and Hollifield et al. (2006).
Traders have the capability to submit either market or limit orders. These choices are based on
their desire to obtain the best possible price in the transaction and how this trades off against
non‐execution risk. They also face adverse selection risk from trading against informed traders.
23 Knyazeva et al. (2015). Data are from Thomson Financial Database. Knyazeva et al. (2015) has another
important implication that investor heterogeneity contributes to a larger price reaction around the
announcements for both positive and negative earnings.
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Optimal order submission strategy and the optimal price requested is directly related to
investors’ reservation prices. Hollifield et al. (2006) have a similar view that using order data to












where, OrderPrice is the price of the newly arrived market or limit order, PriorTradePrice is the
price of the last transacted price, %Distance is called opinion divergence percentage, DIVOP is
then the standard deviation across all orders on the day.
%Distance directly measures the differential investor’s opinion difference at an instant moment,
and DIVOP integrates %Distance to a whole day. There are several problems with this measure.
1). OrderPrice includes all of the prices of newly arrived order, however, not of all of these
orders could contribute to the thickness (depth) of the limit order book. Investors could
withdraw the newly arrived orders which haven’t been executed. These withdrawn orders could
be due to various reasons, which also represent the divergent opinions. 2). some of the orders
are immediate or cancel (IOC) orders, these orders are considered as market orders which finds
counter parties which have the same price requests, if not filled, they are automatically
canceled. Especially in the era of high‐frequency trading, credit traders frequently use these IOC
orders as liquidity consumers to earn credit rebate24. 3). this measure could be affected by the
extreme value bias. 4). Using average value of %Distance should be a better choice than
24 For example, order channel is selected as BYXONLY plus IOC type. Traders earn a credit rebate of
$0.0002/share. See BYX fee schedule.
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standard deviation. 5). Data availability is still the biggest problem, it requires expensive high‐
frequency data.
E. Abnormal/Unexplained Volume Based Proxies
Using volume to interpret investor heterogeneity based on the theory that trading volume
reflects differential beliefs and hence heterogeneity.
Harrison and Kreps (1978) suggest that abnormal trading volume around corporate public
announcements could be explained by the divergence of opinion among traders. Kandel and
Pearson (1995) predict that volume will be increasing in the diversity of investor opinions
around earnings events. The seminal study, Kim and Verrecchia (1991) show that greater
diversity of opinions caused by the differential processing of the information, leads to an
increase in trading volume. Other empirical studies, including Bamber (1987), De Long et al.
(1990), Ajinkya, Atiase and Gift (1991), and Ajinkya et al. (2004), all confirm the view that
abnormal trading volume is associated with higher divergent opinion. Direct evidence is also
recorded in the experimental literature, Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988) show that even
when traders observe identical probabilistic dividend distributions, then trade occurs,
sometimes in large volume. They conclude that there is diversity in opinions.
One version of the benchmark is based on a trading volume market model analogous to that
used in event studies on returns, as noted by Tkac (1999):
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𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 𝛼𝑖 𝛽𝑖𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑚,𝑡 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
Where 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡
𝑆ℎ𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑚,𝑡
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑚,𝑡
𝑆ℎ𝑟𝑠𝑚,𝑡
𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the residual of the regression, called abnormal trading volume, which is trading volume
generated but is not explained by the market volume. Garfinkel (2009) concludes that this
unexpected volume “is the best proxy for opinion divergence. The residual component captures
investor heterogeneity, it also rules out of the effect of liquidity commonality25 and all other
market factors, the information captured remain in the residual 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 represents pure investors’
divergent opinion.







𝑚 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡∑ and 𝑆ℎ𝑟𝑠𝑚,𝑡 1
𝑚 𝑆ℎ𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡∑
Sufficient literature has documented that trading volume is proportional to the absolute price
returns. (Bamber, 1997; Harrison and Kreps, 1978; Varian, 1985, 1989; Kandel and Pearson,
1995). The third volume‐based measure which Garfinkel (2009) develops, is the Standardized
25 Garfinkel (2009) also points out that this measure has the drawback that it cannot capture the un‐
transacted orders, which is an attenuated sample of investor heterogeneity.
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Unexplained Stock Trading Volume (SUV) model. He argues that it measures unexpected trading
volume and isolates from the effect of both liquidity and information26.
Standardized Unexplained Stock Trading Volume (SUV)




The residual of the regression 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 represents all of the factors which are not explained by
absolute price returns.
Overall, these measures are prevailing in the studies of investor heterogeneity, each has merits
and drawbacks. The measure I choose is based on SUV with modifications. These modifications
come from both theoretical and empirical evidence, which will be elaborated in Section III.
2.1.5 Investor Types and Overconfidence
In order to address the third challenge of heterogeneous asset pricing models, scholars begin
with classifying investors into various types and try to find out their trading incentive and
strategies. It is difficult to extract the trading behavior of diverse types of investors from
historical transaction data. As noted by Bamber et al. (2011), academics still has very limited
understanding on different classes of traders and their incentive to trade. Although these
classifications are not mature, one common finding of the studies on investor types is that, large
26 See Section III methodology for a discussion.
35
price movement and excessive trading volume are ascribed to investors’ overconfident behavior
(Odean, 1998).
Benos (1998) models investor behavior with rationally and irrationally informed traders, he
shows that higher volume, larger depth and more volatile and informative price are generated
by the overconfident irrational traders. Benos argues that some informed traders, who are
overconfident about their estimates of unknown variables, think that they are smarter than
average and compete with rational informed traders. Although these overconfident informed
traders are considered irrational, they can make higher individual profits than their rational
colleagues and survive in the markets. The reason behind this finding is that irrational traders
act aggressively, they enjoy a “first‐mover advantage”.
Hong and Stein (1999) classify traders into news‐watchers and momentum followers. News‐
watchers trade based on their analysis on firms’ fundamentals, while momentum followers only
care about the price patterns, they watch the price reactions and aggressively join if they found
momentum exists. Hong and Stein also conclude that large price turbulence is induced by the
overconfidence of momentum traders. Odean (1998) argues that overconfidence is prevailing in
the market, price‐taking traders, strategic‐trading insiders and risk‐averse market makers could
be all overconfident. Overconfidence increases expected trading volume, increases market
























Figure 1: Different Investor Types
Luo et al. (2018) argue that momentum arises because late informed investor provide too much
liquidity to early informed traders. Both momentum and reversals emanate from
overconfidence. Chui et al. (2010) classify investors into individualistic and collectivistic, and
point out that momentum is not explained by risk models, but explained by individualistic
investors’ overconfidence. DHS (1998) show that momentum can be generated by investors’
overconfidence and self‐attribution bias, excessive trading volume is also generated by
overconfidence.
Gervais and Odean (2001) argue that traders are “learning to be overconfident” from the
beginning of their trading careers, and greater confidence leads to greater trading volume.
Traders take too much credit from their prior successes, and less for their failures. This leads to
overconfidence. When a trader is successful, he ascribes too much of his success to this own
ability and revises his beliefs about this ability upward too much. With more experience, people
develop better self‐assessments.
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Although overconfidence is of critical importance in the literature of Finance, its measurement
has rarely been documented in the literature of Psychology (Olsson, 2014)27, as it needs an
individual’s original expectation which is a non‐observable variable. Recently, finance scholars
started to address this issue by using individualism or collectivism from one dimension of
culture28, which starts a new research direction in classifying investors.
2.1.6 Finance Meets Culture
What is natural culture? Hofstede defines it as “A collective programming of the human mind
that distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another” (Hofstede,
1980). In his pioneer work, Hofstede defines three levels of human mental programming: 1).
Universal, which is the least unique, it is the one shared by all humans, biological and inherited
genetically. 2). Collective, which is common to people belonging to a certain group or category,
different from people belonging to other groups or categories. It is learned, not inherited. 3).
Individual, which is the truly unique part, a level of individual personality providing for a range of
alternative behavior within the same collective, and likely both learned and inherited. Research
in business management have been using this classification widely in relative areas, and this
framework has had an enormous impact on research in various business disciplines, like
27 In the literature of psychology, overestimation, overplacement, and the calibration of subjective
probabilities are all considered as different forms of overconfidence (Olsson, 2014). There are only two
studies document that more than two measures of overconfidence, see Moore and Healy (2008) and
Larrick et al. (2007).
28 Hofstede (2001) classifies cultures into five dimensions: individualism, masculinity, power distance,
uncertainty avoidance, and long‐term orientation. Among these five cultural dimensions, individualism is
the most closely related to overconfidence and self‐attribution bias. This index is regarded as the most
comprehensive in terms of both the range of countries and the number of respondents involved
(Kagitcibasi, 1997).
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organizational behavior, strategy, and human resources management (Karolyi, 2016). Only
recently, researchers have been putting attention on cultural impacts on finance.
The earliest, as well as the most impactful study used culture to analyze financial behavior is
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001). They document that investors are more likely to hold, buy, and
sell the stocks of Finnish firms that are geographically proximate to the investors, that
communicate in the investor's native tongue, and that have chief executive officers (CEOs) of
the same cultural background. One of the intriguing findings in the study is that the influence of
distance, language and culture is less prominent among the more sophisticated financial
institutions with available data in the Finnish Central Securities Depository than among less‐
sophisticated households and government/non‐profit firms.
Gelfand, Nishii, and Raver (2006) argue that individual behavior tends to be more homogenous
and exhibit a lower degree of variation in culturally tight countries. This convergence in investor
behavior will cause positive correlations in investors’ stock selections and buy/sell decisions, and
higher return co‐movement in culturally tight countries are expected. Similarly, Literature from
behavioral finance shows that behavioral biases can affect stock commonality 29(Hirshleifer,
2001; Shiller, 2003; Barberis, Shleifer, and Wurgler, 2005). Cultural dimensions introduce
systematic biases into investor behavior and hence affect stock price movement.
In Hostede’s culture measure, individualism and collectivism are the most closely related with
finance. Individualism reflects the degree to which people focus on their own internal attributes
to differentiate themselves from others. People are more likely to believe that they are above
29 Stock commonality, synchronicity and comovement are used interchangeably in this study, all refer to
the phenomenon that stock prices move together.
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average in individualistic countries than that is in collectivistic countries (Markus and Kitayama,
1991; Heine et al., 1999). Individualistic people (such as US) think positively about themselves
and focus on their own internal attributes (Markus and Kitayama, 1991), they believe that they
have better ability than average and tend to overestimate their abilities(Heine et al., 1999).
Individualistic investors are more likely to use their own methods to collect, process or analyze,
and use their own information for trading, this behavior incorporates more firm‐specific factors
into stock prices, and trades made by individualistic investors have low trading correlations. As
investors from individualistic countries tend to be more over‐confident (Hofstede, 2001), this
over‐confidence results in more trading volume generated (Nofsinger, 2012) and price
momentum (Chui et al, 2010). Also, individualistic investors are less concerned about their
trading behavior based on opinions that differ from the norm (Eun et al., 2015), hence, less
herding effect or liquidity commonality are expected in individualistic countries compared with
that in collectivistic countries(Beckmann, Menkhoff and Suto, 2008).
In contrast, people in collectivistic cultures (such as Japan) do not have the belief that they are
better than average, they view themselves “not as separate from the social context but as more
connected and less differentiated from others” (Markus and Kitayama (1991). Collectivistic
people are willing to see that they are accepted by others. When investing, collectivistic people
tend to rely on consensus rather than their own analyzing ability or their own channel to get
information.
Individualistic investors are inclined to view and analyze stocks from their own points of view,
detach objects from the system and focus on the object’s individual attributes. On the other
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hand, investors from collectivistic cultures have holistic thinking styles, leading them to view
stocks jointly (Eun et al., 2015). Individualistic cultures promote, whereas collectivistic ones
suppress skepticism (Luo, 1998). All else equal, when clienteles for equities in collectivistic
cultures shift to foreign ownership by individualistic cultures, momentum should increase.
Chui et al. (2010) argue that greater individualism is positively associated with higher trading
volume, stock index return ability and the magnitude of momentum strategy return. One
important conclusion from Chui et al. (2010) is that, they found investors from individual culture
tend to be more overconfident than from collective culture, and these investors tend to
overestimate the precision of their information, and hence more trading is made. Large trading
volume is associated with large price movement. This conclusion is consistent with Odeon (1998)
that overtrading leads to excess volatility. Eun et al. (2015) take their cue from the Chui et al.
study on Hofstede's individualism measure, but for a different market‐wide outcome measure,
namely, stock price synchronicity. The commonality, or average correlatedness, among
individual stock returns is negatively related to individualism. They found that stock prices move
more (less) in culturally tight (loose) and collectivistic (individualistic) countries. They also
suggested that culture is an important omitted variable in the literature that investigates cross‐
country differences in stock price co‐movements. In their study, two cultural dimensions are
considered, namely tightness/looseness, which is considered external constraints on individual
behavior and individualism/collectivism, which focus on internal attributes that guide an
individual to differentiate his or her decision from others. The literature suggests that
individualistic investors are likely to be more confident in their ability to acquire and analyze
information and less concerned about having different opinions from others (Markus and
Kitayama, 1991; Heine, Lehman, Markus, and Kitayama, 1999; Chui, Titman, and Wei, 2010).
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Therefore, one would expect to observe less herding behavior and more firm‐specific
information being incorporated in stock prices, which would be likely to lead to lower stock
price co‐movements in individualistic countries. The influence of culture on stock price co‐
movement is economically significant and robust.
Using the individualism index as a proxy for overconfidence is an effective option, as it is an
observable and measurable variable, it also avoids the difficulties in classifying investors. The
Individualism index has been used as an instrumental variable for classifying firms and investors
in recent studies (Chui et al, 2010; Verardo, 2009; Luo et al, 2018).
2.1.7 Two Direct Manifestations: Price Momentum and Trading Volume
Although investor homogeneity is a critically important assumption in classical finance theories,
there is a large gap between the investor homogeneity assumption and the market reality. This
poses a serious challenge to establish theoretical frameworks such as Capital Asset Pricing
Model. Many anomalies regularly occur in markets, but one of them attracts the most attention
and is a source of controversy: “the Momentum Effect” (Fama and French, 2007). The
Momentum Effect refers to the fact that, stocks with high returns over the last year tend to
continue to have high returns in the following few months; similarly, low short‐term past
returns also tend to persist (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993). The momentum trading strategies
are widely used by traders. Scholars ascribe this anomaly to “differential beliefs” or “investor
heterogeneity” (Chui et al., 2010; Verardo, 2009; Hong and Stein, 2007; Fama and French, 2009).
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Chui et al. (2010) show that there are significant cross‐country differences in momentum profits
that persist across time. The cross‐country differences are instigated by various characteristics
of investors such as their cultural orientation. Zhang (2006) documents that US stocks with
information uncertainty, measured by more dispersed analyst earnings forecasts, exhibit
stronger momentum and he attributes this to higher individualism of US investors. It is widely
accepted that dispersed analyst forecasts are used as a proxy for investor heterogeneity. Huynh
and Smith (2013) find momentum exists in US, Europe Asia and Japan, and their explanation of
the momentum effect is centered on under‐reaction to news. This conclusion is consistent with
Hong and Stein’s (1999) “Gradual Information Diffusion Model” which provides a rationale for
differential beliefs. Fama and French (2012) also point out the pervasive nature of the
momentum effect in North America, Europe and Asia‐Pacific excluding Japan. Although Fama
and French do not provide an explanation why the Japanese stocks do not exhibit momentum
effect, a related study by Chui et al. (2010) provide a convincing explanation. Chui et al. (2010)
attribute the insignificance of momentum effect in Japanese stocks to the collectivistic nature of
the Japanese culture. Using analysts’ forecast dispersion as a heterogeneity proxy, Verardo
(2009) shows that momentum profits are significantly larger for portfolios characterized by
higher heterogeneity of beliefs. On the other hand, considering the momentum effect from the
market microstructure perspective, the order flows supplied by heterogeneous investors are in
favor of forming and maintaining a price trend. In sum, momentum which is an observable
phenomenon of investor heterogeneity, has established an effective bridge for studying the
heterogeneity of investors as higher level of heterogeneity results in higher momentum.
Another manifestation of investor heterogeneity is trading volume. The generated trading
volume reflects traders’ agreement with the current value for exchange, but at the same time, it
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also reflects their disagreement on the future value of the asset. Hence, trading volume exhibits
an already‐formed disagreement, but as Garfinkel(2009) argues trading volume does not
capture the full extent of disagreement. The seminal study, Kim and Verrecchia (1991) show
that greater diversity of opinions caused by the differential processing of the information, leads
to an increase in trading volume. Harrison and Kreps (1978) suggest that abnormal trading
volume around corporate public announcements could be explained by the divergence of
opinion among traders. Kandel and Pearson (1995) predict that volume will be increasing in the
diversity of investor opinions around earnings events. Other empirical studies, including Bamber
(1987), De Long et al. (1990), Ajinkya, Atiase and Gift (1991), and Ajinkya et al. (2004), all
confirm the view that abnormal trading volume is positively associated with higher divergent
opinion. Trading volume reflects differential beliefs, and it is the most direct and observable
evidence of investor heterogeneity (Bamber et al., 2011; Bamber et al., 1999).
From the point of view of order flow, investors with strong heterogeneity provide sufficient
buying and selling orders at different price levels on the limit order book (LOB). These non‐
marketable limit orders offer sufficient liquidity, which allows traders to easily find the counter
parties of the transactions, this process leads to the change of prices and the generation of
volume. Sufficient liquidity is manifested by continuous price levels with small spreads. On
average, the smaller the spreads are, the easier the formation of transactions. In contrast, the
order flow provided by the investors with poor heterogeneity often causes price fractures on
the LOB, which makes it harder for trades to match. Under the extreme circumstances of
investor homogeneity, the orders are stacking merely on a single side of the LOB, resulting in
that new traders could not find the counter parties for their transactions, this LOB state
corresponds to Milgrom and Stokey (1982)’s Pareto Optimal of the asset, which is the famous
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“No Trade Theorem”. Poor investor heterogeneity hinders the formation of transactions, and
thus hinders price changes and the generation of trading volume. This is the reason why
investor heterogeneity is positively related with momentum and trading volume.
2.1.8 Summary
This section reviews the literature of investor heterogeneity. This assumption violates the
homogeneity assumption of classical finance theories, it is of critical importance for building
new asset pricing models. Due to its complexity, academics has not reached an agreement on its
measurement, this section provides a comprehensive review of current measures. In finding out
different types of investors, this section also reviews current investor classifications, one
interesting finding is that no matter what classification method scholars use, they attribute
momentum and trading volume to the overconfident behavior of investors. Traders appear a
process of “learning to be overconfident” through their lives. This section also surveys the
literature on culture’s influence on finance, mainly on individualism and collectivism. Investors
from individualistic cultures tend to be more confident than who from collectivistic cultures.
Finding out the determinants of investor heterogeneity is not the objective of this study, but
through culture dispositions, investor heterogeneity can be further differentiated by investor
composition, this differentiation is manifested by momentum and volume.
2.2Momentum
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2.2.1 Definition and Evidence
Many anomalies in finance regularly occur in markets, but one of them attracts the most
attention and is a source of controversy: “the Momentum Effect”30 (Fama and French, 2007).
The Momentum Effect refers to the fact that, stocks with high returns over the last year tend to
continue to have high returns in the following few months; Low short‐term past returns also
tend to persist (Jegadeesh and Titman (JT), 1993). The momentum effect refers to the relation
between an asset’s return and its recent relative performance history (Asness et al., 2013).
Momentum exists not only in equity markets, it was found consistently and ubiquitously across
all the markets, i.e., the bond, commodities and currency markets. Momentum exists
everywhere (Asness et al., 2013).
Large volume of studies documents the existence of price momentum. JT (1993) use daily return
data of the US market from 1965 to 1989, through the winner and loser portfolio methodology,
they find momentum exists and point out the research direction for the following studies.
Grinblatt, Timan and Wermers (1995) analyze the data from 155 mutual fund companies from
1975 to 1984, without considering the transaction costs, they find that more than 75% of these
companies used momentum strategies, and their quarterly investment profit was significant.
Their research demonstrates that momentum strategies could produce significant profit.
Rouwenhorst (1998) examines 12 countries in Europe, he finds that momentum exists in all
30 Fama and French (2007) point out that there are two anomalies which attract the most attention and
controversy, they are the Value Effect and the Momentum Effect. The Value Effect refers to the fact that,
stocks with low prices relative to fundamentals like cash flow or book value have higher average returns
than predicted by the CAPM (Statman, 1980, Rosenberg, Reid, and Lanstein, 1985, Fama and French,
1992). In this study, only the Momentum Effect is related with investor heterogeneity.
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developed countries, but the zero‐cost portfolio31 has very limit profitability. The profitability of
momentum strategies is found in equity markets throughout the world (Rouwenhorst, 1998;
Griffin, Ji, and Martin, 2003), however, Asian countries are exceptions (Chui, Titman, and Wei,
2003).
Lee and Swaminathan (2000) propose a “Momentum Life Cycle” (MLC) model. Under their
framework, trading volume provides information useful in locating a given stock in its
momentum/expectation life cycle. Generally, when a stock falls into disfavor, and its trading
volume declines. Conversely, when a stock is popular, and its trading volume increases. The MLC
would characterize high volume winners and low volume losers as late stage momentum stocks,
in the sense that their price momentum is more likely to reverse in the near future. Conversely,
low volume winners and high volume losers are early stage momentum stocks, in the sense that
their momentum is more likely to persist in the near future.
2.2.2 Causes of Momentum
A.The Traditional Explanations
After JT (1993)’s seminal study, the momentum profit has been accepted widely, but its causes
remain debated. Early explanations ascribe the momentum effect to risk models, i.e. Wang
31 Zero‐cost portfolio refers to a portfolio does not need any initial investment. i.e., buying and selling a
stock at the same time.
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(2000), and some scholars attribute it to data mining. Conrad and Kaul (1998) and Lo and
MacKinlay (1990) are representatives. They argue that the profitability of momentum strategies
could be entirely due to cross‐sectional variations in mean returns rather than to any
predictable time‐series variations in stock returns. Conrad and Kaul argue that there are no
discernable time‐series variation in returns and that momentum returns arise because of cross‐
sectional variation in returns. This argument implies that the post‐holding period returns of the
momentum portfolio should be significantly positive. Momentum profits arise because of cross‐
sectional differences in expected returns rather than time‐series predictability.
B. Investor Heterogeneity and Momentum
Recently, more scholars find momentum can be explained by investors’ “differential beliefs” or
“investor heterogeneity” (Chui et al., 2010; Verardo, 2009; Hong and Stein, 2007; Fama and
French, 2009), related literature links investor heterogeneity with the information environment
market (Allen, Morris and Shin, 2006; Banerjee, Kaniel, and Kremer, 2009; Makarov and
Rytchkov, 2009), and argues that information is the main reason leads to investor heterogeneity.
Chui et al. (2010) show that there are significant cross‐country differences in momentum profits
that persist across time. The cross‐country differences are instigated by various characteristics
of investors such as their cultural orientation. Zhang (2006) documents that US stocks with
information uncertainty, measured by more dispersed analyst earnings forecasts, exhibit
stronger momentum and he attributes this to the higher individualism of US investors. It is
widely accepted that dispersed analyst forecasts are used as a proxy for investor heterogeneity.
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Huynh and Smith (2013) find momentum exists in US, Europe Asia and Japan, and their
explanation of the momentum effect is centered on under‐reaction to news. This conclusion is
consistent with Hong and Stein’s (1999) “Gradual Information Diffusion Model” which provides
a rationale for differential beliefs. Fama and French (2012) also point out the pervasive nature of
momentum effect in North America, Europe and Asia‐Pacific excluding Japan. Although Fama
and French do not provide an explanation why the Japanese stocks do not exhibit momentum
effect, a related study by Chui et al. (2010) provide a convincing explanation. Chui et al. (2010)
attribute the insignificance of momentum effect in Japanese stocks to the collectivistic nature of
the Japanese culture. Using analysts’ forecast dispersion as a heterogeneity proxy, Verardo
(2009) shows that momentum profits are significantly larger for portfolios characterized by
higher heterogeneity of beliefs. On the other hand, considering the momentum effect from the
market microstructure perspective, the order flows supplied by heterogeneous investors are in
favor of forming and maintaining a price trend. In sum, momentum which is an observable
phenomenon of investor heterogeneity, has established an effective bridge for studying the
heterogeneity of investors as higher level of heterogeneity results in higher momentum.
Verardo (2009) provides the empirical link between investor heterogeneity and momentum
strategy profits and shows that momentum characterized portfolios have significantly larger
returns for heterogeneity beliefs. This conclusion is consistent with Allen, Morris, and Shin
(2006), which document that higher‐order beliefs lead to price drift (Momentum). In addition,
Banerjee, Kaniel, and Kremer (2009) show theoretically that differences of opinion, together
with uncertainty about other agents' opinions, generate price drift in a dynamic setting.
Makarov and Rytchkov (2009) present a rational model of heterogeneously informed agents,
and show that this model could generate momentum.
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Some of the momentum studies are showing contradicted conclusions. Hong et al. (2000) show
that stocks with lower analyst coverage tend to exhibit more momentum, lower analyst
coverage could represent lower investor heterogeneity. However, in their earlier and later
studies, Hong and Stein (1999) imply that investor heterogeneity is positively related to
momentum, and Hong and Stein (2007) characterize an economy where investors receive
different information signals and erroneously believe that their signals are sufficient to forecast
the asset liquidation value. The authors show that higher heterogeneity among investors implies
stronger momentum. Although these studies got mixed or even contradictory results, viewing
momentum from the microstructural logic, they are consistent. I will explain why most studies
document the positive relation between investor heterogeneity and some of them document
negative detail in Section III.
C. The Microstructural Explanation
From the point of view of order flow, investors with strong heterogeneity provide sufficient
buying and selling orders at different price levels on the limit order book (LOB). These non‐
marketable limit orders offer sufficient liquidity, which allows traders to easily find the counter
parties of the transactions, this process leads to the change of price and the generation of
volume. Sufficient liquidity is manifested by continuous price levels with small spreads. On
average, the smaller the spreads are, the easier the formation of transactions. In contrast, the
order flow provided by the investors with poor heterogeneity often causes price fractures on
the LOB, which makes it harder for trades to match. Under the extreme circumstance of investor
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homogeneity, the orders are stacking merely on a single side of the LOB, resulting that new
traders could not find the counter parties for their transactions, this LOB state corresponds to
Milgrom and Stokey (1982)’s Pareto Optimal of the asset, which is the famous “No Trade
Theorem”. Poor investor heterogeneity hinders the formation of transactions, and thus hinders
price changes and the generation of trading volume. This is the reason why investor
heterogeneity is positively related to momentum and trading volume.
In section III, I proposed a two‐period order flow model, which explains how orders are flowing
as information arrives at the market. It explains how information induced trading generates
momentum and trading volume.
2.2.3 MomentumMeasurement
Starting from JT (1993), momentum is measured by the Winner and Loser Portfolio Method, this
method has the most important and enduring influence.
According to the definition of price momentum, stocks’ past returns predict future returns,
stocks with positive (negative) returns tend to have positive (negative) returns in the following
time period (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993). Barberis and Shleifer (2003) define a style
momentum strategy as the one that “buys into styles with good recent performance and avoids
styles that have done poorly”. Hence, a typical f‐h Winner and Loser Portfolio is constructed as:
first, stocks with certain characteristics32 33 are classified into different groups. For each group,
watch the stocks for f months (the formation period), then the f months’ returns are calculated
32 eg. B/M ratios, sizes, industry classifications. In this study, I use individualism scores.
33 Some studies call it double sorting methods. Blitz and Bliet (2007), Hou et al. (2009) etc.
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and ranked in descending order. Stocks which ranked the top one‐third (or 10% or quintiles)34
are assigned to the Winner portfolio (Portfolio W), the strategy is to buy portfolio W. At the
same time, those whose returns are ranked in the bottom one‐third (or 10% or quintiles)35 are
assigned to the Loser portfolio (Portfolio L), the strategy is to sell Portfolio L. These portfolios
are equally weighted and are not rebalanced over the following h months (the holding period).
The third portfolio W‐L is constructed by buying portfolio W and selling portfolio L. At the end of
the holding period, the returns of Portfolio W, Portfolio L and Portfolio W‐L are examined in
order to find the momentum characteristics of this stock category. Stock return is simply the
cumulative return during the formation and holding periods. If return data was missing, a typical
method is using stock’s beta multiplied by the market return as a replacement (Chui et al., 2010).
2.2.4 The Applicability of Momentum: Mean Reverting and Volatility Trading Strategies
Short‐term traders, especially swing and trend followers, are always looking for stocks which
could generate large price movement. They are looking for some overbought or oversold stocks,
in other words, stocks are “mean reverting”. The momentum and mean reverting strategies are
widely used by practitioners from short run to intermediate time horizon, most technical
indicators are designed based on momentum or mean reverting strategy. Current prevailing
stock screening tools provide powerful cross‐sectional characteristics to filter stocks, from
fundamental to technical indicators, most of them are also based on this well‐known strategy.
34 The number of stocks in the Winner or Loser portfolio depends on data availability, usually at least 30
stocks needed within each portfolio.
35 Using top one third or 10% cutoff depend on the size of each group of firms. Chui et al. (2010) use top
or bottom one third, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and other studies use 10%.
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Momentum traders are in favor of finding securities which are likely to be in trending, and they
have to judge the direction of the price movement. In turn, volatility traders do not consider the
directions of price movement, instead, they only care about how much price changes. Volatility
trading is a group of strategies that enable the strategeurs to profit from the magnitude of price
swings of the instruments rather than the direction of such swings (J.P.Singh, 2017). According
to Carr and Mandan (2002), there are three main strategies for volatility trading. 1). Long a
position in straddle. 2). Delta‐hedging an option position. The prime determinant of the
profitability of this strategy is the difference between the anticipated and realized volatility. 3)
Buying or selling a volatility contract at an over‐the‐counter market, eg. A vol swap. Using
straddles and strangles before earnings announcements are the most common and widely used
strategies that individual and institutional investors apply.
Zhou and Shon (2013) did a comprehensive study by using more than 100,000 calls and puts to
test these option strategies from 2003 to 2009 around earnings announcements. They found
that in general, neither buying nor shorting straddles around earnings announcements was
profitable, with the hitting ratio (success rate) of shorting much higher than buying36. But using
the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS)37 to cross‐sectionally analyze the test results,
they find that IT industry is the most volatile and best suited for both buying and selling
straddles or strangles, the average hit ratio increases significantly compared with the all‐
industry average; while utility industry is the most suitable for selling because these stocks
seldom move very fast. Further filtering stocks by company size (market cap), implied volatility,
36 More investors are joining the EA strategy, and elevating the implied volatility of calls and puts, which
makes straddles much more expensive (inflated) than it should be.
37 Developed by MSCI and S&P in 1999.
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longing straddles had an average of 1.28% return38, and shorting straddles had an average
return of 6.28% for IT industry39.
One important impedance for longing straddles is time decay, the underlying stock must move
far enough from the strike price to make the option combination profitable before options
expire. With more investors are jointing this volatility trading strategy, selecting stocks which
have large price movements around earnings announcements is the key to the strategy. Greater
investor heterogeneity implies that more disperse understandings and belief corrections will be
generated when new information is released, so do the price momentum and the trading
volume of the stock. One drawback of Zhou and Shon (2013) is that they provided very little
evidence on how to filter stocks within a certain industry, only P/E, P/B and P/S ratios and the
data up to 2009 was not suited for today rapidly changing market. It is reasonable to assume
that, compared with non‐foreign‐listed firms, foreign‐listed firms have more price movement
and trading volume generated, this larger price movement and trading volume generated are
quite a good tool for institutional investors’ and hedge managers’ trading strategies. This study
will be a make‐up for Zhou and Shon (2013) and other volatility trading literature, to provide
further evidence on foreign‐listing or non‐foreign‐listing as a new classification method. It will
provide new evidence both theoretically and empirically on the literature of volatility trading.
The empirical results will also benefit for retail investors in their practical use. Test results will be
discussed in Section V.
38 This return is measured by a 3‐day window around each earnings announcement.
39 This return rate is for a three‐day window around earnings announcements. With the day of the
earnings, the day before and the day after.
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2.2.5 Summary
In this section, I review the literature of momentum. The main point of this section is that
investor heterogeneity is the major source of momentum, and momentum is the direct
manifestation of heterogeneity. Momentum is documented its existence across markets and
instruments all over the world, momentum strategies are widely used by practitioners. Volatility
trading, which is also based on momentum largely depends on the stock selection techniques.
Choosing the right stocks which are likely to be in trending can increase the profitability.
In a trading environment, the price of a security is the last transacted price. Investors exchange
their views of future expectations on an asset, this exchange also reflects investors’ different
opinions, and hence investor heterogeneity. In financial economics, trading volume is an
important variable which describes the quantity of this “heterogeneity”, it represents the
sentiment of a market.
2.3 Trading Volume, Theories and Bridge to the Research
2.3.1 Trading Volume Theories and Investors’ Disagreements
A. Early Theories of Trading Volume
The theories of trading volume have an old history. Louise Bachelier (1900) is being credited as
the first scholar who investigated the fluctuations on security prices by linking the price changes
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to investor disagreement and trading. In his paper, Bachelier indicated that “the influences
which determine fluctuations on the exchanges are innumerable: past, present, and even
discounted future events are reflected in the market price, but often show no apparent relation
to price changes……Contradictory opinions concerning these changes diverge so much that at
the same instant, buyers believe in a price increase and sellers in a price decrease”.
Although Bachelier’s work was the first to point out disagreement, his work was largely
restricted by contemporary economic analysis method (Bamber, et al. 2011). After almost 70
years, researchers began to utilize advanced data analysis tools on security price formation, and
Beaver (1968) is considered to be another pioneer work in the field who identified the potential
for trading volume to yield unique and valuable new insights. He argues that trading volume
reactions reflect a lack of consensus regarding the appropriate price of the firm’s shares, and
trading volume captures individual expectations while price reactions capture only the
expectations in the market as a whole. Previous literature overlooks the fundamental
characteristics of securities that investor disagreement leads to trades. Beaver (1968) also
concludes that volume reactions may be more sensitive tests of the usefulness of public
disclosures than price reactions.
Another seminal work, Stephen Ross (1989) also pointed out that, it was embarrassing that
economists analyze price reactions and complete being silent on the quantity. After Ross’s
discussion, theorists had made significant advances in trading volume as well as price to public
disclosures40.
40 See Verrecchia (2001) for a review.
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B. Review of Price Theories
Although theorists in financial economics had realized that trading volume could reflect
disagreement and this disagreement had important implications on trading, theories of trading
volume developed very slowly. The reason behind this is the fact that theorists paid too much
attention on price theories while these price theories left little room for trading volume theories
to develop (Bamber et al., 2011). Fama (1970) proposes the most accepted theorem which
states that all information including public or private is revealed in the current market price.
Under this assumption, there are no trades available in the market. This No‐Trade Theorem
argues that all investors have rational expectations, identical views on an asset, and new
information cannot induce trades if the initial allocation of shares is Pareto Optimal. All
investors having rational expectations, and hence homogeneous expectations, means that all
investors know that all other investors have ration expectations, all investors know that all
investor know that all others have rational expectations, and so on (Milgrom and Stokey, 1982).
To allow the possibility of trades, early price models first abandoned the assumption of rational
expectation, and assumed that investors learned nothing from market price and adjust their
investment behavior adaptively to information releases (Epps 1975, 1976; Jennings, Starks, and
Fellingham, 1981; Karpoff, 1986; Jang and Ro, 1989). These early models identify two important
determinants of trading volume around earnings announcements 1). Heterogeneous prior
expectations before information releases. 2). Heterogeneous reactions to the announcement.
These two determinants directly lead to Beaver (1968)’s intuition that trading volume perverse
difference in individual beliefs that are averaged out in price reactions.
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Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) argue that investors are unable to get a return if market price fully
reveals all information. Gathering information is so costly and investors are not willing to do that,
and hence no trade will incur. On the other hand, Grossman and Stiglitz demonstrate that
investors can earn a return with costly information under the assumption that market price
partially reveals all information. Investors add noise supply to the traded assets, and this supply
noise prevents prices from being fully revealing because investors can no longer fully distinguish
between: 1) market fluctuations arising from new private information and 2) market
fluctuations arising from supply shocks that are unrelated to information. This noise supply view
is also supported by Kim and Verrecchia (1991a), which argues that the supply and demand of a
security are random liquidity needs. Supply noise represents liquidity and/or asset supply shocks
(Verrecchia 2001), it is general enough to capture any kind of market noise that keeps the
market price from being fully revealing.
After Grossman and Stiglitz 1980, a new stream of rational expectations models assumed
investors learn from price, but price reveals private information with noise (e.g., Kyle 1985;
Grundy and McNichols 1989;Tkac 1999; Chae 2005). These theoretical models are frequently
labeled as partially revealing or noisy rational expectations models, and they can be considered
as a large step from pure price models to the combination of price and volume, further relaxing
the strict assumptions made in classical finance theories.
C. Recent Theories Development
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Only recently, researchers in financial economics have renewed the call for asset pricing models
to give trading volume a prominent role in their models. Hong and Stein (2007) state that “we
find it hard to imagine a fully satisfying asset pricing model‐‐‐‐in either the rational or behavioral
genres that does not give a front‐and‐center role to volume. Trading volume is extremely large
across virtually all developed stock markets, and many of the most interesting patterns in prices
and returns are tightly linked to movements in volume.” Cready and Hurtt (2002) also provide
simulation‐based evidence suggesting that volume reactions are more powerful indicators of
market response than price reactions. Garfinkel (2009) concludes that unexpected volume “is
the best proxy for opinion divergence”.
According to Bamber et al. (2011), there are three reasons why trading volume other than prices
is warranted. 1). Trading is an important economic activity. Both daily trading volume and
abnormal trading volume around financial disclosures increased more than tenfold over the past
20 years. 2). Trading in response to financial disclosures provides the most direct evidence that
financial disclosures have affected investor’s expectations and decisions. Trading volume
reactions to financial disclosures are more readily detected than price reactions (Cready and
Hurtt, 2002). 3). It has an important implication on information asymmetry around financial
disclosures.
D. Trading Volume and Investor Heterogeneity
Beyond price momentum, trading volume is another manifestation of investor heterogeneity.
The generated trading volume reflects traders’ agreement with the current value for exchange,
but at the same time, it also reflects their disagreement on the future value of the asset. Hence,
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trading volume exhibits an already‐formed disagreement. The seminal study, Kim and
Verrecchia (1991) show that greater diversity of opinions caused by the differential processing
of the information, leads to an increase in trading volume. Harrison and Kreps (1978) suggest
that abnormal trading volume around corporate public announcements could be explained by
the divergence of opinion among traders. Kandel and Pearson (1995) predict that volume will be
increasing in the diversity of investor opinions around earnings events. Other empirical studies,
including Bamber (1987), De Long et al. (1990), Ajinkya, Atiase and Gift (1991), and Ajinkya et al.
(2004), all confirm the view that abnormal trading volume is positively associated with higher
divergent opinion. Trading volume reflects differential beliefs, and it is the most direct and
observable evidence of investor heterogeneity (Bamber et al., 2011; Bamber et al., 1999).
2.3.2 Empirical Measures of Volume
Measures of trading volume are debated in early studies. They have the choice of measuring
trading volume using the number of shares or number of transactions. The number of
transactions captures the number of times investors are motivated to act, but it is sometimes
misleading. Cready and Ramanan (1995) point out that orders coming into the LOB can be
divided or batched, which produces noise. The number of shares encompasses the magnitude of
the action as well as the decision to act (Cready and Ramanan 1995).
Researchers use trading volume turnover as a trading volume measure. Lo and Wang (2000)
argue that this turnover is a natural measure of trading volume and it automatically controls for
firm size and the fact that the number of shares outstanding and the number of shares traded
have grown steadily over time (Bamber et al., 2011). Empirical studies find that share turnover
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still trends upward, possibly due to elimination of fixed commissions (Campbell et al. 1993),
technological innovations such as online trading and Internet speed increase (Ahmed et al.
2003), and the increase in institutional investors’ trading, especially hedge funds (Fung and
Hsieh 2006).
Compared with the number of shares and the number of transactions, trading volume turnover
is the most widely accepted measure, however, it needs adjustment. Bamber et al. (2011) point
out that using log form of shares turnover is a viable option. The distributions of daily trading
volume are highly skewed to the right (Ajinkya and Jain, 1989), due to a few days having
extremely high trading. In the studies of the determinants of trading volume, the dependent
variable(shares turnover) is so skewed that the regression residuals significantly depart from
normality, evidencing severe skewness and heteroskedasticity, in this case, using a natural log of
the trading volume is recommended (Bamber et al, 2011). Theoretically, Kim and Verrecchia’s
(1991a) model predicts that trading around an announcement is a multiplicative function of the
absolute magnitude of the contemporaneous price change and differential precision of private
pre‐disclosure information. The natural logs of trading volume as the independent variable and
price change as one dependent variable plus differential precision as another, is just suitable for
their prediction41, this prediction and its model are confirmed by Atiase and Bamber (1994).
2.3.3 Trading Volume, Information, and Earnings Announcements.
Information is the key determinant of trading in financial markets, it can affect investors’ trading
decision and overall strategies. Trading volume is associated positively with the absolute
41 Recall that the properties of logarithms: log (y/x)=log (y)‐log(x).
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magnitude of returns (Karpoff, 1987), and empirical research supports this view (Atiase and
Bamber 1994; Bamber and Cheon 1995; Bhattacharya 2001; Bailey et al. 2003; Hope et al. 2009).
However, there are some exceptions. Bamber and Cheon (1995) showed that this positive
relation was not strong. They argued that about one fourth of earnings announcements
generated either 1) very large trading volume without large price change or 2) large price
change without large trading volume. Kandel and Pearson (1995) showed that large price
reactions around earnings announcements were caused by more divergent analysts’ forecasts42,
not by abnormal trading volume.
2.3.4 Earnings Announcements and Information Releases
Prior research concludes that financial disclosures, such as earnings announcements, are
important enough to cause investors to take action by trading (Beaver 1968; Kiger 1972; Morse
1981; Bamber 1986, 1987). Earnings announcements release the most important and recurring
information to investors, and this information releasing spurs differential belief revisions, and
hence investor heterogeneity.
The Differential belief revisions have many sources. One possible source belief revision
differentials are the quality of the pre‐disclosure information investors possess. As predicted by
Kim and Verrecchia (1991a)’s theoretical model, pre‐disclosure information asymmetry spurs
differential belief revisions, because investors with imprecise pre‐disclosure information find the
announcement more informative than those privy to more precise pre‐disclosure information.
42 According to the theories of investor heterogeneity, abnormal high trading volume and divergent
analysts’ forecasts are not contradicted, but the same consequences of investor heterogeneity.
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Different investors have different capabilities to gather data, regardless if the information is
private or public, and they also have different capabilities to analytically process the data. When
earnings are released, investors receive more information than other periods, and differential
beliefs exhibit more significantly than other times. Accordingly, these differential beliefs spur
trades and generate trading volume; therefore, earnings announcements are considered to be
good windows to capture the changes in trading activities, and hence good windows to capture
investor heterogeneity which causes these trading activities.
Zhou and Shon (2013) document that recurring, predictable and impactful events are important
and necessary attributes of events which trigger price movement, for individual firms, the most
regular and striking economic activities are the earnings announcements.
Early empirical evidence supports the view that financial disclosures stimulate trading. Beaver
(1968), the seminal study aimed to investigate whether earnings announcements are
informative to investors, and he found that in earnings weeks, squared price fluctuations were
67% higher and mean trading was 33% larger than in a non‐earning week. He concluded that
earnings announcements have information content that spurs investors to trade. Kiger (1972)
and Morse (1981) extended beaver’s study. Kiger (1972) found that the mean trading volume
over a three‐day and five‐day windows were 50% higher than that during a control period.
Morse (198) reported a significant increase in trading the day before quarterly and annual
earnings announcements, and this phenomenon extends to three days after the disclosure (Post
Earnings Announcements Drifts).
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Bamber et al. (2011) pointed out that early research on trading around financial disclosures was
subjected to selection criteria, this selection method increased the likelihood of finding the
reaction of earnings announcements (Bamber, Christensen, and Gaver, 1994 and 2000; Bamber,
et al. 2011). Beaver (1968) used 143 firms from NYSE which had non 12/31 fiscal year‐ends, and
had less than 20 news items from the Wall Street Journal. Kiger (1972) used 87 firms from NYSE,
and Morse (1981)’s research targets were 20 firms from NYSE, 5 from AMEX, and 25 firms over
the counter. As Bamber et al. (2011) pointed out that these statistical data were subjected to
some problems, and mean values were largely affected by extreme values. Beaver (1968)
recommended that research should relax the selection criteria to get the generalizability of his
findings.
Recent evidence suggests that the price and trading volume around financial disclosures are
increasing over time. There are several explanations. First, the increased price reaction over
time was attributed to the increased concurrent earnings announcements releases (Francis,
Schipper, and Vincent, 2002), this view is also confirmed by Barron, Byard and Yu(2010), which
showed that abnormal trading which was not explained by price changes was due to the
increasing number of disclosures. Landsman and Maydew (2002) argued that because large
firms’ disclosures usually contained more information, the overlaid information led to the
increase price reactions43. Second, preannouncement information asymmetry was the main
reason lead to this earnings announcements reaction (Barron, Schneible, and Stevens, 2009).
Third, the advent of online trading spurred more trading from less sophisticated traders also
increased the price and trading volume reactions around financial disclosures (Ahmed et al.,
43 Landsman and Maydew (2002) also supported the view that the overtime increase of price reactions to
earnings announcements was due to large firms.
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2003). Finally, Bailey et al. (2003) find that trading volume reactions to earnings
announcements increase after Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD)44 prohibited selective
disclosure. They conclude that this elevated trading reflects differential interpretations of
earnings announcements, and further support this interpretation with evidence that analyst
disagreement, including Kandel and Pearson’ s 1995 measure of differential interpretations,
likewise increases after Reg FD.
Ball and Shivakumar (2008) concluded that the trading volume response to earnings
announcements is statistically significant, albeit modest in magnitude, and that trading reactions
to earnings announcements increased over the period 1972 to 2006.
2.3.5 Summary
This section provides the review of literature of trading volume. Theories of trading volume
develop much more slowly than price theories, largely because of the assumptions of classical
finance theories left little room for investor disagreement (Bamber et al., 2011). Trading volume
fully reflects this disagreement, and hence investor heterogeneity. Share turnover is the best
measure for trading volume, it controls for firm size, when utilize it, natural log adjustment is
needed to avoid the non‐normal distribution and the heteroscedasticity problem. Earnings
announcements spur trades by information releasing to the market. With the arrival of new
information, investors understand it differently from their prior beliefs or information process
44 Regulation FD addresses the selective disclosure of information by publicly traded companies and other
issuers. Regulation FD provides that when an issuer discloses material nonpublic information to certain
individuals or entities—generally, securities market professionals, such as stock analysts, or holders of the
issuer's securities who may well trade on the basis of the information—the issuer must make public
disclosure of that information. In this way, Regulation FD aims to promote the full and fair disclosure.
65
models, further enlarges the level of heterogeneity. Numerous studies have documented the
fact that large price change is accompanied by large trading volume generated, during and out
of the earnings periods. In order to compare different levels of investor heterogeneity,
appropriate market venues are needed.
2.4 Foreign‐Listings: Status Quo and Investor Compositions
2.4.1 Background
Foreign listing, also named as International listing and cross‐listing45, is a strategic choice made
by a firm to list its shares on an oversea market. The globalization process including
technological advances, deregulation of capital markets and declining transaction costs, led to a
surge in foreign listings in the past three decades (Karolyi, 2006). According to a report from
World Federation of Exchanges (WFE), as of the end of 2016, there were total 2,409
international‐listed firms around the world, which was 5.22% of total 46,170 listed firms.
Foreign listed firms are distributed across the major markets around the world. Although recent
studies (Doidge, 2017; Ciccotello, 2014; Rosett and Smith, 2014; Grullon, Larkin, and Michaely,
2015) suggest that this process has slowed down46, foreign‐listing continues to be a viable
choice for firms influencing capital raising and price discovery processes. It is an indispensable
and important force for the integration of global financial markets (Gagnon and Karolyi, 2010).
45 Technically speaking, cross‐listing refers to a firm which is double listed in two or more countries.
Foreign listing or international listing refers to a firm listed abroad, no matter it is listed domestically or
not. This study will use foreign listing, international listing and cross listed interchangablely.
46 From 2014 to 2016, total number of international‐listings firms are 2,452, 2,504, and 2409, which are
5.50%, 5.47% and 5.22% of all listed firms respectively. WFE (2016; 2015). Academics calls the delisting
phenomenon “listing gap”.
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2.4.2 Investor Composition of Foreign Listed Firms
Foreign listed firms can attract investors all over the world, they are natural habitats of
heterogeneous investors. There are four reasons that the investor compositions of foreign‐listed
firms and purely domestic firms are different:
First, firms are motivated by a variety of factors for listing their shares abroad, with broadening
shareholders’ base as one primary objective. Several surveys of managers conducted by
Mittoo(1992), Fanto and Karmel (1997) and Bancel and Mittoo(2001) document that broadening
shareholder base is a major objective of managers of the foreign‐listed firms. By broadening the
stockholders’ base, these internationally listed firms can not only raise the funds they need
abroad but also reduce their cost of capital (Verrecchia, 2001; Lambert et al., 2006; Hail and
Leuz, 2006). More importantly, the foreign‐listing process may improve the firms’ visibility and
reputation in the destination country, which enhances its influences, and hence attracts more
traders to join. At the micro level, the increase in the diversity of shareholders brings the market
with a higher level of heterogeneity and liquidity. Second, from the perspective of investors,
Theory of Psychic Distance suggests that investors normally select stocks which have similar
background as they do, especially for the foreign listed firms which have no counter‐parties
listed in their home markets. Both individual and institutional investors are affected by this
theory (Nofsinger, 2012). Third, foreign‐listed firms may generate opportunities for arbitrage as
revealed through large, actionable deviations from price parity between the markets trading
those same shares. These arbitrageurs are also a component of traders which are not found in
purely domestic firms. Fourthly, foreign institutional holding will also demonstrate higher level
of heterogeneity of foreign listed firms47. Ng et al. (2011) point out that Foreign Direct
47 See statistics in Section III.
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Investment (FDI) could lower the liquidity in the host countries48, while Foreign Portfolio
Investment (FPI) will improve the host countries’ liquidity. Due to the fact that liquidity and
heterogeneity are highly associated, and the prediction by Psychic Distance, FPI will also add
heterogeneity to the foreign listed firms.
In sum, foreign listed firms broaden investor heterogeneity both intuitively and theoretically,
but have not been tested empirically. Both International Business theories and Finance theories
support the view that foreign listed firms can maximize the heterogeneity of investors in a
relatively small market, which objectively provides an almost perfect market venue for studying
the heterogeneity of investors.
2.4.3 Summary
In sum, as academic interests of foreign‐listed firms are changing from motivations of foreign‐
listed firms to its economic consequences. New academic interests concentrate on multimarket
trading, arbitrage, price discovery process and liquidity. Especially in market microstructure
literature, a study of the essence of a multi‐market trading environment and liquidity change is
necessary. Although high‐frequency data collection and econometric method are the major
challenges, there are still fruitful research results. The new hosting market such as Hong Kong is
suggested for future research, not only because of the recent shift of hosting markets, but also
the unique microstructure of the market.
48 Host country firms with FDI investors, who have superior information and control positions in the firms,
suffer from information asymmetry between insiders and outside uninformed investors. Further, these
foreign investors bring their unique skills, international expertise, and knowledge to the firms, and
domestic investors may be unfamiliar with such “foreign inputs." Thus, the presence of controlling FDI
investors induces an adverse selection problem, making the stock less liquid. Also FDI reduces trading
activities, but FPI improves.
68
Foreign‐listed firms provide a naturally perfect habitat for the study of investor heterogeneity.
Earnings announcement as a triggering event, generates more significant information than
normal periods, this information is captured and interpreted by diverse investors, who have
different prior beliefs and precisions, different information processing methods and different
culture, these will all affect the investment decision they made, and hence impact the price
discovery process. Whether foreign‐listings and non‐foreign‐listings are different in this process,
is still untouched in prior literature.
69
3. The Microstructural Explanation of Momentum: the Two‐
Period Order Flow Model and the Heterogeneous Market
Hypothesis
In this section, I propose an order flow model, which simulates the process of order flowing
when information is released to an order driven market. This model is under the condition of a
single exchange and the best price execution mechanism49.
Hong and Stein (1999) are the first to theoretically model the price momentum phenomenon
using information diffusion. In their model, traders are classified into news‐watchers and
momentum chasers. News‐watchers receive information about future fundamentals and trade
stocks merely based on such kind of information, whereas momentum chasers receive no
fundamental information and they make their investment decisions solely based on price
forecast from past price history. As information slowly diffusing into the market (Hong and Stein,
1999), price experiences under‐reaction first because news‐watchers slowly adjust with the new
information. Then price experiences overreaction as momentum traders attempt to profit from
the under‐reaction caused by news‐watchers (Hong and Stein, 1999). The model delivers an
important empirical implication: stocks with slower information diffusion should exhibit more
pronounced momentum50. In a follow‐up study, Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) classify stocks into
slow/fast diffusion groups according to size and analysts’ coverage. They find that momentum
49 A single exchange means that there is only one trading venue for a security. Best Price execution refers
to the rule of National Best Bid Offer (NBBO).
50 After 20 years, Internet trading makes the market quite different from 20 years ago. News can diffuse
much faster and momentum can be caused by short‐term overreaction. How this herding effect affects
the efficiency of the market is still unexplored (Chui et al, 2010).
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profit earned by investing in firms with small size and/or low analyst coverage are indeed
higher51. Chen and Lu (2017) use option implied volatility to test Hong and Stein’s Gradual
Information Diffusion model and support their view.
Information is crucial when explaining momentum (Chen and Lu, 2017). Previous studies on
momentum document various causes of momentum, the most important one is investor’s
heterogeneous beliefs. However, the cause from market microstrucutre is not yet available. This
research is related to Hong and Stein (1999; 2000) and Chen and Lu (2017), but it explains
momentum from the perspective of information influence on the two types of traders. It also
includes the trading behavior of the traders, it setups a linkage between investor heterogeneity
and momentum. Trading volume can also be used as an auxiliary tool for momentum, which
helps to explain the trading behavior. One thing worthy to mention is that this model is set up
under the condition of short term.
3.1Types of Traders and Their Strategies
In this model, I assume that there are two types of traders in the market: range traders and
momentum (break out) traders52. This classification method is from price patterns or technical
analysis. Although technical analysis is regarded by academics with a mixture of suspicion and
contempt, it has a long history and many studies have documented its profitability, i.e. Blume et
al. (1994). Range traders and momentum traders are analogue with the news‐watchers and
momentum chasers in Hong and Stein’s (1999)’s model, respectively.
51 This conclusion neglects the effect of price reversals.
52 In general, there are only two strategies when trading securities: one is buying low and selling high or
reverse. The other is buying the winners and selling the losers.
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In Hong and Stein’s model, news‐watchers extract no information from prices, they analyze
firms’ fundamentals from the accounting facts or macroeconomic conditions, and they believe
that with the information slowly diffusing to the market, other traders will eventually find the
same fundamental value and push the price up or down. Hence, when there is no important
information flowing into the market, they observed previous price highs and lows, and they sell
at prices which are close to prior highs (resistance zone) or buy at prices which are close to prior
lows (support zone), and expecting that the following movement of the price will merely “touch”
or “trigger” their desired price levels, and then moves in their favorable directions. Since range
traders are not sure when the new information will arrive, and believe that the arrival of the
new information can cause the price to fluctuate violently, in order to prevent price fluctuation
caused by the arrival of new information, they will place stop loss orders53 to cover their
positions once the price moves in the opposite direction of their positions. For sellers, they will
place stop buy orders above but not far away from prior highs. In the same way, buyers will
place their stop sell orders below but not far away from the previous lows. When the price
increases or decreases sharply, they are able to close out their positions with minimum losses.
From the point view of LOB, a trader will see that the order depths of the support (resistance)
zones are thicker than other ranges. Because of these limit buying (selling) orders are stacking
around the support (resistance) zones, without the power produced by the new information,
these price levels will not be broken. Thus, the price will be consolidating within the support and
resistance zones. This price pattern further attracts more range traders to join.
53 Stop loss orders are stop‐market orders.
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Another type of trader is the momentum trader as described by Hong and Stein (1999). Such
traders chase larger price changes to gain profits. Momentum traders do not join the
consolidation phase of price movement, they believe the arrival of new information will induce
new round of price movements. When they observe that stock prices are moving rapidly in one
direction, they believe that new information has arrived in the market, and they enter the
market aggressively to pursue greater subsequent profits. Momentum traders pursue larger
profits and hence tolerate higher risks.
3.2The Relationship between Investor Heterogeneity and Liquidity
The definition of liquidity
The classification of liquidity
In a perfectly heterogeneous market for a certain period, each investor has completely different
views on an asset with other traders. Under this hypothesis, once one investor submits an order
to the LOB, other traders cannot submit orders with the same price and direction, in other
words, the limit orders are mutually exclusive, hence the limit orders are continuously
distributed on the price axis of the LOB, with bid‐ask spread equaling to the smallest
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incremental unit of price, i.e., $0.01, $1/8 or $1/6454. In contrast, in a perfectly homogeneous
market for a certain period, all investors have the same view of an asset. They submit identical
orders of price and direction to the LOB. All orders are stacking on a single side on the LOB. Of
course, the two cases are too extreme, the reality lies somewhere between them. Figure 2 and 3
show the order status of the two cases.
The relationship between investor heterogeneity and liquidity is seldom examined or even not
touched. Avramov et al. (2006) studied the three‐dimensional relationship among return,
turnover and illiquidity. They consider turnover and illiquidity55 as separate variables. In this
study, I argue that trading volume turnover and liquidity are highly correlated. Trading volume
turnover reflects investors trading interests within a certain time, while one dimension of
liquidity is measured by how many transactions are formed. To some degree, trading volume
and liquidity are on the same axis, and trading volume reflects the past liquidity condition within
a certain range (return), while liquidity reflects the interest of possible future transactions.
54 The minimal incremental price level is called tick size. Now, the option market still has the smallest
incremental price of $1/64, and the equity market is $0.01.
55 The inverse of liquidity.
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Figure 2. The order status of a perfectly heterogeneous market. Orders are distributed uniformly along the price axis.
















Figure 3. Order status of a perfect homogeneous market. All orders are on the buy side(left), and sell side (right).














Academics believes that liquidity represents the extent of ease for trading a security (Amihud,
2009). When it is easy for an investor to buy or sell a security at a desired price for any
quantity56, it indicates that this security has high level of liquidity at the moment, conversely,
low level. There are many indicators to measure this extent of ease, such as bid ask spread, the
56 It is often assumed that quantity has no impact on price changes in academics, but in reality, each
transaction, even the trading volume is as low as one share, has an impact on price changes, by
consuming the liquidity on the LOB.
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average waiting time in a price position, and the average trading volume. This extent of ease
reflected on the limit order book is whether there are sufficient counter parties to achieve the
trading processes. The essence of higher liquidity is that, the buyers (sellers) can easily find the
sellers (buyers) who are offering (biding) the same or lower (higher) prices and who are
providing sufficient volume for their needs within a short period of time. Buyers and sellers
must exist at the same time to form a transaction.
Figure 4. Order status on the LOB in real situations.
















Kyle (1985) defines three dimensions of liquidity, tightness, resilience, and depth, this definition
has been widely accepted in the microstructural literature. Tightness refers to “the cost of
turning around a position over a short period of time”, or in other words, bid‐ask spread;
Resiliency refers to “the speed with which prices recover from a random, uninformative shock”;
and depth refers to “the size of an order flow innovation required to change prices a given
amount”. High liquidity refers to smaller tightness, shorter resilience and larger depth.
Among the dimensions of liquidity, both tightness and resiliency are positively related with
investor heterogeneity, while depth relates with heterogeneity negatively. Investors with strong
heterogeneity provide sufficient buying and selling orders at different price levels on the limit
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order book. These non‐marketable limit orders57 offer sufficient liquidity, which allows traders
to easily find the counter parties of the transactions, this process leads to the change of price
and the generation of volume. Sufficient liquidity is manifested by continuous price levels with
small spreads. On average, the smaller the spreads are, the easier the formation of transactions.
Tightness can be understood as the density of the limit orders, so higher investor heterogeneity
ensures small spreads on the LOB. Bid‐ask spread or its related variations58 are used to measure
liquidity tightness, it is the most widely accepted liquidity measure. Smaller spreads indicate
higher liquidity. On the LOB, smaller spreads are manifested by higher density of the limit orders
in a certain period. Hence, tightness is positively related with investor heterogeneity. However,
when studying this tightness, time dimension should be controlled, as levels of investor
heterogeneity can vary from time to time.
Securities are traded continuously in time, so resiliency which is defined as the average time or
speed required for the limit orders to restore its normal level when a random shock happens, is
also an important determinant of liquidity. Resiliency is positively related with investor
heterogeneity. Higher investor heterogeneity implies higher participation rate. When the limit
orders are removed from the LOB, either because of traders’ order‐withdraws or already‐
formed transactions, new limit orders with the same prices and direction will quickly fill up the
vacuum on the LOB. During the eras of high‐frequency trading (HFT), highly liquid stock recovers
its liquidity almost instantaneously, resiliency can be as small as a nano‐second. For less liquid
stocks, it takes a longer time to recover, investors’ psychology could change during this process.
In this model, I assume that a stock with higher investor heterogeneity/liquidity, its resilience is
57 Non‐marketable limit orders on the LOB are the actual liquidity, and they are also called liquidity
suppliers. Market orders and marketable limit orders are liquidity consumers.
58 Such as effective bid‐ask spread.
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high and its liquidity will recover immediately after price shocks. On the other hand, for a low
heterogeneity stock, it takes longer time for its liquidity will recover to its normal level.
Order depth is the only dimension that distinguishes liquidity and investor heterogeneity. Order
depth refers to how much volume stacked in a certain price level, the more volume waiting to
be transacted, the more liquid a stock is. However, more volume on the same price level means
more investors have the desire to buy/sell a stock at the same price, which reflects the same
price or directional expectations of traders, it has the inverse relationship with investor
heterogeneity.
Overall, I argue that investor heterogeneity and liquidity are positively related in general, though
both concepts are elusive (Kyle, 1985; Pastor and Stambough, 2003). In other words, when the
heterogeneity of a financial market is very strong, different value and risk perceptions are
prevailing on the market, the orders submitted to the LOB are both broad and deep. Investors
are providing sufficient liquidity at any price levels, each price level has large volume waiting to
be executed. Order Breadth refers to how many price levels are listed, and Order Depth refers
to the total amount of transactions that can be provided at a certain price level on the LOB. At
this point, traders on the other side can easily find the price they want to trade and the quantity
is sufficient at that price. Conversely, when investor heterogeneity is low or the liquidity is low,
there will be a very shallow order depth for each price level, there may even exist many price
fractures on the limit order book, which makes the bid‐ask spread very large.
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For a certain stock, highly heterogeneous investors provide sufficient liquidity, and this kind of
order arrangement on the LOB objectively creates the condition for fast price moving, hence
objectively creates the foundation for momentum to generate. In contrast, highly
homogeneous investors provide either scares price levels or stacking orders on the same price
levels on the LOB, which hinders price movement and hinders momentum to generate.
Investor heterogeneity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for price momentum59 60.
3.3 The Two‐Period Order Flow Model
In this section, I propose a “two‐period” order flow model which contains three stages and two
periods, it describes how investor heterogeneity affects momentum when effective information
flowing into the market.
Stage Zero: Before the arrival of information
When the market is absent of new and effective information, the price exhibits a consolidation
pattern. Range traders dominate in the market, they sell at prior highs and buy at prior lows,
and the price will continue this pattern until the arrival of new information. See section 3.1 for
range traders’ behavior.
Stage One: Information arrives at the market
59 For some illiquid stocks, it is possible that these stocks can generate higher momentum than liquid
stocks, due to their order arrangement statuses.
60 Higher investor heterogeneity plus effective news are the sufficient and necessary condition for
momentum.
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If new information arrives at the market, insider traders who get the information and who have
the capability to control large funds will aggressively put funds into the market in the direction
implied by the information. Taking positive information as an example, insiders submit limit buy
orders with execution price higher than the market price61, which shows immediate higher
buying pressure than selling pressure on the LOB. The selling orders on the right side of the LOB
(selling liquidity) are being consumed very quickly, which pushes the price up.
One point worth to mention is that, there are two forces which enact the strong buying power.
The first is the buying power triggered by the release of the newly arrival information, which
attracts the momentum chasers who aggressively submit buying orders to the market. The
second force is the prior stop‐loss buying orders placed by the range traders. These stop‐loss
buying orders are sent directly to the market immediately once the price level triggers their
stop‐loss points62. The resultant buying orders release immerse power. Once this happens, a
sufficient amount of buying orders provided by the two forces will quickly erode the selling
orders on the LOB, and the transaction price rises quickly in a short period of time, accompanied
by increased volume. The upper right side of the LOB will temperately exhibit a fracture of the
lowest price levels63, this is the reason why much literature documents that large price returns
are accompanied with large trading volume. As more and more momentum traders joined in,
61 Usually, experienced traders do not submit market orders to avoid the execution price too far away
from desired.
62 The stock market is usually different from the foreign exchange market for the server stop or stop‐limit
orders. A server stop order can be assigned a stop price, which is the triggering price. Once this price is
reached, a market order will be sent, so that it will be executed immediately, it is also called stop‐market
orders. However, the executed price could be large from desired. A stop limit order can be assigned both
stop price and limit price, once the market price triggers the stop price, the limit order will be sent to the
market, but the execution is not guaranteed. The FX market has this mechanism partially due to its high
liquidity compared with the stock markets.
63 Recall that on the right or the sellers’ side of the limit order book, prices are ranked in ascending order.
80
the overreaction phenomenon emerges, which is consistent with Hong and Stein (1999)’s
momentum trading behavior.
Stage Two: After price breaks out
At this time point, we consider two scenarios:
1. For a market with strong investor heterogeneity and high level of liquidity. High liquidity
implies high resilience, hence it requires less time for liquidity to recover. When the price
fractures on the upper right of the LOB appear, strong heterogeneity enables investors to
quickly adapt this price turbulence, and refill the price fractures. Range traders quickly quit
their trades through stop orders, and momentum traders continue to trade by aggressively
submitting buying orders to the market, hoping the price will go up further. For an
extremely liquid market, recovering the liquidity is almost instantaneous right after liquidity
disappears. The new round of negotiation starts based on the new price level, there are
sufficient buying and selling orders on the LOB to maintain the new price levels. Above the
broken out price levels, buyers and sellers restart their price discovery processes and
momentum continues. Trading volume increases significantly during this process64.
2. On the contrary, for a market with low investor heterogeneity and liquidity. When the price
breaks through the consolidation range and forms price fractures on the upper right of the
LOB, the overall market is incapable of recovering liquidity on a short period because of low
liquidity resilience. At this moment, the prior range traders have already been repelled out
and momentum traders are prevailing, but these momentum traders see that there lacks
64 Large volume comes from prior sell orders around the resistance zones and the stop‐loss orders. Recall
that in the consolidation range, order depths around the resistance/support zones are thick.
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new buying power added to the market, fear makes them begin to realize their profits by
selling to liquidate their positions, hence create large selling pressure. Momentum fails to
continue by price reversals. The change of trading volume in this process is not as high as
that in Scenario One.
It can be seen that investor heterogeneity plays a crucial role in the formation of momentum.
Strong heterogeneity facilitates momentum whereas price reversals often occur in a weak
heterogeneity environment. It is worthy to note that this two‐period model is setup up in a
short horizon, in the current trading system65, this process takes place within a few seconds. In
the long run, if price reversals occur often, intermediate or long‐term momentum cannot form,
price consolidates will be in a relatively larger range. Figure 5 to figure 11 illustrate the order
flow process.
Table 1: Investor Heterogeneity and its relations with liquidity, momentum, price reversal and trading volume.









The Two‐Period Order Flow model is consistent with Wang (1999)’s conclusion that price
continuations are accompanied by high trading volume when investors trading based on their
65 POSIT etc.
82
private information, and Cooper (1999)’s results that reversal profitability declines with trading
activity.




















Figure 5:Initial Order Status




















Figure 6:New buying orders arrive as positive news released to the market. As noted that time priority is more
important for momentum traders.




















Figure 7:Liquidity on the sell side is consumed and the transaction price goes up.
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Figure 8: Price continues to go up, right side price fractures are generated.

















Figure 9: Temporary price shock, price fractures and large bid‐ask spread.




















Figure 10: High investor heterogeneity enables liquidity recover immediately on the left side. New buyers quickly adapt
the price changes. Price continues to go up.
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Figure 11: Low investor heterogeneity makes the anxious buyers start selling stocks to prevent stock price from
dropping, which generates price reversal.
3.4 The Heterogeneous Market Hypothesis
3.4.1 The Old Heterogeneous Market Hypothesis by Muller et al. (1993)
Muller et al. (1993) use GARCH to model volatility on the FX market, based on their empirical
findings, they propose the Heterogeneous Market Hypothesis, which is characterized by:
1). Different actors in the heterogeneous market have different time horizons and dealing
frequencies. The high dealing frequencies are FX dealers and market makers, and the low
dealing frequencies are the central banks, commercial organizations, pension fund investors
with currency hedging. These different frequency dealers react differently with the same news,
and the market is heterogeneous with a fractal structure of participants’ time horizons.
2). In a homogeneous market, the more agents are present, the faster the price should converge
to the “real market value”, on which all agents with a “rational expectation” agree. Thus, the
volatility should be negatively correlated with market presence and activity. In a heterogeneous
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market, different actors are likely to settle for different prices and decide to execute their
transactions in different market situations. In other words, they create volatility.
3). The market participants of the heterogeneous market hypothesis also differ in other aspects
beyond the time horizons and the geographic locations: they can have different degrees of risk
aversion, institutional constraints, and transaction costs.
This HMH proposed by Muller et al. (1993) is not widely accepted, searching on Google search
engine shows very few results.66
Figure 12: Structure of Heterogeneous Market Volatility by Muller et al. (1993). Market volatility is created by different
types of investors.
3.4.2 The New Heterogeneous Market Hypothesis.
Over decades, researchers, theorists and investors are constantly looking for new findings to
improve the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), in order to understand the information effect
on prices and to shrink the gap between the theory and the reality. i.e., Muller et al. (1993)’s
HMH, this view was also supported by Dacorogna et.al. (1998), Lux and Marchesi (1999) and
Peters (1994). But this HMH has not been widely accepted, largely because it merely points out
66 Because HMH is contradicted with EMH, and EMH is regarded as the axiom in the academics. In
industry, maintaining constantly abnormal positive returns is the most difficult job for traders and hedge
funds, which further enhances the recognition of the EMH.
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an abroad outline, but its applicability and tractability are very limited. How can traders and
strategists, regulators understand the price behavior is not covered in this study. In addition, Lo
(2005) proposes a new framework called the Adaptive markets hypothesis (AMH) that reconciles
market efficiency with behavioral alternatives by applying the principles of evolution such as
competition, adaptation and natural selection to financial interactions. “Prices reflect as much
information as dictated by the combination of environmental conditions and the number and
nature of ‘species’ in the economy”. This hypothesis emphasizes on the counter examples to
economics rationality such as loss aversion, overconfidence, overreaction, mental accounting
and other behavioral biases, it can be used to generalize the behavior of investors, which the
EMH cannot. This theory is still in the early stage of development (Chin, 2015).
The analysis in this study leads me to propose a new version of HMH, based on the level of
investor heterogeneity. The new Heterogeneous Market Hypothesis states that:
The price movement of any asset67 can only be divided into two phases: the consolidation
patterns and the trending patterns; Investor heterogeneity is the essence behind the two;
effective news is the most important marginal factor that spurs the level of investor
heterogeneity.
When the market is in the consolidation phase, due to the lack of effective information
penetrated into the market, investors lack new understanding of asset prices, and the level of
investor heterogeneity is at a relatively low level. Range traders dominate in the market, and
they provide deep and thick buying and selling orders (liquidity) in the support and resistance
67 This statement requires a single market venue and National Best Bid Offer (NBBO) mechanism.
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zones, respectively. These order depths are so strong that when the market lacks of newly
effective information, the price will remain in this state. Rational investors should continue to
buy at support levels and sell at resistance levels until prices effectively break through the
established support and resistance zones.
When effective information penetrates into the market, investors’ cognitive differences make
the level of heterogeneity boosted. The order arrangement on the limit order book objectively
creates the condition for rapid price changes, and the involvements of large funds lead trending
to start. Rational traders should continue to enter long or short positions at the first time of the
price breakouts, or re‐enter in the pullback positions after the momentum is generated, until
the price momentum disappears.
Similarly to the EMH, I argue that there are three forms of HMH: the strong, the semi‐strong and
the weak forms. The strong‐form of HMH is the state that, when effective information flows into
the market, price breaks out of the consolidation phase, and the price continues to move
without the happening of price reversals, this process is accompanied by the highest volume.
Semi‐strong form of HMH is the state that price reversals happen after the price break‐outs,
prices forms an up‐parallelogram, medium volume is generated. The weak form of HMH is the
consolidation phase. There is one point worthy to note, the perfectly homogeneous market
corresponds to the efficient market (Hull, 2012), which new information is fully reflected
immediately, at this moment, there is no trades happen, the market reaches to a Pareto Optimal
as discussed in Section II.
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The level of investor heterogeneity is a relative concept. For the same stock, it is different from
time to time; for different stocks at the same time, they could also be at various levels. Figure 7
shows AAPL from Jan 2018 to June 2018, and it illustrates how I segment the market into
different phases according to the new HMH, and Figure 6 in the appendix shows an investor
heterogeneity spectrum summarizing all related market characteristics.
Figure 14: Illustration of different phases of HMH. AAPL as an example. Time: January to June, 2018.
4. Problem Statement, Hypothesis Development, Motivation and
Contribution
This study aims to address the first two issues by constructing a new paradigm on studying
investor heterogeneity. I argue that trading volume and price momentum are observable and
tangible variables, and they offer direct evidence of investor heterogeneity, both of them can be
used as proper measures of investor heterogeneity. This argument alleviates the problem of the
lack of tangible data. Garfinkel (2009) and Wang and Liu (2014) compare current prevailing
measures of investor heterogeneity, they conclude that unexplained trading volume68 is the best
measure. But these studies and the subsequent studies did not have any predictions regarding
investor heterogeneity, neither trading volume nor momentum has been applied. In order to
address the un‐testable predictions on investor heterogeneity, I adopt a completely new
approach. That is, first analyzing investor compositions on different market venues, then
hypothesizing that heterogeneity is higher on the markets with more diverse investors, and
lower for less diverse ones, and finally use trading volume and momentum reactions to test this
hypothesis. Hence, choosing the right market venues with diverse investor profiles ensures
higher level of heterogeneity, it is the key to the research.
Foreign listed firms broaden investor heterogeneity both intuitively and theoretically, but have
not been tested empirically. Both International Business theories and Finance theories support
the view that foreign listed firms can maximize the heterogeneity of investors in a relatively
68 Garfinkel (2009) documents that both bid‐ask spread and unexplained volume are better proxies.
Analysts’ forecast dispersions has very weak explanatory power.
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small market, which objectively provides an almost perfect market venue for studying
heterogeneity of investors.
The main premise of this study is to empirically explore the extent of investor heterogeneity in
the context of foreign listed firms by using a matching control sample of non‐foreign listed firms.
I use all listed firms from NYSE and NASDAQ, as the US has the highest individualism score of 90
in the world. Foreign listed firms are further categorized into higher‐order and lower order firms.
Higher order firms are those whose home countries’ individualism scores below 40, and lower‐
order firms are those whose home countries’ individualism scores above 40. This controlling
method ensures each group of firms has distinct investor compositions. I assume that the
investor heterogeneity (IH) rank of the three groups of firms is:
𝐼𝐻ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠 𝐼𝐻𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠 𝐼𝐻𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑈𝑆 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠
According to the analysis of the relation between momentum and trading volume, this study is
going to use both momentum and trading volume reactions to verify this hypothesis.
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Figure 15: Research hypothesis. The more diverse a stock group is, it may imply higher investor heterogeneity
manifested by price momentum and trading volume.
One motivation of this research is to address the issue of measuring investor heterogeneity in
academics: the lack of tangible data problem as well as the problem of testable predictions, as
prior studies documented. Starting from investors’ habitats, making hypothesis and then
proving by momentum and trading volume reactions, this approach alleviates the data problem
and provides a new paradigm to predict and test investor heterogeneity. It avoids the multi‐type
investor problem, it also adds new evidence to the literature of investor’s overconfidence and
culture’s influences on stocks. The conclusion of this study will also add new insights into the
trading volume research in the literature of financial economics. The “Two‐Period Order Flow
Model” demonstrates that the positive relationship between investor heterogeneity and
momentum, to the best of my knowledge, there is no research documents this conclusion in the
market microstructural literature. It also has important implications on the price discovery
process.
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In addition, my interest in this topic is in part due to the fact that hedge fund managers,
professional traders and option strategists are suffering the puzzle that what kinds of stocks are
likely to be in trending and what kinds are likely to be consolidation patterns, as these two
phases have completely different trading strategies. Prior literature suggests price momentum
(trending) is likely to happen more often in a market with wider differential beliefs or
disagreement (Chui et al., 2010; Verrardo, 2009), other studies argue that momentum
characteristics differ by industrial classification (Zhou and Shin, 2013; Moskowitz and Grinblatt,
1999). In this study, I argue that foreign‐listed firms are also appropriated for trend trading,
because of its higher level of investor heterogeneity facilitates to generate momentum and
trading volume can be used as confirmations. The “Two‐Period Order Flow Model” of
heterogeneous market ensures the less frequency of price reversals. Following this logic,
professional traders and option strategists can use foreign‐listing as a stock screening tool for
their trading strategies, which could largely increase the profitability of momentum and
volatility strategies.
This study will add new evidence on behavioral finance literature that it explains the question
why in some Asian countries, momentum strategy profits are lower than that in US and Europe.
Chui et al. (2010) found this conclusion and leave this question open, and implies that “some
countries, but not all, are subject to the psychological biases that cause momentum”.
Finally, it will have implications on asset pricing models researchers. Heterogeneous
expectations violate Efficient Market Hypothesis and MM’s propositions (and other finance
foundational theories) in that they all assume investors are all rationale with homogeneous
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expectations. Research of heterogeneous beliefs have a long history and most of them have
been used to modify the asset price models. The research results of this study will provide new
evidence of asset pricing models of foreign‐listed firms and non‐foreign‐listed firms, from the
aspect of investor heterogeneity.
5. Data and Methodology
5.1 Data
I collected about 2200 stocks from NYSE and NASDAQ with the highest trading activities,
measured by daily volume turnover. Of these stocks, 1820 are pure US stocks, and 400 stocks
are foreign‐listed stocks. Foreign listed stocks are grouped further by their countries’
individualism scores. Higher‐order foreign listed firms are those whose home countries’
individualism score below 40, and lower‐order foreign listed firms are with individualism scores
of home country above 40.
Stock data are from 2001 to 2017, daily close prices69, trading volume, transaction time,
quarterly earnings announcements data including earnings dates, actual EPS, and estimated EPS
are collected from Bloomberg. Individualism scores are from Hofstede (2001).
There are totally 2,169 firms. In order to rule out the effect of illiquidity, I deleted the most
inactive ones. The cutoff level is set by 2017 trading volume turnover, stocks with daily trading
volume turnover less than 0.0001% are deleted. The average trading volume turnover of all
stocks is 1.0976%. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the firms.









Pure US US 91 1807 1.1251%
AU 91 5 0.0207%
GB 89 27 0.9128%
NL 80 10 0.7970%
DE 80 2 0.1889%
CA 80 87 0.7593%
IT 76 3 0.0158%
BE 75 2 0.1910%
DK 74 1 0.0749%
SE 71 2 0.3925%
FR 71 4 0.1709%
IE 70 10 0.5305%
NO 69 4 0.6135%
CH 68 7 0.6957%
FI 63 1 0.2592%
LU 60 4 0.6606%
ZA 58 6 0.5058%
IL 54 35 0.6351%





IN 48 8 0.3098%
JP 46 10 0.0170%
AR 46 10 0.3652%
RU 39 2 0.3342%
BR 38 20 0.1717%
GR 35 7 0.7698%
PH 32 1 0.0418%
MX 30 7 0.0272%
HK 25 8 0.5411%
CL 23 6 0.0599%
TH 20 1 1.6504%
SG 20 2 0.4939%
CN 20 51 1.7575%
KR 18 4 0.2301%
TW 17 10 1.0061%









Table 2: Firms Statistics by individualism scores. For the total 4500 stocks from NYSE and NASDAQ, I deleted the most
inactive ones (by average trading volume turnover over the entire horizon), 2,200 stocks are selected.
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5.2 Empirical Methodology: Momentum
5.2.1 Momentum ‐‐‐‐Winner and Loser Portfolio Method
I adopt Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)’s Winner and Loser Portfolio Momentum Examination
method to test momentum. This method is the most widely accepted one, it is straightforward
and has the most enduring influence on momentum studies (Chao et al., 2012)70.
According to the definition of price momentum, stocks’ past returns predict future returns,
stocks with positive (negative) returns tend to have positive (negative) returns in the following
time period (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993). Barberis and Shleifer (2003) define a style
momentum strategy as the one that “buys into styles with good recent performance and avoids
styles that have done poorly”. Hence, a typical f‐h Winner and Loser Portfolio is constructed as:
first, stocks with certain characteristics71 72 are classified into different groups. For each group,
watch the stocks for f months (the formation period), then the f months’ returns are calculated
and ranked in descending order. Stocks which ranked the top one‐third (or 10% or quintiles)73
are assigned to the Winner portfolio (Portfolio W), the strategy is to buy portfolio W. At the
same time, those whose returns are ranked in the bottom one‐third (or 10% or quintiles)74 are
assigned to the Loser portfolio (Portfolio L), the strategy is to sell Portfolio L. These portfolios
are equally weighted and are not rebalanced over the following h months (the holding period).
The third portfolio W‐L is constructed by buying portfolio W and selling portfolio L. At the end of
70 Studies employ this method include Jegadeesh and Titman (1993); Asness, (1994); Fama and French,
(1996); Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004); Gutierrez and Kelley (2008); Verardo (2009); Chui et al (2010);
Boussaidi (2017) and others.
71 eg. B/M ratio, firm size, industry classification. In this study, I use individualism score and trading
volume turnover.
72 Some studies call it double sorting methods. Blitz and Bliet (2007), Hou et al. (2009) etc.
73 The number of stocks in the Winner or Loser portfolio depends on data availability, usually at least 30
stocks needed within each portfolio.
74 Using top one third or 10% cutoff depend on the size of each group of firms. Chui et al. (2010) use top
or bottom one third, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and other studies use 10%.
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the holding period, the returns of Portfolio W, Portfolio L and Portfolio W‐L are examined in
order to find the momentum characteristics of this stock category. Stock return is simply the
cumulative return during the formation and holding periods. If return data was missing, a typical
method is using stock’s beta multiplied by the market return as a replacement (Chui et al., 2010).
For higher‐order foreign listed firms, lower‐order foreign listed firms and pure US listed firms,
the expected testing results are that their returns of Portfolio W and W‐L in the holding periods
are monotonically decreasing, and their returns of Portfolio L are monotonically increasing.
As suggested by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and the subsequent studies, overlapping
momentum portfolios or time rolling is used. For example, for a typical 6‐6 Winner and Loser
Portfolio starting from the beginning of January is formed as follows: the formation period is the
previous 6 months, from last July to December, and the holding period is from January to June.
Then, for the portfolio starts from February, the formation period is from last August to this
January and the holding period is from this February to July. The compositions of winner and
loser portfolios in January or February could be different, depend on the return performances at
the end of each formation period.
5.2.2 Potential Issues of the MomentumModel
Although this Winner and Loser Portfolio Momentum Method is widely accepted, according to
Chao et al. (2012), there are three potential issues. The first one is whether equal weighting or
value weighting should be used when forming portfolios. Equal‐weighting puts more weights on
small stocks, from Jagadeesh and Timan (1993) to Chui et al. (2010) all important momentum
studies use equal weighting (Chao et al., 2012). Value weighting confers three potential benefits.
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First, it is consistent with most theoretical asset pricing models that rely on the value‐weighted
market portfolio to generate appropriate risk measures. Second, and more importantly for
portfolio managers, value‐weighting is the dominant weighting scheme for benchmark indexes,
and, these indexes are likely to serve as the basis for the portfolio strategies and exchange
traded funds that asset allocators are apt to employ. Finally, value‐weighting does not impose
the overall capacity constraints that equal‐weighting imposes on trading strategies. Lewellen
(2002) uses B/M ratio as a control variable for the value weighting. In this study, the main
objective is to find investor heterogeneity through momentum instead of portfolio construction
for practical use, so equal‐weighting facilitates a direct comparison of style momentum and
stock momentum profitability (Chao et al., 2012). In addition, I will control the stocks through
volume turnover at first, some illiquid stocks are ruled out, therefore, the equal weighting
scheme will be adopted as prior studies did.
The second issue is the choices of combinations of forming period and holding period. After the
initial work of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), the dominant portfolio strategy in the stock
momentum literature involves a six‐month formation period followed by a six‐month holding
period. While a variety of other combinations ranging from one to twelve months formation and
holding periods are contemplated in the literature, the consensus view appears to be that the
results of the 6– 6 combination are reasonably representative of the other strategies. For
example, Chui et al. (2010), Griffin et al. (2010), and Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) all follow the
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)’s protocol and report the results from a single momentum
strategy involving a six month formation period and a six month holding period. Whether this
single momentum strategy is truly representative of style momentum around the world is an
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empirical matter (Chao et al., 2012). In my work, I will consider portfolio strategies with f and h
ranging from 1 to 12, a total of 144 forming and holding for each portfolio. These combinations
of the choices further contribute to the momentum literature in finding the time variations and
lasting capability of momentum, this choice of f and h has not been used by prior studies.
The third issue is whether to skip a month between the forming and holding period. Chao et al.
(2012) argue that winner stocks tend to close the month at the ask price and loser stocks tend to
close at the bid. When these stocks bounce to the other side of the market on the open,
reported returns to momentum strategies are lower than what would obtain if a suitable period
of time were placed between the two measurement periods. However, prior studies have
different views on this issue. Chen and De Bondt (2004) show that skipping a month has little
impact on reported style momentum returns. Lewellen (2002) employs a model that does not
skip a month in his study of U.S. style momentum. Barberis and Shleifer (2003) suggest that
skipping a month should not hurt style momentum returns. Jegadeesh and Timan (1993), Chui
et al. (2010) and Griffin et al. (2010) use the skipping technique. This bid‐ask bounce is actually a
microstructural issue (Chao et al., 2012), it happens due to lack of liquidity. If liquidity is
controlled in the analysis, the bid‐ask bounce is not as large as thought. In this study, I use daily
close prices to calculate the monthly returns, so there is no need to skip a month between the
formation and holding period.
There is another issue of using the Winner and Loser Portfolio Method, whether to use weekly
or monthly returns. Prior literature suggests that using weekly return data may suffer from the
problem of price reversal (Lehmann, 1990; Lo and Makinlay, 1990), which can largely affect the
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momentum strategies. Causes of reversals can be various, Kaul and Nimalendran (1990) and
Conrad, Kaul, and Nimalendran (1991) show that part of the return reversal is due to bid‐ask
bounce. Lo and MacKinlay (1990) and Boudoukh, Richardson, and Whitelaw (1994) note that
nonsynchronous trading contributes to contrarian profits. Jegadeesh and Titman (1995b)
observe that market makers set prices in part to control their inventories, which induces a
return reversal. Gutierrez and Kelly (2008) argue that the momentum profitability at the weekly
frequency is more puzzling and represents stronger under‐reaction to news than at the monthly
frequency. Avramov, Chordia, and Goyal (2006) show that weekly reversals are strongest for
stocks in which liquidity is low and turnover is high75. Using weekly returns to assess potential
explanations of momentum affords researchers greater confidence in identifying the news that
underlies the return, the 6‐ or 12‐month returns commonly used to examine momentum
theories preclude such identification (Gutierrez and Kelley, 2008). In order to alleviate the
problem of reversal, I will use monthly data in this study, weekly return will also be examined in
order to explain momentum in short horizons as well as test the information environment of the
sample76.
In sum, for the concerns of Winner‐Loser Portfolio Momentum method, I will utilize equal
weighting schemes, multiple choices of formation and holding periods, daily data to avoid the
skipping problem and monthly returns as suggested by prior literature.
75 This conclusion is critically important, it is linked with the microstructural issue of the market. In this
study, I argue that high investor heterogeneity can make investors quickly accept the newly broken out
prices, which reduces the chances of price reversals. Higher turnover ratio also helps to build this belief.


















Figure 16: The flow of W/L Portfolio Momentum Strategy. Also called double sorting momentum strategy. First sort
the stocks by some certain fundamental characteristics, such as market capitalization, sectors. Then, sort the stocks by
their formation period returns. Finally, compare the holding period returns to see the momentum results.
5.3 Trading Volume
5.3.1 The Measure of Volume: Volume Turnover
As aforementioned in Section I and II, trading volume is the direct manifestation of investor
heterogeneity, its reactions have the potential to yield insight into the effects of financial
disclosures on unobservable disagreement across investors. In order to capture investors’
heterogeneous characteristics, I use trading volume turnover as the volume measure. Trading
volume turnover is defined as the percentage of shares traded relative to the number of shares
outstanding, it is a natural measure of trading activity (Lo and Wang 2000), it also automatically
controls for firm size (Garfinkel, 2009).
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5.3.2 Model Development
As discussed in Section II, Garfinkel (2009) compares the prevailing measures of investor
heterogeneity with high‐frequency tick data and concludes that unexplained volume measures
are the best suited for investor heterogeneity, this view is also supported by Wang and Liu
(2014). In this study, in order to find the best volume measure of investor heterogeneity
incorporating the microstructural explanations from Section II, my measure is based on
Garfinkel’s measure, but different by some modifications.
Garfinkel (2009) documents that the standard unexplained volume is calculated using the
equation:




Where SUV is Standard Unexplained Volume and 𝜀𝑖 is the residual. In Garfinkel (2009)’s model,
heterogeneity is represented by the residual of Equation (1) divided by its standard deviation, he
argues that for each individual stock, there is inherently generated volume when price changes,
this could be caused by market wide trading activities or liquidity commonality, it is captured by
the return77. By using the residual of the regression, SUV captures the volume which is not
explained by this market wide liquidity. Liquidity commonality is primarily caused by program
trading (Choe and Yang, 2010). Garfinkel (2009) implies that these electronic traders do not
have fundamental views on the assets, they are just looking for counter parties to trade, which
is known as “chase for liquidity” (O’Hara, 2015). Hence, Garfinkel (2009)78 concludes that the
excessive trading volume which is not explained by this market wide trading activities, reflects
77 In a standard market model of CAPM, firm return is regressed with market return. Wang (1994) uses a
similar modelling method, which regresses volume with market‐wide volume.
78 Garfinkel (2009) refers this idea as the liquidity effect.
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investor heterogeneity of individual stocks. However, Garfinkel neglects the fact that even
orders which are generated and sent by computer programs, are not randomly produced, they
are based on some trading logics designed by humans, which also reflect the designers’ views,
and hence reflect investor heterogeneity. Most of the trading logics are designed based on
charts, only a few are designed based on firms’ fundamentals. Therefore, I argue that in





is the right measure of investor heterogeneity. From the definition equation, 𝛽𝑖 represents the
trading volume generated per unit change of absolute price return. Given a certain return,
larger trading volume generated indicates that more liquidity on the limit order book (LOB) were
consumed, and hence more agreements on “disagreements” are reached79. Knyazeva et al.
(2014) find that firms with more investor heterogeneity exhibited higher trading volume overall
and higher trading volume reaction per unit price reaction. Higher consumed liquidity
represents higher investor heterogeneity in the current period. In contrast, given the same
amount of return, lower volume indicates that there is very few liquidity consumed on the LOB,
and hence less agreements reached during this price change process. This could be due to the
fact that the investors were less interested in participating or have less incentives to trade,
hence the market shows lower investor heterogeneity at the moment.
From the point view of liquidity measurement, Goyenko et al. (2009) do a comprehensive study
on the current prevailing liquidity measures, they conclude that Amihud (2002)’s illiquidity
measure is the best to capture the price impact effect of liquidity among all liquidity indicators.
79 See section II for a discussion on trading volume.
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The reciprocal of this measure is the liquidity measure. As demonstrated in Section II, the
positive relationship between liquidity and investor heterogeneity, I believe that the coefficient
𝛽𝑖 is the right measure for investor heterogeneity81. This conclusion is in line with Ahmed et al.
(2003), Ahmed and Schneible (2007), Hope et al. (2009) and Bamber et al. (2011)’s conclusion
that “the slope coefficient from a regression of trading volume on the magnitude of price
changes is a good proxy for differential precision of preannouncement information”, and I argue
that it is also a good proxy for earnings periods.
5.3.3 The Earnings Period and Non‐Earnings Periods
Bamber et al. (2011) point out that further researching the validity of this measure has
important implications for information asymmetry, which is one main source of investor
heterogeneity. Due to the fact that earnings announcements could spur trades, investor
heterogeneity is maximized when the release of the earnings announcements. I am going to
examine investor heterogeneity in both earning periods and non‐earnings periods. Similar to
Zhou and Shin (2013), I will use Equation 1 and 2, plus a nine‐day window to capture the
earnings period. Starting from five days before the earnings date until three days after the
earnings date, there are totally nine days for the earnings period. Each firm has four reported
80 Amihud uses dollar trading volume as the denominator, another study argues that this measure is the
same as using trading volume.
81 This measure could be subjected to the influence of price reversal in long horizons. In this study, I use
daily returns to capture investor heterogeneity to minimize the effect of price reversal.
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10Q file each year, so there are four earnings windows, and the remaining days are the non‐
earnings windows.
The expected testing results are: the coefficient 𝛽𝑖 is positive across all firm groups and all
periods; Higher‐order foreign listed firms have the highest level of trading volume, lower‐order
foreign list firms follow, and pure US listed firms have the lowest level of volume, for both
earnings and non‐earnings periods. Earnings periods have higher trading volume generated than
that of non‐earnings periods, because the arrival of new information stimulates heterogeneity
to reach a higher level.
6. Results
6.1 The Momentum Reactions
This section reports the test results of the Winner and Lower Momentum Strategy. For each
stock category (high order foreign listed, low order foreign listed and pure US, and hence high,
low and US), for a certain month, the returns of the whole group in the past f months (formation
period) are ranked in descending order, and the top and bottom 10%82 of the stocks (rounded to
the nearest whole number) will be collected to Portfolio W and Portfolio L, respectively. These
two portfolios will be watched for the following h months (holding period). The stocks are
equally weighted for simplicity and academic scrutiny83. Ideally, the returns of Portfolios W and
L in the holding period are supposed to be positive and negative, respectively, as predicted by
82 Chui et al. (2010) use 10%, and Asness et al. (2013) use one third. This proportion is depended on the
number of stocks in each category.
83 In reality, weighted portfolio will be used depending on the capital pool and manager’s interest.
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the definition of momentum. The zero cost strategy84 Portfolio W‐L, is also tested in order to
compare the strength of the positive and negative momentum. To increase the power of the
tests, overlapping portfolios are constructed, and the overlapping interval is set to one month.
Portfolios are not rebalanced during the holding period, as previous studies did.
<Insert Table 1 here>
<Insert Table 2 here>
<Insert Table 3 here>
<Insert Table 4 here>
6.1.1 The Winner Portfolios: How Investors React with Past Positive Returns
From the test results of average returns of portfolio Ws, the average monthly returns of the
holding period of high order, low order and pure US firms over the entire time horizon are
0.0477, 0.0231 and 0.0172, respectively, and all of them are very strongly significant. The
returns are in descending order, this result is consistent with my prediction that investor
heterogeneity is descending among the three groups. It shows that investor heterogeneity is the
highest for the high group, and the lowest for the pure US group. The ANOVA tests show that
the average p‐values85 of Portfolio Ws of high, low and US is 0.2360, and this number is
unacceptable to reach the conclusion that the high, low and US are significantly different.
However, after reviewing the detailed data for the individual holding period, I find that for each
portfolio, if the holding period is greater than 6 months, the ANOVA tests results are quite
84 A zero cost strategy is a portfolio buying and selling securities at the same time to offset initial
investment capitals.
85 The P‐value of ANOVA test is based on the F‐statistic and F distribution.
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significant. After controlling the holding periods to 6 to 12 months, the average p‐values of the
ANOVA tests are 0.008486, and they are acceptable at the 1% level and highly significant, which
suggests that the positive momentum for the groups are significantly different over
intermediate to long terms, in orders words, investors react to positive returns differently in the
medium to long terms87, not in the short terms. This conclusion is consistent with Hong and
Stein’s (1999) model that information is diffusing into the market gradually, the diffusing
process starts from 6 months and up to 12 months. The positive momentum returns are the
most in the 6 months holding period, after 6 months, they start to decrease, and still significant
until the 12 month. Investor Heterogeneity is manifested from 6 to 12 month periods, in the
short‐term it is not reflected.
After controlling the sampling periods to pre, during and post‐financial crisis, this conclusion still
holds. In the pre‐financial crisis period (2000 to 2007), the average returns are 0.0971, 0.0387
and 0.0249, respectively, which is also in descending order. It shows the decreasing level of
investor heterogeneity, and it also exhibits similar patterns as the whole sample. In the financial
crisis (October 2007 to March 2009), all returns are negative and highly significant. This indicates
that investors react to positive returns negatively in the financial crisis, with the loss of
confidence, investors were escaping from the stock market to avoid further potential loss. We
could see the immense power of this confidence loss, and hence the loss of liquidity. This trend
is not found during the post‐financial crisis period. One amazing finding in this period is that
some of the US firms have very large returns during the financial crisis. This can be
understandable, I consider the pure US firm as the ones having the lowest level of investor
86 Exclude the one month formation period.
87 Six to twelve months.
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heterogeneity, according to the Two‐Period Order Flow Model, stocks with the lower level of
heterogeneity tend to reverse after breakouts. This conclusion is consistent with Zhou and Shin
(2013) that large MNEs, especially IT firms have higher momentum/volatility. Further studies
should focus on which stocks produce so large abnormal returns under the circumstances of the
overall loss of market confidence, what fundamental characteristics these firms have. Hedge
fund managers could be interested in these stocks.
However, in the recent years of the post‐financial crisis (2009 to 2017), the explanatory power
of investor heterogeneity decreases, although the mean returns of the three groups are 0.0188,
0.0185 and 0.0131 respectively, still in a decreasing manner. The ANOVA tests have a low
average p‐value of 0.1340, compared with 0.0084 for the whole sample, and the 0.0454 for the
pre‐financial crisis period. The following t‐tests between groups show that only the 12 months
holding periods have the significant difference between High and low order. For the 12 month
formation periods, high and low order groups have significant difference starting from 3 months
holding to 12 months holding. A possible reason is with the advent of Internet trading, investors
are able to trade different stock categories. The restrictions of cultural background are
weakened. This phenomenon exists among all firm groups. The Internet is possibly producing a
homogenizing process of investors and momentum is diminishing88.
The t‐tests between groups show that the mean monthly returns of portfolio Ws are higher for
high order foreign listed firms than that of low order foreign listed firms, and low orders are
88 This is another topic worthy to study further. How does Internet change investor’s behavior, does it
homogenize or heterogenize investors? Another school of thought says that Internet is enlarging investor
heterogeneity, because it makes investor trade easier.
109
higher than that of pure US firms. This is consistent with my first hypothesis that Investor
Heterogeneity of the three groups is in descending order. But in the financial crisis period, the
differences are not apparent. In the post‐financial crisis period, it is not significant. I also
attribute this phenomenon to the reason of Internet trading.
Overall, investors positively response with past positive returns, high order foreign listed firms
have higher returns than low order foreign listed firms, which has higher returns than that of the
pure US firms. The ANOVA tests show the differences between the three groups of Portfolio W.
Most of the significant tests are found in the 6‐12 holding period of 6‐12 formation period,
indicating that the momentum effect differences between the three group are in the
intermediate or the long term, in other words, investor heterogeneity are best explained in the
intermediate to the long term. But the group differences of Portfolio W are decreasing, which
shows that investor heterogeneity reflected by Portfolio W is decreasing over time. A possible
explanation of this phenomena is that as investors get more familiar with the US market, they
are not limited to invest stocks which are closely related with them, they are investing other
stock categories, which reduces investor heterogeneity in a certain group. The effect of Psychic
Distance is diminishing. With the development of the Internet, language barriers are reducing,
and analysts in different languages emerge which also facilitates foreign investors to join the
trading process of local stocks.
The t‐tests between groups show that from intermediate to long term, high order stocks and
low order stocks have significant differences, and its mean difference is positive, indicating high
momentum effect for high order firms and hence higher level of investor heterogeneity.
According to Chui et al. (2010), their test results reveal that momentum profits monotonically
increase with the score of the individualism index. This study also supports this conclusion. The
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high, low and pure US groups have monotonically decreasing profits, which also indicates that
individualism is playing an important role in investors’ behavior.
<Insert Table 5 here>
6.1.2 Portfolio L: How Investors React with Past Negative Returns
For Portfolio Ls, the test results are quite interesting. The average monthly returns of the
holding period of high order, low order and pure US firms are 0.0297, 0.0328 and 0.4764,
respectively, for the entire horizon, all of them are very strongly significant. For all subsamples,
all of the holding returns of Portfolio Ls are positive, except for some returns in the financial
crisis. From the definition of momentum, past negative returns could predict future negative
returns. However, in my test results, all groups have positive returns for portfolio L. This
phenomenon can be explained as the happening of price reversals after severe price drops. The
average psychology of investors is on the long side, and hence investors are willing to buy back
these stocks, other than further shorting them. This conclusion is consistent with Avramo et al.
(2006) that price reversals are mainly confronted with loser stocks.
In previous studies, Chui et al. (2010) and Asness et al. (2013) documented the results of
positive returns of portfolio Ls, however, they did not provide reasons for this price reversals.
According to the Heterogeneous Market Hypothesis and the Two‐Period Order Flow model,
markets with poor investor heterogeneity tend to produce price reversals. High orders firms
have the highest level of investor heterogeneity, and hence have the lowest chances of price
reversal. This conclusion is consistent with JT (1993) that lack of liquidity is a potential reason for
price reversals, in my sample, the pure US group has the lowest level of investor heterogeneity
and hence the lowest level of liquidity.
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Secondly, for all subsample periods and the whole sample period, the returns of the three
groups are in a monotonically increasing order, except for the financial crisis period with slight
difference between the high and low group. The price reversals are higher for the first of the
holding period, than that of the second and the third month. For the high and low groups, the
price reversal effect is diminishing, however, price reversals start to continue after 6 months for
the pure US group. The following t‐tests between groups show that the difference between the
high and the low group is insignificant, but highly significant between the low and the US group.
As the assumption is that the US group has the lowest level of investor heterogeneity, plus low
level of heterogeneity tends to create price reversals, these test results are consistent with my
original assumption.
For all groups around all subsample periods, the pure US firm group has the highest returns,
which is much higher and much more significant than the other two groups. Some of the returns
are very high and can be up to 102% per month for the whole and can up to 640% monthly
return in the financial crisis period89. As the level of investor heterogeneity the pure US firms is
the lowest within the three group, it could have the large rebound on average, this conclusion is
not consistent with the hypothesis that momentum should be monotonically decreasing,
however, it can be explained by the Two‐Period Order Flow model. After breakouts, stocks with
high level of heterogeneity tend to have the same direction as the breakout, while stocks with
low level of heterogeneity tend to have the opposite direction (price reversals). The same as the
Portfolio Ws, the ANOVA tests show that the returns of the three groups are significantly
89 Could be affected by the financial crisis returns. In the financial crisis period, returns are extremely large
compared with normal periods.
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different after 6 months of holding, which indicates that investor heterogeneity identified by
individualism scores have long‐term differences.
The returns of portfolio Ls are exhibiting decreasing order. That is, the first month right after the
formation period has the highest return, and the returns of the following months are getting
lower and lower. On the other hand, examining the time variations returns of Portfolio Ls shows
that the momentum is decreasing for all groups. This phenomenon also exists in the Portfolio
Ws. I also attribute this phenomenon to the advent of Internet trading.
6.1.3 Portfolio W‐L: The Differences between Positive and Negative Momentum
Portfolio W‐Ls measures the differences between positive and negative momentum. In general,
the returns of Portfolio W‐L are negative and very significant, which demonstrates that investors
react with negative returns more aggressively than positive returns. Only in the period of pre‐
financial crisis, the positive momentum is higher than the negative ones. The only significant
group is the pure US, as this group has quite a high price reversal return. Other two groups show
very weak differences. Again, for the portfolios with holding periods more than 6 months, the
W‐L portfolios also passed the ANOVA tests, which indicates the medium to long‐term
heterogeneity differences between the three groups.
The subsequent t‐tests between groups show that in general, in the winner portfolio, high order
firms have higher returns than low order firms, which is consistent with my prediction because
of its higher level of investor heterogeneity. But this positive difference is not significant. Low
order firms have higher returns than that of pure US firms in general, the significance is much
higher in the medium to the long run.
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In sum, using the individualism index as a culture measure shows momentum differences in the
6 to 12 months holding periods. High order foreign listed firms generate higher returns than that
of low order foreign listed firms, and the pure US group has the lowest return. From this point,
we could see investor heterogeneity identified by individualism index is effective. Practitioners
can use this index as a stock screening tool in the long run. For momentum traders, they would
better choose stocks with low individualism index as they have larger chances to produce
momentum, while it is better for range traders to choose pure US firms as it has smaller chances
of momentum because of lower investor heterogeneity.
6.1.4 Alternative Tests: Using Trading Volume Turnover as an Investor Heterogeneity
Filter
As section II argues, trading volume also reflects another dimension of investor heterogeneity, I
also test the momentum effect by using trading volume turnover as an alternative indicator. The
reasoning is that, trading volume turnover reflects how active a stock is, higher turnover
suggests higher investor participation rate, and hence higher investor heterogeneity90. I group
all of the firms by their average trading volume turnover over the most recent period from 2009
to 2017. With Group One having the highest trading volume turnover, and Group Five having
the lowest. Each group has about 430 stocks. According to the relationship between investor
heterogeneity and liquidity, Group One also has the highest liquidity, and Group Five has the
lowest liquidity. I would like to test whether trading volume turnover an effective indicator of
investor heterogeneity. If it was, momentum must be reflected through this classification
method. Price momentum is positively related with investor heterogeneity, hence the
90 Recall in section III that investor heterogeneity is positively related with liquidity.
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momentum reactions of the five groups should be: momentum is monotonically decreasing
from Group One to Group Five. Group One should has the lowest chance of price reversals, and
group five has the largest chances.
The Winner and Loser testing strategy is the same as prior tests. From Table 7, we could see that
the average returns for portfolio Ws are 0.0201, 0.0186, 0.0173, 0.0155, and 0.0120 respectively,
all of them are significant. This monotonically decreasing order is consistent with my prediction
that investor heterogeneity has a positive effect on price momentum. The following months in
the holding periods exhibit a slightly decreasing manner, which shows that the momentum
effect is decreasing. The average returns of portfolio Ws in the holding periods is about from 1%
to 2%, the ANOVA tests show that there are no significant differences between the groups in all
holding months in general, and the subsequent t‐tests between groups confirm this results.
Again, from the test results of Portfolio Ws, we also see that in general, investors react with
positive returns positively, this reaction reflects investor’s psychology that they believe that the
positive news is still dominating the market, and the stock price is experiencing an under‐
reaction process.
For portfolio Ls, the test results show that all returns are positive and most of them are
significant, this result is consistent with the prior tests grouped by individualism scores.
Investors negatively react with negative returns: when investors observed large negative stock
returns, they are inclined to buy it back and with a flunking mind of “bottom fishers”, this
pushes up the stock prices. The testing results are worthy to elaborate.
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The following ANOVA tests show that in general, the five groups have no significant differences,
but for 6 to 9 holding months, the test results are quite significant. The following t‐tests also
confirm this relationship. Combined with the momentum tests grouping by individualism scores,
6 to 12 months are good windows to capture investor heterogeneity. From this aspect, the two
conclusions are consistent. This further illustrates that investor heterogeneity is playing a key
role in the medium to the long term. In the short term, investor heterogeneity is not manifested,
but in the longer terms(over 12 months), momentum starts to diminish and thus is not a
determinant variable to control investor heterogeneity, further studies should check longer
holding periods, ie. (18 to 36 months)91, and also extend the holding period to see the
momentum effect, but this test could be subjected to another problem, that is, the change of
investor psychology over time caused by firms’ fundamental changes. The highest returns are
generated in the month right after the formation periods, all of the samples are higher than 2%.
In general, the returns of Portfolio Ls for Group one to Group five exhibit a U‐Shaped pattern.
Group one has a generally larger return around 40% per month, the returns are very significant.
The highest returns are generated in the month right after the formation periods, all of the
samples are higher than 40%. The following months in the holding periods exhibit a decreasing
manner, which shows that the price reversal effect92 is decreasing. This is the same as the
corresponding returns in Portfolio Ws. As Group One has the highest level of investor
heterogeneity measure by TV turnover, this could be explained as that, when investors observed
large price drops, a market full of aggressive and active investors are tending to buy the stocks
back, hoping to grasp the price bottom, and as more investors saw the formation of price
91 Over 18 months holding months is considered problematic, it is considered as another Portfolio W.
92 Negative formation period returns, and positive holding period returns.
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bottom, more investor begin to join in. The following months (2‐12) are all positive returns,
which indicates that investors begin to accept this price reversal, sellers have been ruled out of
the market. One striking phenomenon is that the returns of month 2 to 9 in the holding period
are decreasing, but they are still very ideal (around 20%), especially, the returns of month 12
increase to about 40% again, which reflect investors’ psychology.
For Group Two, the returns are quite stable in all months, about 2% to 3%. Group three has an
interesting pattern, returns in later months, the holding periods greater than the formation
months, are increasing. As Group Three has the medium level of heterogeneity, reasons have to
be further analyzed. Group Four has a very stable and quite large return around 15% per month,
do not change with holding periods, the returns decrease slightly right after the holding periods
exceed the formation period.
The most striking is Group Five, with the lowest level of heterogeneity by TV turnover. After 6
months of the holding period, the average monthly return is more than 300%, but this high
return does not exclude the outliners in around the financial crisis. During the financial crisis, the
average trading volume turnover is sharply lower than the normal periods, this low investor
heterogeneity and hence low liquidity could lead too much air for the returns. In order to
exclude this effect, I conduct the 2009 to 2017 test which is reported in Table 8.
<Insert Table 7 here>
<Insert Table 8 here>
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Table 8 reports the momentum strategy profits using trading volume turnover as grouping
method, time spans from 2009 to 2017. This time span does not cover the period of financial
crisis, hence it has fewer extreme returns. For Portfolio Ws, all returns are positive and highly
significant, but all returns regardless of the formation and holding periods, are around 1%. The
ANOVA tests show that in general, investor heterogeneity does not affect positive momentum,
Group One, Three and Five have no significant differences. Investors react with positive
momentum calmly, different groups have no differences according to the results of the ANOVA
tests. The following t‐tests between groups show that there is very little difference between the
means, and these differences are insignificant.
For portfolio Ls, it also shows that from Group One to Group Five, the returns exhibit a U‐shaped
pattern. Group One and Group Five have the highest and second highest returns, with Group
Three the lowest. In this classification method, Group One has the highest level of heterogeneity,
and Group Five has the lowest, this U‐shaped pattern can be explained as investor
heterogeneity is helping to build positive momentum, with less price reversals. However, for
Group Five, because it has the lowest level of investor heterogeneity, price reversals frequently
happen, but low liquidity could produce extremely large returns which offsets the price
reversals. Consistent with previous tests, negative momentum has all positive returns in the
following holding periods, which shows that investors are willing to accept the already‐dropped
stocks, and start to buy them back. Theories behind this phenomenon are worthy to study
further. Group One exhibits a return decreasing manner, that is from one month holding to 12
months holding, its returns are monotonically decreasing, with the first month holding returns
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0.83, and the third month 0.55 to the twelve month 0.18, however, their significance level is
increasing. It can be explained as high investor heterogeneity starts to function in the
momentum strategies, this phenomenon repeats for both 9 and 12 formation periods, also, the
average returns for the same holding month are almost the same regardless of the formation
periods for Group One and Group Three, except Group Five. I can also explain this phenomenon
by the level of investor heterogeneity of Group Five. As it has the lowest level, its momentum
effect is relatively unstable compared with the groups with high heterogeneity.
Portfolio W‐L generally shows negative returns, which further confirms Portfolio Ls have larger
returns than Portfolio Ws.
6.1.5 Summary
In summary, investor heterogeneity is playing an important role in the Winner and Loser
Momentum Strategy. Both individualism scores and trading volume turnover can be used as
investor heterogeneity identifiers. Combined with the Two‐Period Order Flow Model, I argue
that investor heterogeneity can be measured by price momentum in the medium to the long‐
term (from 6 to 12 months), further studies should build on this conclusion to find other insights
about investor heterogeneity and momentum.
Practitioners can use foreign listing as a stock screener. For trend traders, they can choose high‐
order foreign listed firms as their trading targets for trend following strategies. While, for range
traders, pure US firms with low average trading volume and small market capitalization are good
choices, because their low level of investor heterogeneity reduces the chances of trending.
From section 6.1.4, we could see the power of trading volume turnover as an alternative
measure of investor heterogeneity. Section 6.2 reports the test results combined with both
return and trading volume.
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6.2 The Trading Volume Reactions
6.2.1 Trading Volume Reactions around Normal Periods
<Insert Table 9 here>
Table 9 reports the regression statistics of trading volume for all timeframes. Trading volume is
defined as the total monthly volume divided by the outstanding shares. The coefficient beta can
be explained as the trading volume generated per unit change of absolute return. According to
my analysis in Section II and III, more trading volume generated per absolute return represents
higher level of investor heterogeneity. According to Table 2, beta is positive and significant over
the whole period and the sub‐periods, indicating that absolute returns have high explanatory
power in trading volume.
For the whole period (2000 to 2017), the betas of the high, low and US groups are 0.7834,
0.2672 and 0.4052 respectively. The means of the betas are not the same as my prediction.
Ideally, investor heterogeneity of the three groups are in decreasing order, and hence their
betas, but the low group has the smallest beta. The high order group has the highest beta as
predicted. For all periods, the high group has larger betas than the low group, and the US group
has larger betas than the low group, which indicates that investor heterogeneity is higher for the
high group and lower for the US group, it is the lowest for the low order group. The final two
columns show the mean differences and their related p‐values for the t‐tests. I find that the
beta differences are significant all over the periods, except the high‐low group in the financial
crisis period. This indicates that in general, high order foreign listed firms have higher investor
heterogeneity than that of low order foreign listed firms, but this difference is only significant at
the 0.1 level.
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We could see that the R‐squared values for the regressions are relatively stable over the periods.
The highest level of R‐square is 16.53% for all groups over all periods, which suggests that
absolute return is not the only variable could explain trading volume, there are other factors
behind it, this conclusion is consistent with Garfinkel (2009). High order firms have the highest
average R‐squares, which indicates that absolute return has the highest explanatory power in
this firm group. The R‐squares reach to the highest level in the financial crisis period for all three
groups, this is consistent with my prediction, in that, in the financial crisis period, the
explanatory power of absolute return increased. Panic of financial loss leads investors to trade
in the crisis period.
The difference between low and US group is highly significant. For all periods, the US group has
higher beta than that of the low order foreign listed group, the difference is significant at the
0.01 level, which suggests that investor heterogeneity is higher for the US group. However, this
conclusion should include the chances that there are large MNEs in the US group, these large
MNEs have enough influence so that their investor heterogeneity is still quite higher. In Section
6.1.4, I use trading volume turnover to group the same data set, in group one, which has the
highest trading volume and hence highest investor heterogeneity, I find that the firms in Group
one are mainly the firms from the Pure US group. This indicates that 1). these two classifications
are not uniform, 2).there is indeed, that some pure US firms have higher investor heterogeneity
than high order and low order firms, such as Apple, Google, Amazon, etc. In order to eliminate
this large‐MNEs effect, I use market capitalization as a filtering option, subtracting the top 5% of
all market capitalization(of the whole sample) from the US group as well as the high and low
order group, and retest the betas of Equation One.
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<Insert Table 10 here>
Table 10 reports the betas for the regression tests omitting the stocks which have the top 5%
market capitalizations of each group. The mean differences between groups increased
compared with previous tests, and the p‐values show that they are more significant. Removing
larger stocks (by market capitalization) does have a significant effect on investor heterogeneity.
6.2.2 Trading Volume Reactions around Earnings Announcements
<Insert Table 11 here>
Table 11 reports the regression statistics around the earnings announcements period. For each
firm, I collect the earnings announcements dates from Bloomberg. According to my analysis in
Section III, earnings announcements spur trades (Bamber et al., 2011), and enlarges investor
heterogeneity. I set the window to a (‐5, 5) window, which is, five days before the earnings date,
plus five days after the earnings dates.
Many studies i.e., Zhou and Shin (2013) find that Post Earnings Announcements Drifts (PEAD)
exists, and other literature documents the existence of trading volume surge around the earning
dates. In this test, I am assuming that earnings announcements spur investor heterogeneity to a
higher level than the non‐earnings periods. In addition, the high order foreign listed group
should have trading volume generated than that of the low and US firm, because of its higher
level of heterogeneity. From the last two rows of Table 11. One amazing finding of the earnings
period regressions are that all means of coefficients are negative, and these means are all
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The empirical analysis shows that investor heterogeneity of high order foreign listed, low order
foreign listed, and pure US firms are in monotonically descending order. This result is consistent
with my original research hypothesis. It can be inferred that investor heterogeneity is
manifested by price momentum from the medium to the long timeframe (6 to 12 months),
however, in the short run (less than 6 months), the test result shows less explanatory power.
According to a report from MFS Investment Management Canada, the average holding period of
NYSE stocks was 2.5 years in 1929, it reached to a historical high of 30 years in 1940, and
recently dropped to 1.67 years in 2012 (Roberge et al., 2014). If the average holding period is
expected to be a long‐term variable, short‐term variations of momentum are considered as
noise, which cannot represent generality. For the holding periods longer than 12 months, it
involves the overlap of a new round of momentum, hence it was not covered in this study. I split
the entire period into three sub‐periods, pre‐financial crisis period (2000‐2007), the financial
crisis (2007‐2009), and post‐financial crisis (2009‐2017) 93 . Except for the financial crisis sub‐
period, the other two also shows this heterogeneity‐descending relationship.
Another interesting finding of this study is that, investors positively react with past positive
returns and negatively react with past negative returns. In other words, investors are inclined to
93 For the post‐financial crisis period, the average momentum does not show a descending order of
heterogeneity of the three groups, but for the significant periods, this conclusion still holds. See section 6
test results.
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buy past winners and buy past losers, which shows a “chase rising effect” and a “bottom fishing
effect”. Buying past winners (positive momentum) did not show significant returns, however,
buying past losers of low‐liquidity (low heterogeneity) stocks generates significantly higher
returns. Stocks with the lowest level of investor heterogeneity generates the highest returns
after prices collapse. This conclusion is counter‐intuitive with momentum but can be explained
jointly by the theory of mean‐reverting and the Two‐Period Order Flow Model. In the Two‐
Period Order Follow Model, I argued that stocks with low level of heterogeneity tend to reverse
after price breakouts, this conclusion is in line with Avramvo et al. (2006) that there are
substantially more reversals in less liquid stocks than in highly liquid stocks.
In addition, I used trading volume turnover as an alternative investor heterogeneity splitter, and
reallocated the stocks into five groups. Because trading volume itself represents investor
heterogeneity, this classification method also ranks stocks from the highest level of
heterogeneity to the lowest. The testing results show a monotonically decreasing order of
positive momentum among the groups, which shows that the stocks with higher level of
investor heterogeneity generate higher momentum constantly over long time, and lower levels
tend to generate price reversals. The negative momentum tests show a “U‐shaped” pattern, this
could be explained as that high investor heterogeneity supports momentum to accumulate, and
low investor heterogeneity supports price reversals to happen. Using trading volume as an index
of investor heterogeneity is an effective option, it has important implications for practitioners
for their strategy design.
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In summary, the momentum tests show that investors are chasing for price continuation. They
react with positive returns positively and react with negative returns negatively. When stocks
have positive past returns, fundamental analysts explain them as good economic conditions.
According to Hong and Stein (1999)’s model, information is diffusing into the market slowly. As
good news gradually spreads across the markets, investors start to react with the news. The
behavior of optimistic investors overcomes the pessimists’, which leads to the significantly
positive returns in the following months. When stocks have past negative returns, investors’
“bottom fishing” psychology starts to function, aggressive investors start buying the stocks back
and the confidence of optimists is rebuilt. In general, after 12 months the momentum effect
disappears. Investor heterogeneity identified by Hofstede’s individualism score or trading
volume turnover is playing an important role in momentum, its level determines the medium to
the long‐term momentum profits.
For the tests of trading volume reactions, the results are not as significant as the momentum
tests, but they still show that higher order foreign listed firms have the highest level of investor
heterogeneity among the three groups. The Pure US group had higher trading volume generated
per unit return than the lower order group, and this conclusion was contradicted with my
original hypothesis. This phenomenon happens partially because some of the large US MNEs
have the highest market capitalizations which can also attract more investors94, and hence it
alleviates the heterogeneity of the pure US group.
94 This conclusion is in line with Zhou and Shin (2013) that stocks with largest market capitalization have
higher momentum.
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This study creates a new paradigm on quantifying investor heterogeneity. That is, starting from
investors’ composition first, then hypothesizing that investor heterogeneity is higher for the
more diverse groups and lower for the less ones, finally using price momentum and trading
volume to test this hypothesis. It successfully create an example to address the original two
issues: 1) lacking tangible data to represent investor heterogeneity and 2) the untestable
predictions. This method is novel and can be considered as a starting point for further studies on
quantifying and testing the forecasts of investor heterogeneity.
This study also contributes to the current literature on stock selection methods: Using
individualism scores and trading volume turnover as stock screening tools. Professional traders
and option strategists could benefit from using the individualism scores or trading volume
turnover to classify firms. Trend traders should choose foreign listed stocks with low
individualism scores or high trading volume turnover stocks, as these stocks have higher level of
investor heterogeneity, and hence larger chances for trending or momentum. On the other
hand, range traders should choose stocks with higher individualism scores, pure US stocks and
stocks with lower trading volume turnover, as these ones have larger chances to be in a
consolidation pattern because of their lower heterogeneity. However, large pure US MNEs, such
as Apple, Google, Intel, which have the largest market capitalizations, also tend to be in a
trending because of its higher level of investor participation rate and hence heterogeneity, this
conclusion is consistent with Zhou and Shin (2013) and other studies that IT industry is the most
volatile among all sectors. Option strategists should choose stocks with low individualism scores
as volatility buyers, and stocks with high individualism scores as volatility sellers to make joint
strategies.
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The analysis of this study leads me to posit the new Heterogeneous Market Hypothesis (HMH).
This new theory gives all investors and regulators a new framework to understand the price
actions of any asset, and it also points out the theoretical foundation for heterogeneous asset
pricing models. The price movement of any asset can be classified into two phases: either
trending or consolidation. The essence behind the two phases is the level of investor
heterogeneity. The news is the most important factor affecting investor heterogeneity.
Depending on the level of heterogeneity, a market can be further classified into strong, semi‐
strong and weak forms of heterogeneity. Again, this hypothesis is contradicted with the Efficient
Market Hypothesis which assumes that all investors have the same expectation. But it also has a
linkage with EMH, which is, under the extreme case of homogeneous expectation, information
arrives at the market and spreads instantaneously, all investors understand the new information
in the same way and reflect their expectations on the limit order book by the same way, which is
Milgrom and Stokey (1982)’s Pareto optimization condition. At this moment, no trades happen,
and the market is fully efficient95. This new version of HMH has no material differences with
Muller et al. (1993)’s version, which argues that market volatility is caused by different types of
investors. However, it has wider applicability. The Two‐Period Order Flow Model also
demonstrates the relationship between investor heterogeneity, price momentum and price
reversals, it can be used to explain the breakout patterns and price reversals in any asset market.
For decades, technical analysis is considered contemptuous in academics, because it lacks
mathematical proof and merely reflects traders’ subjective visual feeling. In addition, as the
95 See the Heterogeneous investor spectrum in section 3.4.
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EMH dominates in financial economics, it left little room for the foundational theories of
technical analysis to develop. The wide applications of technical analysis by practitioners
illustrate its effectiveness. In this study, I argue that investor heterogeneity is the main cause of
price volatility, compared with investors’ homogeneous assumption in the EMH, the investors’
heterogeneous assumption in the HMH can be used as the theoretical foundation for technical
analysis. Of course, defining heterogeneity is much more difficult than defining homogeneity,
this study is merely a starting point. Theories on heterogeneity have to rely on future research.
7.2 Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research
There are several limitations to this study. Firstly, the overall test results are not ideal when
using trading volume as an investor heterogeneity measure. The average R‐squared is 18%,
which indicates that the overall explanatory power is low. A significant portion of variations of
absolute returns on trading volume is not explained. For the future research, a better fitted
trading volume model should be employed.
Secondly, the sample data has a potential problem in that, both higher order and lower order
foreign listed firms have too few firms. They are 149 and 213 respectively, while the pure US
group has 1816 firms. It could affect the explanatory power of the individualism score. For the
future research, Chui et al. (2010) suggest that using Hong Kong as a target country because
Hong Kong has the easiest listing requirements, and its geographic location ensures that it is a
concurrent of culture. WFE (2017) shows that Hong Kong has 131 foreign listed firms out of
1987 total, Euronext has 162 foreign listed firms out of 1093 total, Singapore has 267 foreign
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listed firms of 483 total and Taiwan96 has 119 foreign listed firms of 1549 total. Future studies
can use these exchanges as target venues. However, these exchanges have different trading
mechanisms, i.e., short selling constraints, or the availability of the option and other derivatives’
markets97, these factors will also affect the level of investor heterogeneity. In selecting the
samples, researchers have to consider the problem that firms with the largest market
capitalizations are natural collectors of diverse investors. Many studies document that higher
momentum is generated by these large firms, i.e. Zhou and Shin (2013), future studies should
control firm size in order to reduce the selection bias.
Third, the relationship between EMH and HMH is worthy to explore further. Muller et al. (1993)
argue that the more homogeneous the investors are, the more closely the price converges to its
“real value”. This “real price” discovery process is also the process to the market efficiency.
Market vitality is composed of liquidity, while liquidity is provided by heterogeneous investors. It
is because of these heterogeneous investors, who could get information from different channels
and immediately reflect the value of new information on prices, can make the market free of
arbitrage and more “efficient”. In my opinion, there is no “real value” of an asset, investors buy
and sell only for profits, and the markets are completely speculative. The argument that
Investors are constantly finding the “real values” of the assets, implies some degrees of
homogeneity. These investors believe that they could find the “real value” earlier than other
investors using the same information set. As we discussed in Section III, it is not homogeneity,
but heterogeneity generates trades.
96 There are two stock exchanges in Taiwan: the Taipei Exchange and the Taiwan Stock Exchange.
97 Derivative markets provide a perfect hedging tool and hence can attract more diverse investors.
According to my understanding, the US stock market has the most competitive and fairest trading rules,
as it provides multiple ECN channels connected to the exchange. These ECN channels have different
charging/rebating mechanisms, which allowed investors can get access to liquidity with different needs.
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Muller et al. (1993) use the FX market as the research target, I believe it is the most
heterogeneous market in the world. According to BIS (2016), the currency market has the
largest daily market capitalization of 5.1 trillion dollars, and this value is quite stable over time.
EURUSD is considered as the most liquid underlying security in the world. Future studies can
also focus on other underlying markets other than the equity and currency markets. Up until
now, there is no evidence document that momentum exists in the option markets, there are
several possible reasons. First, the mechanism of options are much more complex than that of
stocks, hence fewer participants and lower levels of heterogeneity. The other reason is that the
value of an option is depended on its underlying security, option value could dramatically
change instantly after security changes. Long‐term momentum cannot be formed under this
mechanism. However, the value of an option is largely depended on its extrinsic value, which is
a function of time. Whether the extrinsic value has a momentum effect has not been explored
yet.
Many studies believe that asset prices should follow a martingale process98 over short time
horizons (Avramov et al., 2006), and argue that this stochastic process is due to the arrival of
unpredictable information. Under the environment of efficient market, the systematic short‐run
changes in fundamental values can be negligible. However, GARCH is widely used to model
volatility and McMillan (2012) argues that stock volatility is a relatively stable variable, both of
98 In general, it is widely accepted that stock price follows a Generalized Wiener Process. A Generalized
Wiener Process is a stochastic process which the incremental value depends on its current value plus a
time related noise. 𝑑𝑆 𝜇𝑆𝑑𝑡 𝜎𝑆𝑑𝑧, where 𝑆 is the current value of the security, 𝜇 is the expected
value at time t, it is also called the drift rate, 𝜎2 is the variance or historical volatility of the security, and
𝑑𝑧 is a typical Markov Process. A martingale is a zero drift process. (Hull, 2018). The Wiener Process is
consistent with the weak form of market efficiency (Hull, 2018).
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these demonstrate that stock value is bounded by some already‐known factors. From the aspect
of investor heterogeneity, investors trading for a certain stock are relatively stable, hence the
value of a stock should be somewhat depended on its previous values, this is in line with the
martingale process. There is much to explore in this direction.
Figure 13 shows the investor heterogeneity spectrum. It shows how stock prices react with
investor heterogeneity from pure homogeneity, low heterogeneity to high heterogeneity. On
the right most side, there is a missing level of pure heterogeneity. How momentum and volume
reactions are under the condition of pure heterogeneity is beyond the scope of this study.
Ideally, investors must have some degree of homogeneity in a large timeframe, but to the
extreme case, it can be assumed that within a certain short timeframe, no two investors have
the identical views on an asset. In other words, there are no more than one buying/selling
orders at the same price level within a certain short timeframe. How does the stock price react
under this special assumption? It has to be tested in with a laboratory simulation.
Previous studies suggested that price returns and trading volume should be studied jointly
(Bamber et al., 2011). Kim and Verrecchia (1997) show that the cross‐sectional differences in the
precision of preannouncement information and differential interpretations manifest themselves
as differences in the relation between price changes and trading volume. Dontoh and Ronen
(1993) demonstrate that neither price nor trading volume alone provides a complete
characterization of information. This study actively attempted to integrate the two factors, i.e.,
using trading volume turnover as a grouping variable to find the medium to long‐term
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momentum, and the results are very ideal. Future studies should use Volume Weighted Average




where 𝑃𝑘 is the actual close price of a day, and 𝑉𝑘 is the volume generated during a day. VWAP
considers all the intra‐day prices at which transactions have occurred. It is documented that the
daily returns computed with VWAP have a smaller realized variance than that with the closing
price (Ting, 2006). VWAP is a relatively less research area in academics (Sahadev, 2018), but
referenced frequently by professional traders to find the average costs. Ting (2006) provides an
example which evidences that, relative to the volatility of VWAP returns, the volatility of closing
price returns tends to understate the beta risk estimation result. By consequence, the research
suggests that by using VWAP along with the closing price, estimation of financial risk and asset
pricing can be performed with considerably less noise (Ting, 2006).
Further, using Amihud (2002)’s liquidity measure can also be an alternative measure of investor
heterogeneity. In this study, I elaborated the relationship between investor heterogeneity and
liquidity. In general, investor heterogeneity has a positive relationship with all dimensions of




captures the effects of both price and volume, hence it is a good attempt to control the level of
investor heterogeneity.
99 Except the trading volume dimension (order depth) at the same side and at the same price level on the
LOB.
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Finally, the Two‐Period Order Flow model is based on short‐term order reactions after price
breakouts. For longer timeframes, I assume that a stock’s long‐term volatility is comprised of the
accumulations of short‐term volatility, and this short‐term order reaction can be generalized
into long terms. However, the momentum test results are based on long time frames, i.e., from
6 to 12 months, this study did not reach a consistency at this point. To test the short‐term
volatility, high‐frequency data (less than one minute) is needed. Whether this model and its
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Appendix I: Tables
Table 1 reports the testing results of the Winner/Loser Portfolio strategy from 2000 to 2017. For each portfolio, I
include 10% of total stocks of each group in portfolio W and L. Time rolling interval is one month100. Column 3 to 11
show the monthly portfolio returns of each group, with the corresponding t‐statistics underneath. Column 1 shows the
formation month and column 2 shows the holding months. Rolling starts at January 3, 2000 and ends at December 29,
2017. Column 12 to 15 show the ANOVA p‐values among the groups(high, low and US) and the remaining columns
show the t tests of difference of the means between the groups. For portfolio Ws, the average monthly returns of the
holding period of high order, low order and pure US firms over the entire time horizon are 0.0477, 0.0231 and 0.0172,
respectively, and all of them are very strongly significant. The returns are in descending order, this result is consistent
with my prediction that investor heterogeneity is descending among the three groups. It shows that investor
heterogeneity is the highest for the high group, and the lowest for the pure US group. As discussed in Section III, high
investor heterogeneity implies less chances of price reversals and higher momentum. After controlling the holding
periods to 6 to 12 months, the average p‐values of the ANOVA tests are 0.0084 and they are acceptable at the 1%
level and highly significant, which suggests that the positive momentum for the groups are significantly different over
intermediate to long terms, in orders words, investors react to positive returns differently in the medium to long terms,
but not in the short terms. Investor heterogeneity is statistically significant among the groups, the higher order, lower
order and pure US groups of stocks have heterogeneity in decreasing order. The t‐tests between groups show that the
mean monthly returns of portfolio W are higher for high order foreign listed firms than that of low order foreign listed
firms, and low orders are higher than that of pure US firms. This is consistent with my first hypothesis that Investor
Heterogeneity of the three groups are in descending order. But in the financial crisis period, the differences are not
apparent. In the post‐financial crisis period, it is not significant. I also attribute this phenomenon to the reason of
Internet trading. In general, if the formation period is larger than 6 months and the holding period is larger than 6
months, all groups shows significant differences in momentum. For Portfolio Ls, almost all returns are positive, which
shows that the average psychology of investors is on the long side, and hence investors are willing to buy back these
stocks other than further shorting them. The average monthly returns of the holding period of high order, low order
and pure US firms are 0.0297, 0.0328 and 0.4764 respectively, they are monotonically increasing. The high order
group has the lowest positive returns, and the pure US group has the highest positive returns, this can be explained in
100 On average, each month has 21 trade days.
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that price reversals happen mostly in the group of stocks with the least investor heterogeneity, is it consistent with the
hypothesis and the Two‐Period Order Flow Model.
Starting Dat 1/3/2000 End Date 12/29/2017 No.of Firm 10% Rolling Pe 21 days







High/Low Low/US High/Low Low/US High/Low Low/US
0.0616 0.0203 0.0167 0.0315 0.0346 0.1181 0.0301 ‐0.0143 ‐0.1014 0.0413 0.0036 ‐0.0031 ‐0.0836 0.0444 0.0872
(1.4220) (2.7361) (2.9635) (3.5418) (3.6412) (1.6505) (0.7091) (‐1.5953) (‐1.4167) 0.1741 0.3503 0.4059 0.1241 0.1537 0.1142
0.0264 0.0193 0.0205 0.0242 0.0334 0.0969 0.0022 ‐0.0141 ‐0.0765 0.0071 ‐0.0011 ‐0.0092 ‐0.0635 0.0163 0.0624
(2.4708) (3.6396) (2.4043) (3.4032) (4.1037) (2.0262) (0.2052) (‐1.8519) (‐1.5840) 0.2762 0.4550 0.1970 0.0960 0.1094 0.1016
0.0195 0.0209 0.0185 0.0245 0.0268 0.0821 ‐0.0051 ‐0.0058 ‐0.0635 ‐0.0015 0.0024 ‐0.0022 ‐0.0553 0.0008 0.0577
(3.4189) (4.1680) (2.9639) (4.2081) (4.5046) (2.3020) (‐0.9423) (‐1.0812) (‐1.7682) 0.4235 0.3818 0.3947 0.0637 0.4603 0.0569
0.0372 0.0202 0.0261 0.0253 0.0258 0.0892 0.0120 ‐0.0057 ‐0.0631 0.0171 ‐0.0059 ‐0.0006 ‐0.0634 0.0176 0.0574
(2.8600) (5.0986) (3.6685) (4.8188) (5.0980) (2.4997) (0.9189) (‐1.2917) (‐1.7422) 0.1055 0.2334 0.4685 0.0401 0.1004 0.0585
0.0288 0.0207 0.0225 0.0251 0.0255 0.1475 0.0037 ‐0.0048 ‐0.1250 0.0081 ‐0.0018 ‐0.0004 ‐0.1220 0.0085 0.1202
(5.0456) (6.0930) (5.5007) (5.0874) (5.6786) (1.6889) (0.6870) (‐1.3492) (‐1.4272) 0.1120 0.3690 0.4745 0.0823 0.0949 0.0859
0.0317 0.0242 0.0201 0.0235 0.0240 0.1820 0.0082 0.0002 ‐0.1619 0.0075 0.0041 ‐0.0005 ‐0.1580 0.0080 0.1621
(5.1899) (7.2706) (6.8349) (5.1962) (5.9640) (1.6821) (1.5217) (0.0486) (‐1.4932) 0.1421 0.1758 0.4644 0.0731 0.1084 0.0684
0.0643 0.0262 0.0157 0.0376 0.0390 0.1254 0.0267 ‐0.0128 ‐0.1097 0.0381 0.0104 ‐0.0013 ‐0.0864 0.0395 0.0968
(1.4723) (2.7574) (3.3733) (3.7501) (4.0388) (1.7324) (0.6301) (‐1.1419) (‐1.5146) 0.1972 0.1627 0.4617 0.1190 0.1840 0.0938
0.0282 0.0243 0.0233 0.0269 0.0309 0.1147 0.0013 ‐0.0066 ‐0.0913 0.0038 0.0010 ‐0.0040 ‐0.0837 0.0079 0.0847
(2.5804) (4.1592) (2.7680) (3.6999) (4.1465) (2.2782) (0.1183) (‐0.8310) (‐1.8037) 0.3782 0.4612 0.3500 0.0506 0.2771 0.0499
0.0235 0.0260 0.0232 0.0280 0.0271 0.1015 ‐0.0046 ‐0.0011 ‐0.0783 ‐0.0025 0.0028 0.0009 ‐0.0744 ‐0.0035 0.0772
(3.7459) (5.0668) (3.6900) (3.9877) (4.7179) (2.6465) (‐0.6562) (‐0.1926) (‐2.0300) 0.3787 0.3660 0.4585 0.0282 0.3534 0.0246
0.0468 0.0228 0.0220 0.0302 0.0272 0.1113 0.0166 ‐0.0043 ‐0.0893 0.0240 0.0008 0.0030 ‐0.0842 0.0210 0.0850
(3.3066) (5.8712) (5.7227) (4.7740) (5.5341) (2.9459) (1.1194) (‐0.9471) (‐2.3650) 0.0518 0.4391 0.3525 0.0141 0.0893 0.0133
0.0371 0.0231 0.0196 0.0263 0.0269 0.3636 0.0108 ‐0.0038 ‐0.3440 0.0139 0.0035 ‐0.0006 ‐0.3367 0.0146 0.3402
(5.4252) (6.8415) (6.8571) (4.7626) (6.3650) (2.1894) (1.5861) (‐1.0242) (‐2.0661) 0.0341 0.2118 0.4649 0.0220 0.0303 0.0212
0.0404 0.0258 0.0182 0.0256 0.0261 0.3157 0.0148 ‐0.0003 ‐0.2975 0.0145 0.0076 ‐0.0006 ‐0.2896 0.0151 0.2972
(5.0586) (7.8581) (7.9089) (5.0964) (6.5954) (2.2209) (2.0193) (‐0.0871) (‐2.0875) 0.0467 0.0293 0.4649 0.0215 0.0321 0.0192
0.0697 0.0255 0.0167 0.0469 0.0459 0.1544 0.0228 ‐0.0205 ‐0.1377 0.0442 0.0087 0.0010 ‐0.1085 0.0433 0.1172
(1.5732) (3.9696) (3.9215) (3.1830) (4.5792) (1.9753) (0.5111) (‐2.1154) (‐1.7635) 0.1620 0.1285 0.4784 0.0851 0.1722 0.0689
0.0668 0.0228 0.0163 0.0381 0.0359 0.1429 0.0286 ‐0.0131 ‐0.1266 0.0440 0.0065 0.0022 ‐0.1070 0.0418 0.1135
(1.7719) (4.7510) (4.7748) (3.4208) (5.0522) (2.6586) (0.7518) (‐1.9229) (‐2.3726) 0.1243 0.1334 0.4345 0.0249 0.1409 0.0180
0.0585 0.0239 0.0162 0.0399 0.0336 0.1257 0.0185 ‐0.0097 ‐0.1095 0.0345 0.0077 0.0063 ‐0.0921 0.0282 0.0998
(2.2053) (5.3818) (5.5115) (4.0905) (5.5091) (3.0538) (0.6725) (‐1.7168) (‐2.6801) 0.1002 0.0737 0.2924 0.0140 0.1583 0.0082
0.0564 0.0223 0.0163 0.0307 0.0336 0.5578 0.0257 ‐0.0113 ‐0.5415 0.0341 0.0060 ‐0.0029 ‐0.5242 0.0370 0.5302
(3.2904) (6.0364) (6.7462) (4.2796) (6.3565) (2.2312) (1.4337) (‐2.5543) (‐2.1615) 0.0265 0.0878 0.3723 0.0186 0.0231 0.0178
0.0394 0.0258 0.0158 0.0273 0.0302 0.6554 0.0120 ‐0.0043 ‐0.6396 0.0135 0.0101 ‐0.0028 ‐0.6253 0.0163 0.6353
(5.8279) (7.5931) (7.1897) (4.9054) (6.7626) (2.7856) (1.6930) (‐1.1929) (‐2.7112) 0.0376 0.0068 0.3469 0.0043 0.0206 0.0038
0.0378 0.0249 0.0154 0.0293 0.0333 0.4177 0.0085 ‐0.0084 ‐0.4023 0.0129 0.0095 ‐0.0040 ‐0.3844 0.0169 0.3939
(5.2024) (8.0537) (7.8474) (5.3508) (6.7968) (2.7684) (1.1647) (‐2.0110) (‐2.6585) 0.0516 0.0048 0.2956 0.0058 0.0226 0.0050
0.0781 0.0165 0.0170 0.0389 0.0438 0.9281 0.0392 ‐0.0272 ‐0.9112 0.0616 ‐0.0004 ‐0.0049 ‐0.8844 0.0664 0.8840
(1.7458) (2.5873) (3.8716) (3.3474) (4.1788) (1.2036) (0.8847) (‐2.6871) (‐1.1810) 0.0872 0.4781 0.3783 0.1264 0.0727 0.1267
0.0819 0.0183 0.0153 0.0284 0.0379 0.9216 0.0535 ‐0.0196 ‐0.9063 0.0636 0.0030 ‐0.0094 ‐0.8837 0.0731 0.8867
(1.8201) (3.7877) (4.7324) (3.5948) (4.9286) (1.6831) (1.1892) (‐2.6127) (‐1.6526) 0.0807 0.3028 0.1962 0.0541 0.0553 0.0537
0.0431 0.0226 0.0153 0.0268 0.0348 0.9866 0.0163 ‐0.0122 ‐0.9713 0.0205 0.0072 ‐0.0080 ‐0.9519 0.0285 0.9591
(3.2753) (4.9227) (5.4514) (3.9493) (5.4252) (1.9863) (1.2269) (‐1.9643) (‐1.9515) 0.0711 0.0901 0.1957 0.0284 0.0266 0.0277
0.0557 0.0253 0.0145 0.0229 0.0333 0.9861 0.0328 ‐0.0080 ‐0.9716 0.0305 0.0108 ‐0.0104 ‐0.9528 0.0409 0.9635
(3.2746) (6.4801) (6.3307) (4.7934) (6.1456) (2.7883) (1.9174) (‐1.7071) (‐2.7405) 0.0412 0.0089 0.0754 0.0038 0.0111 0.0036
0.0361 0.0240 0.0139 0.0255 0.0336 0.7927 0.0106 ‐0.0096 ‐0.7788 0.0121 0.0101 ‐0.0081 ‐0.7590 0.0202 0.7692
(5.4447) (7.2291) (7.0738) (5.1574) (6.8133) (3.2108) (1.7180) (‐2.3928) (‐3.1450) 0.0526 0.0046 0.1233 0.0012 0.0032 0.0011
0.0337 0.0221 0.0134 0.0309 0.0356 0.4850 0.0028 ‐0.0135 ‐0.4715 0.0115 0.0087 ‐0.0047 ‐0.4493 0.0163 0.4580
(4.9635) (7.8216) (7.6906) (5.7548) (7.0499) (3.0516) (0.4654) (‐3.2678) (‐2.9580) 0.0587 0.0045 0.2608 0.0026 0.0127 0.0023
0.0840 0.0250 0.0178 0.0308 0.0372 0.9456 0.0531 ‐0.0122 ‐0.9278 0.0589 0.0073 ‐0.0064 ‐0.9084 0.0654 0.9156
(1.5497) (3.8982) (4.0159) (2.9539) (3.5960) (1.2008) (0.9929) (‐1.1699) (‐1.1775) 0.1406 0.1761 0.3311 0.1250 0.1160 0.1233
0.0810 0.0255 0.0147 0.0281 0.0317 0.9418 0.0529 ‐0.0062 ‐0.9270 0.0555 0.0108 ‐0.0036 ‐0.9101 0.0591 0.9208
(1.7503) (5.2513) (4.5664) (3.5675) (4.1826) (1.6843) (1.1493) (‐0.8081) (‐1.6552) 0.1172 0.0326 0.3711 0.0526 0.1034 0.0509
0.0684 0.0265 0.0139 0.0275 0.0315 1.0218 0.0408 ‐0.0051 ‐1.0079 0.0419 0.0126 ‐0.0040 ‐0.9902 0.0459 1.0028
(2.0961) (6.1812) (4.9498) (4.2584) (4.8547) (2.0144) (1.2415) (‐0.8329) (‐1.9829) 0.1022 0.0072 0.3318 0.0262 0.0857 0.0249
0.0387 0.0249 0.0133 0.0266 0.0360 1.0379 0.0122 ‐0.0111 ‐1.0247 0.0138 0.0116 ‐0.0094 ‐1.0020 0.0232 1.0136
(3.9721) (6.5210) (6.1111) (4.9895) (6.2026) (2.8635) (1.2185) (‐2.2588) (‐2.8197) 0.0936 0.0043 0.1167 0.0031 0.0187 0.0029
0.0282 0.0226 0.0125 0.0286 0.0339 0.8311 ‐0.0004 ‐0.0113 ‐0.8186 0.0056 0.0101 ‐0.0053 ‐0.7972 0.0109 0.8073
(4.8793) (7.0430) (6.7753) (5.7880) (6.7003) (3.2775) (‐0.0875) (‐2.7929) (‐3.2183) 0.2002 0.0033 0.2266 0.0010 0.0462 0.0009
0.0293 0.0216 0.0128 0.0357 0.0334 0.5127 ‐0.0064 ‐0.0118 ‐0.5000 0.0077 0.0088 0.0024 ‐0.4793 0.0054 0.4882
(4.2304) (7.9264) (7.6393) (6.5318) (6.7787) (3.1531) (‐0.9655) (‐2.9028) (‐3.0649) 0.1499 0.0030 0.3745 0.0018 0.2445 0.0016
0.0477 0.0231 0.0172 0.0297 0.0328 0.4764 0.0180 ‐0.0096 ‐0.4592 0.2360 0.0709 0.0541 0.0246 0.0059 ‐0.0030 ‐0.4437 0.0276 0.4496































12 0.0034 0.0015 0.0009
t‐Test for Two Groups(mean differences, p‐value)



















































Table 2:Momentum strategy returns from 2000 to 2007
Starting Dat 1/3/2000 End Date 10/11/2007 No.of Firms in each g 10% Rolling Period  21 days







High/Low Low/US High/Low Low/US High/Low Low/US
0.1280 0.0338 0.0235 0.0349 0.0507 0.0674 0.0931 ‐0.0168 ‐0.0439 0.0942 0.0103 ‐0.0157 ‐0.0167 0.1099 0.0270
(1.3001) (2.6678) (2.5342) (2.4469) (3.2152) (2.8176) (0.9604) (‐1.0370) (‐1.9132) 0.1726 0.2561 0.2302 0.2801 0.1330 0.1686
0.0437 0.0286 0.0171 0.0333 0.0545 0.1079 0.0104 ‐0.0258 ‐0.0908 0.0151 0.0115 ‐0.0212 ‐0.0535 0.0362 0.0650
(1.9632) (3.3126) (2.9726) (2.6051) (3.5914) (1.5231) (0.4460) (‐1.7154) (‐1.2869) 0.2645 0.1346 0.1436 0.2311 0.0971 0.1849
0.0254 0.0316 0.0179 0.0281 0.0409 0.0463 ‐0.0027 ‐0.0093 ‐0.0283 ‐0.0062 0.0136 ‐0.0128 ‐0.0054 0.0066 0.0190
(2.7498) (3.6581) (3.5500) (3.1069) (4.0368) (3.9136) (‐0.2763) (‐0.8924) (‐2.5779) 0.3119 0.0877 0.1735 0.3653 0.3235 0.1060
0.0682 0.0283 0.0238 0.0341 0.0398 0.1193 0.0341 ‐0.0115 ‐0.0955 0.0399 0.0045 ‐0.0056 ‐0.0796 0.0455 0.0840
(2.3050) (4.6042) (5.1657) (4.0061) (4.8928) (1.5903) (1.1370) (‐1.5046) (‐1.2739) 0.0950 0.2815 0.3169 0.1473 0.0720 0.1339
0.0511 0.0328 0.0269 0.0387 0.0364 0.0924 0.0124 ‐0.0037 ‐0.0655 0.0183 0.0059 0.0022 ‐0.0560 0.0160 0.0619
(4.3406) (5.9610) (5.8308) (4.2624) (5.1205) (2.1199) (1.0347) (‐0.6229) (‐1.4984) 0.0809 0.2075 0.4231 0.1042 0.1156 0.0822
0.0570 0.0398 0.0310 0.0368 0.0364 0.2090 0.0202 0.0033 ‐0.1780 0.0172 0.0088 0.0004 ‐0.1726 0.0169 0.1813
(4.2168) (6.7007) (5.4480) (4.3489) (5.5549) (1.2414) (1.6344) (0.4850) (‐1.0562) 0.1227 0.1443 0.4856 0.1544 0.1177 0.1428
0.1318 0.0460 0.0203 0.0398 0.0528 0.0798 0.0919 ‐0.0068 ‐0.0595 0.0857 0.0258 ‐0.0130 ‐0.0270 0.0987 0.0527
(1.3124) (2.3895) (2.7505) (2.3459) (3.5089) (3.0435) (0.9461) (‐0.3069) (‐2.4143) 0.2019 0.1072 0.2840 0.1867 0.1622 0.0563
0.0492 0.0395 0.0204 0.0308 0.0458 0.1474 0.0184 ‐0.0063 ‐0.1270 0.0096 0.0192 ‐0.0151 ‐0.1015 0.0247 0.1207
(2.1355) (3.5861) (3.6446) (2.4693) (3.5340) (1.8497) (0.8208) (‐0.3897) (‐1.6051) 0.3534 0.0617 0.2017 0.1058 0.1864 0.0692
0.0386 0.0424 0.0253 0.0335 0.0382 0.0922 0.0051 0.0041 ‐0.0669 ‐0.0037 0.0170 ‐0.0047 ‐0.0540 0.0010 0.0710
(3.4729) (4.6357) (5.0026) (2.5899) (4.0448) (2.7239) (0.3836) (0.3417) (‐2.0348) 0.3976 0.0524 0.3843 0.0639 0.4781 0.0225
0.0933 0.0377 0.0272 0.0429 0.0405 0.1554 0.0504 ‐0.0029 ‐0.1282 0.0557 0.0105 0.0024 ‐0.1149 0.0533 0.1253
(2.8534) (5.7468) (6.1528) (3.5354) (5.0137) (1.9360) (1.4513) (‐0.3199) (‐1.5996) 0.0492 0.0940 0.4351 0.0790 0.0704 0.0619
0.0697 0.0409 0.0299 0.0395 0.0392 0.1181 0.0302 0.0017 ‐0.0882 0.0288 0.0110 0.0003 ‐0.0789 0.0285 0.0899
(4.7052) (7.0477) (5.8347) (3.6412) (6.1315) (2.4886) (1.9536) (0.2526) (‐1.8474) 0.0365 0.0782 0.4915 0.0516 0.0462 0.0328
0.0775 0.0452 0.0286 0.0390 0.0419 0.2448 0.0385 0.0033 ‐0.2163 0.0323 0.0166 ‐0.0029 ‐0.2030 0.0352 0.2196
(4.2263) (7.3555) (6.8703) (3.9482) (6.7766) (1.3986) (2.2515) (0.4999) (‐1.2344) 0.0489 0.0134 0.4031 0.1250 0.0290 0.1070
0.1475 0.0340 0.0241 0.0643 0.0647 0.1416 0.0832 ‐0.0307 ‐0.1175 0.1135 0.0099 ‐0.0004 ‐0.0768 0.1139 0.0868
(1.4195) (3.2850) (4.0123) (2.1033) (3.9177) (2.0323) (0.7951) (‐1.7737) (‐1.7085) 0.1401 0.2042 0.4952 0.1429 0.1428 0.1120
0.1382 0.0335 0.0249 0.0583 0.0523 0.1902 0.0798 ‐0.0188 ‐0.1653 0.1047 0.0086 0.0060 ‐0.1379 0.0987 0.1464
(1.5497) (4.3229) (4.7385) (2.4835) (4.4412) (2.1175) (0.8845) (‐1.4842) (‐1.8525) 0.1227 0.1810 0.4099 0.0658 0.1410 0.0538
0.1199 0.0377 0.0259 0.0663 0.0470 0.1293 0.0536 ‐0.0093 ‐0.1034 0.0822 0.0118 0.0193 ‐0.0823 0.0629 0.0941
(1.9115) (5.1898) (5.6712) (3.2754) (4.7690) (2.7864) (0.8197) (‐0.8803) (‐2.2741) 0.0982 0.0860 0.1965 0.0430 0.1724 0.0233
0.1161 0.0394 0.0268 0.0529 0.0488 0.1852 0.0633 ‐0.0094 ‐0.1583 0.0767 0.0125 0.0041 ‐0.1364 0.0727 0.1489
(2.8469) (6.4521) (6.4962) (3.6775) (6.1239) (2.1630) (1.4717) (‐1.2868) (‐1.8513) 0.0331 0.0454 0.4018 0.0582 0.0496 0.0432
0.0726 0.0465 0.0270 0.0465 0.0449 0.1508 0.0261 0.0016 ‐0.1238 0.0261 0.0195 0.0016 ‐0.1060 0.0245 0.1255
(4.8777) (7.8013) (6.6361) (4.3400) (6.5634) (2.9110) (1.6372) (0.2750) (‐2.3772) 0.0534 0.0038 0.4493 0.0229 0.0766 0.0095
0.0766 0.0447 0.0270 0.0498 0.0546 0.3010 0.0268 ‐0.0099 ‐0.2741 0.0318 0.0178 ‐0.0048 ‐0.2464 0.0367 0.2642
(4.5129) (7.6613) (7.3037) (4.6653) (6.4372) (1.6408) (1.5728) (‐1.2881) (‐1.4928) 0.0396 0.0056 0.3620 0.0918 0.0261 0.0773
0.1600 0.0256 0.0249 0.0569 0.0519 0.1543 0.1031 ‐0.0263 ‐0.1295 0.1344 0.0007 0.0050 ‐0.1025 0.1294 0.1032
(1.4943) (2.3654) (4.0884) (2.6211) (2.9632) (2.1308) (0.9740) (‐1.4601) (‐1.8089) 0.1076 0.4762 0.4283 0.0861 0.1157 0.0826
0.1714 0.0325 0.0241 0.0462 0.0536 0.2011 0.1252 ‐0.0210 ‐0.1769 0.1388 0.0084 ‐0.0073 ‐0.1475 0.1462 0.1559
(1.5733) (3.8492) (5.0541) (3.2341) (4.0813) (2.1368) (1.1488) (‐1.5087) (‐1.8937) 0.1037 0.1941 0.3531 0.0621 0.0934 0.0512
0.0781 0.0400 0.0255 0.0431 0.0492 0.1349 0.0350 ‐0.0092 ‐0.1094 0.0381 0.0145 ‐0.0061 ‐0.0857 0.0442 0.1002
(2.5455) (4.8508) (5.8423) (3.7243) (4.7939) (2.7600) (1.1373) (‐0.7926) (‐2.2769) 0.1167 0.0614 0.3476 0.0448 0.0910 0.0228
0.1129 0.0465 0.0250 0.0411 0.0498 0.2198 0.0718 ‐0.0033 ‐0.1948 0.0664 0.0216 ‐0.0087 ‐0.1700 0.0751 0.1915
(2.7283) (6.6978) (6.5196) (5.3866) (6.1720) (2.4045) (1.7080) (‐0.4239) (‐2.1306) 0.0588 0.0038 0.2175 0.0338 0.0413 0.0200
0.0695 0.0456 0.0251 0.0419 0.0515 0.2070 0.0277 ‐0.0060 ‐0.1819 0.0240 0.0205 ‐0.0097 ‐0.1554 0.0337 0.1759
(4.6103) (7.3391) (7.2601) (4.9908) (6.3654) (3.4653) (1.9837) (‐0.8947) (‐3.0261) 0.0725 0.0023 0.2037 0.0059 0.0159 0.0024
0.0722 0.0414 0.0246 0.0506 0.0596 0.3394 0.0216 ‐0.0181 ‐0.3148 0.0307 0.0168 ‐0.0090 ‐0.2799 0.0397 0.2967
(4.4775) (7.7595) (7.9533) (5.1374) (6.7168) (1.7479) (1.5759) (‐2.5311) (‐1.6202) 0.0369 0.0037 0.2502 0.0771 0.0058 0.0657
0.1909 0.0425 0.0289 0.0381 0.0488 0.1552 0.1528 ‐0.0063 ‐0.1264 0.1484 0.0136 ‐0.0107 ‐0.1065 0.1590 0.1201
(1.4343) (3.8818) (4.9315) (2.0457) (2.7915) (2.0793) (1.1636) (‐0.3289) (‐1.7028) 0.1349 0.1373 0.3384 0.0842 0.1170 0.0602
0.1813 0.0420 0.0252 0.0429 0.0479 0.2085 0.1384 ‐0.0059 ‐0.1833 0.1393 0.0168 ‐0.0050 ‐0.1606 0.1443 0.1774
(1.5835) (5.0378) (5.6950) (3.0058) (3.6556) (2.1308) (1.2144) (‐0.4084) (‐1.8839) 0.1143 0.0391 0.3981 0.0538 0.1063 0.0375
0.1539 0.0415 0.0246 0.0441 0.0473 0.1735 0.1099 ‐0.0058 ‐0.1489 0.1125 0.0169 ‐0.0032 ‐0.1263 0.1156 0.1432
(1.9039) (5.9459) (6.0074) (4.0861) (4.3850) (3.1804) (1.3458) (‐0.5344) (‐2.7564) 0.0848 0.0195 0.4179 0.0128 0.0820 0.0055
0.0867 0.0431 0.0242 0.0415 0.0569 0.2898 0.0452 ‐0.0138 ‐0.2656 0.0435 0.0189 ‐0.0154 ‐0.2329 0.0590 0.2519
(3.7230) (6.2670) (7.1793) (5.4185) (6.0203) (2.9890) (1.8868) (‐1.6944) (‐2.7346) 0.0381 0.0075 0.1034 0.0096 0.0110 0.0058
0.0621 0.0401 0.0234 0.0453 0.0522 0.2296 0.0168 ‐0.0121 ‐0.2062 0.0220 0.0166 ‐0.0069 ‐0.1774 0.0289 0.1940
(4.7109) (6.7103) (7.7147) (6.0827) (6.1739) (3.8543) (1.5373) (‐2.0497) (‐3.4391) 0.0654 0.0073 0.2713 0.0021 0.0109 0.0009
0.0709 0.0382 0.0243 0.0585 0.0559 0.3745 0.0124 ‐0.0177 ‐0.3501 0.0327 0.0139 0.0027 ‐0.3186 0.0300 0.3325
(4.1851) (7.4491) (8.7478) (6.2833) (6.7865) (1.8445) (0.7646) (‐2.8422) (‐1.7238) 0.0341 0.0096 0.4149 0.0607 0.0434 0.0531
0.0971 0.0387 0.0249 0.0440 0.0485 0.1755 0.0532 ‐0.0097 ‐0.1506 0.1533 0.1683 0.0821 0.0584 0.0138 ‐0.0045 ‐0.1271 0.0629 0.1409
(11.6671) (36.7350) (44.5031) (25.0037) (37.7695) (12.2321) (6.8733) (‐5.8851) (‐10.6014) (5.5943) (6.4271) (5.5319) (6.9329) (13.8307) (‐2.9566) (‐9.1949) (7.5987) (10.0060)
Average
t‐statisitc
9 0.0064 0.0002 0.0000
12 0.0054 0.0902 0.0560
12
1 0.2597 0.1347 0.0805




6 0.0066 0.0027 0.0004
0.0949 0.0168
9
1 0.2114 0.1918 0.0886
2 0.1821 0.0858 0.0388
3
9 0.0054 0.0012 0.0001





1 0.2773 0.3768 0.1513
2 0.2286 0.1270 0.0624
3
9 0.0037 0.0219 0.0018




1 0.3794 0.3556 0.1878
2 0.3905 0.1660 0.0773
3
9 0.0116 0.0783 0.0124
12 0.0095 0.2592 0.1606
0.3567 0.1049 0.0275
6 0.0367 0.1455
12 0.1251 0.3536 0.2837
3 0.4717 0.4474 0.2006
6 0.1496 0.3087 0.1414
Portfolio W‐L
1
1 0.3689 0.4633 0.2140










Portfolio W Portfolio L Portfolio W‐L Portfolio W Portfolio L
9 0.0837 0.2292 0.0902
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Table 3:Momentum strategy returns from 2007 to 2009
Starting Dat 10/12/2007 End Date 3/9/2009 No.of Firms in each gro 10% Rolling Period  21 days







High/Low Low/US High/Low Low/US High/Low Low/US
‐0.0429 ‐0.0645 ‐0.0324 0.0018 ‐0.0407 ‐0.0226 ‐0.0448 ‐0.0238 ‐0.0098 0.0216 ‐0.0321 0.0425 ‐0.0180 ‐0.0209 ‐0.0141
(‐1.2122) (‐2.7035) (‐1.5964) (0.0429) (‐1.2893) (‐0.9082) (‐1.7070) (‐1.4095) (‐0.7393) 0.3088 0.1573 0.2145 0.3287 0.2543 0.2592
‐0.0056 ‐0.0535 ‐0.0271 0.0113 ‐0.0368 ‐0.0300 ‐0.0169 ‐0.0168 0.0029 0.0479 ‐0.0265 0.0480 ‐0.0068 ‐0.0001 ‐0.0197
(‐0.1877) (‐3.5436) (‐1.9227) (0.2687) (‐1.7668) (‐1.5964) (‐0.5442) (‐1.2154) (0.2990) 0.0842 0.1055 0.1582 0.4055 0.4988 0.1274
‐0.0132 ‐0.0446 ‐0.0240 0.0211 ‐0.0406 ‐0.0235 ‐0.0343 ‐0.0040 ‐0.0005 0.0314 ‐0.0206 0.0617 ‐0.0171 ‐0.0303 ‐0.0036
(‐0.5194) (‐3.4311) (‐2.1364) (0.5903) (‐2.4736) (‐1.8758) (‐1.4977) (‐0.4763) (‐0.0625) 0.1432 0.1207 0.0668 0.2083 0.1161 0.3782
‐0.0146 ‐0.0332 ‐0.0239 ‐0.0039 ‐0.0355 ‐0.0185 ‐0.0108 0.0022 ‐0.0054 0.0186 ‐0.0093 0.0316 ‐0.0169 ‐0.0129 0.0076
(‐0.8070) (‐3.1663) (‐3.1578) (‐0.2274) (‐3.5980) (‐2.5669) (‐0.6130) (0.3040) (‐1.1675) 0.1937 0.2404 0.0636 0.0911 0.2533 0.1933
‐0.0210 ‐0.0295 ‐0.0189 ‐0.0023 ‐0.0299 ‐0.0193 ‐0.0187 0.0005 0.0004 0.0085 ‐0.0105 0.0276 ‐0.0106 ‐0.0192 0.0001
(‐1.7973) (‐3.8316) (‐3.1892) (‐0.1265) (‐5.0721) (‐3.7051) (‐1.4616) (0.0867) (0.0812) 0.2784 0.1489 0.0913 0.1004 0.0990 0.4958
‐0.0273 ‐0.0276 ‐0.0199 ‐0.0151 ‐0.0359 ‐0.0238 ‐0.0122 0.0083 0.0039 0.0003 ‐0.0077 0.0208 ‐0.0121 ‐0.0206 0.0044
(‐2.5057) (‐3.3180) (‐3.8010) (‐1.1124) (‐6.1246) (‐4.1593) (‐1.1000) (1.6064) (2.8663) 0.4921 0.2298 0.1066 0.0894 0.0740 0.2261
‐0.0414 ‐0.0500 ‐0.0222 0.0069 ‐0.0452 ‐0.0331 ‐0.0483 ‐0.0049 0.0108 0.0086 ‐0.0278 0.0521 ‐0.0121 ‐0.0434 ‐0.0157
(‐0.9438) (‐2.4540) (‐0.9934) (0.1312) (‐1.3024) (‐1.0196) (‐0.9860) (‐0.2323) (0.6507) 0.4304 0.1833 0.2087 0.4005 0.2132 0.2818
‐0.0510 ‐0.0484 ‐0.0245 ‐0.0231 ‐0.0480 ‐0.0360 ‐0.0279 ‐0.0004 0.0115 ‐0.0026 ‐0.0239 0.0249 ‐0.0120 ‐0.0275 ‐0.0119
(‐2.4555) (‐3.3104) (‐1.5464) (‐0.6737) (‐2.1756) (‐1.5492) (‐1.0979) (‐0.0273) (0.7726) 0.4591 0.1390 0.2746 0.3562 0.1767 0.2817
‐0.0344 ‐0.0465 ‐0.0253 ‐0.0255 ‐0.0416 ‐0.0253 ‐0.0089 ‐0.0049 0.0000 0.0121 ‐0.0212 0.0161 ‐0.0163 ‐0.0040 ‐0.0049
(‐1.2899) (‐3.1309) (‐1.8180) (‐1.0376) (‐2.3214) (‐1.7192) (‐0.4292) (‐0.5899) (0.0000) 0.3477 0.1549 0.3012 0.2454 0.4306 0.3592
‐0.0311 ‐0.0344 ‐0.0209 ‐0.0207 ‐0.0399 ‐0.0203 ‐0.0103 0.0055 ‐0.0006 0.0034 ‐0.0135 0.0192 ‐0.0195 ‐0.0158 0.0060
(‐1.4771) (‐2.5509) (‐2.1329) (‐1.7488) (‐3.9393) (‐2.2605) (‐0.6476) (0.8928) (‐0.1332) 0.4474 0.2159 0.1184 0.0844 0.1883 0.2169
‐0.0364 ‐0.0308 ‐0.0193 ‐0.0297 ‐0.0385 6.7702 ‐0.0066 0.0077 ‐6.7895 ‐0.0055 ‐0.0116 0.0087 ‐6.8087 ‐0.0143 6.7971
(‐3.3232) (‐4.6072) (‐2.8298) (‐4.2636) (‐5.1327) (1.5546) (‐0.8297) (1.5588) (‐1.5582) 0.3386 0.1268 0.2068 0.0894 0.0825 0.0898
‐0.0445 ‐0.0386 ‐0.0262 ‐0.0360 ‐0.0445 ‐0.0320 ‐0.0085 0.0060 0.0058 ‐0.0059 ‐0.0124 0.0084 ‐0.0125 ‐0.0144 0.0001
(‐5.7740) (‐5.9630) (‐4.0283) (‐6.1771) (‐14.5387) (‐5.2450) (‐1.0286) (1.6633) (4.3266) 0.2949 0.1238 0.1449 0.0835 0.1075 0.4874
‐0.0557 ‐0.0580 ‐0.0424 ‐0.0496 ‐0.0471 ‐0.0322 ‐0.0060 ‐0.0109 ‐0.0102 0.0023 ‐0.0156 ‐0.0025 ‐0.0149 0.0048 ‐0.0007
(‐1.1601) (‐2.1447) (‐1.5038) (‐1.0140) (‐1.0767) (‐0.8460) (‐0.1618) (‐0.3921) (‐0.5063) 0.4835 0.3471 0.4848 0.4000 0.4591 0.4921
‐0.0517 ‐0.0465 ‐0.0369 ‐0.0486 ‐0.0498 ‐0.0257 ‐0.0031 0.0034 ‐0.0112 ‐0.0053 ‐0.0096 0.0012 ‐0.0241 ‐0.0065 0.0146
(‐1.2910) (‐2.1395) (‐1.5815) (‐1.4117) (‐1.7504) (‐0.9439) (‐0.1401) (0.2200) (‐0.8006) 0.4549 0.3838 0.4892 0.2742 0.4063 0.2465
‐0.0453 ‐0.0478 ‐0.0312 ‐0.0495 ‐0.0492 ‐0.0226 0.0041 0.0014 ‐0.0086 0.0025 ‐0.0166 ‐0.0003 ‐0.0266 0.0027 0.0099
(‐1.3023) (‐2.1407) (‐1.4707) (‐1.9681) (‐2.3486) (‐1.2702) (0.2133) (0.1245) (‐0.8475) 0.4767 0.2983 0.4965 0.1742 0.4517 0.2575
‐0.0481 ‐0.0377 ‐0.0216 ‐0.0348 ‐0.0441 10.1698 ‐0.0133 0.0064 ‐10.1914 ‐0.0104 ‐0.0161 0.0093 ‐10.2139 ‐0.0197 10.1978
(‐2.6944) (‐2.2012) (‐1.4324) (‐2.2119) (‐2.8523) (1.5579) (‐2.1910) (0.6976) (‐1.5607) 0.3419 0.2483 0.3410 0.0892 0.0538 0.0896
‐0.0619 ‐0.0387 ‐0.0291 ‐0.0439 ‐0.0499 21.3422 ‐0.0180 0.0111 ‐21.3714 ‐0.0231 ‐0.0097 0.0060 ‐21.3921 ‐0.0291 21.3824
(‐7.1227) (‐3.5966) (‐5.7283) (‐3.7062) (‐4.3043) (12.0517) (‐3.6223) (1.4624) (‐12.0458) 0.0865 0.2396 0.3685 0.0034 0.0201 0.0034
‐0.0627 ‐0.0394 ‐0.0425 ‐0.0533 ‐0.0468 17.3873 ‐0.0093 0.0074 ‐17.4297 ‐0.0233 0.0031 ‐0.0065 ‐17.4341 ‐0.0167 17.4371
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
‐0.0386 ‐0.0764 ‐0.0341 ‐0.0715 ‐0.0649 ‐0.0478 0.0329 ‐0.0115 0.0138 0.0378 ‐0.0423 ‐0.0067 ‐0.0171 0.0444 ‐0.0253
(‐0.6014) (‐2.0213) (‐0.9763) (‐1.2363) (‐1.4582) (‐1.0741) (0.6668) (‐0.4833) (0.6807) 0.3109 0.2123 0.4644 0.3952 0.2182 0.2162
‐0.0517 ‐0.0793 ‐0.0431 ‐0.0669 ‐0.0765 11.3229 0.0152 ‐0.0029 ‐11.3659 0.0276 ‐0.0362 0.0096 ‐11.3993 0.0181 11.3631
(‐0.8205) (‐2.2629) (‐1.3751) (‐1.2284) (‐2.7947) (0.9946) (0.4841) (‐0.2059) (‐0.9985) 0.3551 0.2279 0.4394 0.1777 0.3064 0.1784
‐0.0736 ‐0.0709 ‐0.0440 ‐0.0638 ‐0.0762 20.3376 ‐0.0098 0.0053 ‐20.3816 ‐0.0027 ‐0.0269 0.0124 ‐20.4137 ‐0.0151 20.3869
(‐1.5391) (‐2.5899) (‐1.6076) (‐1.3913) (‐3.2473) (1.5573) (‐0.5678) (0.3927) (‐1.5592) 0.4814 0.2517 0.4084 0.0894 0.2536 0.0898
‐0.0880 ‐0.0660 ‐0.0442 ‐0.0496 ‐0.0630 32.0092 ‐0.0384 ‐0.0030 ‐32.0534 ‐0.0221 ‐0.0218 0.0134 ‐32.0722 ‐0.0354 32.0504
(‐4.6928) (‐3.4637) (‐1.9295) (‐1.5742) (‐6.1093) (12.0553) (‐3.0067) (‐0.2879) (‐11.9747) 0.2278 0.2534 0.3596 0.0034 0.0500 0.0035
‐0.0758 ‐0.0522 ‐0.0368 ‐0.0543 ‐0.0635 23.1769 ‐0.0215 0.0112 ‐23.2137 ‐0.0236 ‐0.0154 0.0092 ‐23.2404 ‐0.0327 23.2249
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
‐0.0581 ‐0.0391 ‐0.0389 ‐0.0534 ‐0.0440 3.8184 ‐0.0046 0.0049 ‐3.8573 ‐0.0190 ‐0.0002 ‐0.0094 ‐3.8624 ‐0.0095 3.8622
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
‐0.1539 ‐0.1056 ‐0.0956 ‐0.1369 ‐0.1122 31.7459 ‐0.0170 0.0066 ‐31.8416 ‐0.0483 ‐0.0100 ‐0.0247 ‐31.8582 ‐0.0236 31.8482
(‐5.4559) (‐3.3457) (‐3.1133) (‐3.2076) (‐2.3279) (0.9966) (‐0.3724) (0.2112) (‐0.9998) 0.1437 0.4134 0.3557 0.1869 0.3412 0.1869
‐0.1618 ‐0.1084 ‐0.0967 ‐0.1233 ‐0.1038 45.9125 ‐0.0384 ‐0.0046 ‐46.0091 ‐0.0534 ‐0.0117 ‐0.0195 ‐46.0163 ‐0.0339 46.0045
(‐24.5818) (‐4.3961) (‐3.2424) (‐2.9920) (‐2.4687) (1.7008) (‐1.0650) (‐0.2521) (‐1.7040) 0.0581 0.3864 0.3757 0.0934 0.2224 0.0935
‐0.1571 ‐0.1051 ‐0.1014 ‐0.1242 ‐0.1011 64.0325 ‐0.0329 ‐0.0040 ‐64.1339 ‐0.0520 ‐0.0037 ‐0.0231 ‐64.1336 ‐0.0289 64.1299
(‐14.7703) (‐4.8261) (‐4.7365) (‐3.0848) (‐4.0226) (12.0366) (‐0.8915) (‐0.5572) (‐12.0111) 0.0622 0.4547 0.3283 0.0034 0.2585 0.0034
‐0.1190 ‐0.0808 ‐0.0848 ‐0.0970 ‐0.0951 34.7630 ‐0.0220 0.0143 ‐34.8478 ‐0.0382 0.0040 ‐0.0019 ‐34.8581 ‐0.0363 34.8621
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
‐0.0804 ‐0.0634 ‐0.0678 ‐0.0724 ‐0.0593 5.0852 ‐0.0080 ‐0.0040 ‐5.1530 ‐0.0170 0.0044 ‐0.0131 ‐5.1445 ‐0.0040 5.1490
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
‐0.0447 ‐0.0258 ‐0.0354 ‐0.0165 ‐0.0109 6.9676 ‐0.0282 ‐0.0149 ‐7.0030 ‐0.0189 0.0096 ‐0.0056 ‐6.9785 ‐0.0133 6.9881
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
‐0.0597 ‐0.0548 ‐0.0404 ‐0.0442 ‐0.0545 11.1476 ‐0.0155 ‐0.0003 ‐11.1880 0.5762 0.3963 0.3904 ‐0.0050 ‐0.0144 0.0103 ‐11.2021 ‐0.0153 11.1877
(‐8.0617) (‐12.9190) (‐9.1676) (‐6.0970) (‐12.6983) (3.7240) (‐4.9882) (‐0.1748) (‐3.7329) (10.3650) (6.2507) (6.0968) (‐1.0736) (‐6.4339) (2.6108) (‐3.7379) (‐4.6888) (3.7324)
Portfolio W‐L
1
1 0.7007 0.6736 0.4520










Portfolio W Portfolio L Portfolio W‐L Portfolio W Portfolio L
9 0.6727 0.2468 0.2028
12 0.7709 0.3066 0.1421
3 0.4535 0.1807 0.2171
6 0.5977 0.1976 0.7194
3
1 0.8083 0.6451 0.4141
2 0.4952 0.8115 0.3253
3
9 0.3636 0.1208 0.1220
12 0.2402 0.2951 0.1619
0.7419 0.7964 0.9073
6 0.8159 0.3314 0.5502
6
1 0.9462 0.9549 0.9920
2 0.9375 0.8184 0.8419
3
9 0.0813 0.0000 0.0000
12 n/a n/a n/a
0.8946 0.6041 0.8005
6 0.5428 0.1204 0.1215
9
1 0.7893 0.9407 0.6521
2 0.8417 0.3868 0.3881
3
9 n/a n/a n/a
12 n/a n/a n/a
0.8116 0.1208 0.1218
6 0.3743 0.0000 0.0000
0.1398 0.0000 0.0000
6 n/a n/a n/a
Average
t‐statisitc
9 n/a n/a n/a
12 n/a n/a n/a
12
1 0.3754 0.3962 0.3968
2 0.1515 0.1062 0.1066
3
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Table 4: Momentum strategy returns from 2009 to 2017
Starting Dat 3/10/2009 End Date 12/31/2017 No.of Firms in each g 10% Rolling Period  21 days







High/Low Low/US High/Low Low/US High/Low Low/US
0.0114 0.0292 0.0176 0.0279 0.0364 0.2162 ‐0.0165 ‐0.0072 ‐0.1986 ‐0.0178 0.0116 ‐0.0085 ‐0.1798 ‐0.0093 0.1914
(1.3955) (2.1101) (3.1719) (2.6964) (3.2325) (1.1748) (‐1.8262) (‐0.4667) (‐1.0774) 0.1350 0.2196 0.2896 0.1658 0.3020 0.1516
0.0147 0.0306 0.0338 0.0189 0.0299 0.1099 ‐0.0042 0.0006 ‐0.0761 ‐0.0159 ‐0.0032 ‐0.0111 ‐0.0800 ‐0.0048 0.0767
(2.0771) (2.3078) (1.8425) (2.5087) (3.6551) (1.3229) (‐0.6361) (0.0452) (‐0.8939) 0.1462 0.4431 0.1604 0.1701 0.3776 0.1879
0.0138 0.0289 0.0278 0.0211 0.0302 0.1337 ‐0.0073 ‐0.0013 ‐0.1059 ‐0.0151 0.0012 ‐0.0091 ‐0.1034 ‐0.0060 0.1046
(2.2820) (3.2051) (2.4201) (2.9288) (4.3730) (1.7720) (‐1.3526) (‐0.1535) (‐1.3857) 0.0826 0.4685 0.1807 0.0875 0.2745 0.0883
0.0159 0.0274 0.0371 0.0218 0.0293 0.0801 ‐0.0059 ‐0.0019 ‐0.0429 ‐0.0115 ‐0.0097 ‐0.0075 ‐0.0507 ‐0.0039 0.0410
(2.8092) (3.9824) (2.9074) (3.5060) (4.2777) (2.5013) (‐1.2212) (‐0.2677) (‐1.2457) 0.0998 0.2515 0.2082 0.0620 0.3258 0.1234
0.0140 0.0235 0.0298 0.0176 0.0295 0.0639 ‐0.0036 ‐0.0061 ‐0.0341 ‐0.0095 ‐0.0063 ‐0.0119 ‐0.0344 0.0025 0.0281
(3.3219) (4.5506) (4.2389) (2.7822) (4.7646) (3.1023) (‐0.8110) (‐0.9722) (‐1.5718) 0.0785 0.2356 0.0895 0.0563 0.3730 0.1081
0.0114 0.0213 0.0252 0.0140 0.0267 0.0511 ‐0.0026 ‐0.0054 ‐0.0259 ‐0.0098 ‐0.0039 ‐0.0126 ‐0.0245 0.0028 0.0205
(3.5129) (5.4643) (4.6813) (2.7339) (4.7199) (3.4092) (‐0.7625) (‐1.0810) (‐1.6381) 0.0269 0.2779 0.0499 0.0647 0.3233 0.1089
0.0196 0.0181 0.0155 0.0283 0.0303 0.2203 ‐0.0087 ‐0.0121 ‐0.2049 0.0015 0.0027 ‐0.0020 ‐0.1901 0.0034 0.1928
(1.6480) (2.1871) (3.1264) (2.8527) (2.9248) (1.1743) (‐0.8106) (‐1.2380) (‐1.0902) 0.4596 0.3907 0.4457 0.1571 0.4066 0.1541
0.0176 0.0211 0.0359 0.0290 0.0319 0.1147 ‐0.0114 ‐0.0109 ‐0.0788 ‐0.0035 ‐0.0148 ‐0.0029 ‐0.0828 ‐0.0006 0.0680
(2.2651) (3.4688) (1.9324) (3.7216) (3.9172) (1.3556) (‐1.4006) (‐1.6076) (‐0.9105) 0.3619 0.2250 0.3977 0.1662 0.4789 0.2178
0.0146 0.0231 0.0289 0.0298 0.0324 0.1368 ‐0.0152 ‐0.0093 ‐0.1079 ‐0.0084 ‐0.0058 ‐0.0025 ‐0.1044 ‐0.0059 0.0986
(2.2978) (3.9113) (2.4748) (4.1225) (4.5675) (1.7781) (‐2.2009) (‐1.7098) (‐1.3854) 0.1665 0.3295 0.4009 0.0897 0.2517 0.1047
0.0146 0.0206 0.0246 0.0207 0.0291 0.0933 ‐0.0061 ‐0.0086 ‐0.0687 ‐0.0060 ‐0.0040 ‐0.0085 ‐0.0642 0.0025 0.0602
(3.1963) (4.6038) (4.1095) (3.3362) (4.7888) (2.7067) (‐1.3391) (‐1.8149) (‐1.9780) 0.1740 0.2962 0.1649 0.0348 0.3537 0.0446
0.0139 0.0176 0.0207 0.0147 0.0259 0.0728 ‐0.0009 ‐0.0082 ‐0.0521 ‐0.0038 ‐0.0031 ‐0.0111 ‐0.0469 0.0073 0.0439
(3.8316) (4.7558) (5.3061) (2.5927) (5.2345) (3.3555) (‐0.2155) (‐2.1711) (‐2.3961) 0.2331 0.2853 0.0705 0.0186 0.0934 0.0247
0.0112 0.0180 0.0185 0.0112 0.0223 0.0585 0.0000 ‐0.0043 ‐0.0400 ‐0.0069 ‐0.0005 ‐0.0111 ‐0.0362 0.0043 0.0357
(3.7095) (5.4885) (6.1923) (2.3482) (4.8702) (3.6769) (‐0.0024) (‐1.1603) (‐2.5163) 0.0626 0.4571 0.0465 0.0154 0.2049 0.0154
0.0149 0.0258 0.0154 0.0267 0.0229 0.2254 ‐0.0118 0.0029 ‐0.2100 ‐0.0109 0.0104 0.0039 ‐0.2025 ‐0.0147 0.2129
(1.3045) (3.2407) (3.5056) (2.5573) (2.2673) (1.1675) (‐1.0411) (0.2936) (‐1.0871) 0.2187 0.1263 0.3952 0.1487 0.1646 0.1368
0.0137 0.0204 0.0156 0.0195 0.0236 0.1332 ‐0.0057 ‐0.0032 ‐0.1177 ‐0.0066 0.0048 ‐0.0041 ‐0.1097 ‐0.0026 0.1145
(2.0145) (3.4948) (4.3600) (2.6008) (3.1080) (1.5027) (‐0.7357) (‐0.4459) (‐1.3304) 0.2300 0.2419 0.3514 0.1103 0.4038 0.0999
0.0141 0.0190 0.0153 0.0149 0.0242 0.1498 ‐0.0009 ‐0.0052 ‐0.1345 ‐0.0050 0.0037 ‐0.0092 ‐0.1256 0.0043 0.1293
(2.7110) (3.7817) (4.9268) (2.2688) (3.5945) (1.8802) (‐0.1386) (‐0.8877) (‐1.6892) 0.2469 0.2658 0.1639 0.0596 0.3082 0.0542
0.0139 0.0149 0.0147 0.0074 0.0206 0.0988 0.0065 ‐0.0057 ‐0.0841 ‐0.0010 0.0002 ‐0.0132 ‐0.0781 0.0122 0.0784
(3.8110) (3.8122) (6.2986) (1.7545) (4.7053) (2.7873) (1.9756) (‐1.4329) (‐2.3877) 0.4248 0.4786 0.0153 0.0155 0.0096 0.0146
0.0122 0.0143 0.0141 0.0025 0.0185 0.0746 0.0097 ‐0.0042 ‐0.0606 ‐0.0021 0.0002 ‐0.0159 ‐0.0562 0.0139 0.0564
(4.0576) (4.4190) (7.3712) (0.6955) (5.2527) (3.3564) (3.3122) (‐1.2178) (‐2.7405) 0.3172 0.4793 0.0009 0.0071 0.0012 0.0066
0.0087 0.0141 0.0131 0.0018 0.0164 0.0615 0.0069 ‐0.0023 ‐0.0484 ‐0.0053 0.0010 ‐0.0146 ‐0.0451 0.0093 0.0461
(3.4397) (5.1150) (8.3073) (0.6128) (5.1837) (3.7870) (2.5422) (‐0.6966) (‐2.9892) 0.0787 0.3812 0.0005 0.0038 0.0169 0.0032
0.0183 0.0148 0.0156 0.0126 0.0328 0.2310 0.0057 ‐0.0180 ‐0.2153 0.0035 ‐0.0009 ‐0.0201 ‐0.1982 0.0237 0.1973
(2.3775) (2.0059) (3.2561) (1.2988) (2.1888) (1.1615) (0.6127) (‐1.2099) (‐1.0814) 0.3700 0.4604 0.1307 0.1614 0.0893 0.1627
0.0138 0.0142 0.0136 0.0100 0.0315 0.1353 0.0038 ‐0.0173 ‐0.1218 ‐0.0004 0.0007 ‐0.0215 ‐0.1038 0.0210 0.1045
(2.5024) (2.6228) (3.7719) (1.3191) (2.2373) (1.4830) (0.5665) (‐1.2404) (‐1.3387) 0.4779 0.4602 0.0907 0.1317 0.0875 0.1295
0.0130 0.0147 0.0131 0.0091 0.0268 0.1513 0.0039 ‐0.0122 ‐0.1382 ‐0.0016 0.0016 ‐0.0178 ‐0.1245 0.0161 0.1260
(2.9958) (3.0732) (4.4502) (1.3247) (2.6901) (1.8431) (0.6943) (‐1.2545) (‐1.6848) 0.4007 0.3895 0.0722 0.0677 0.0769 0.0652
0.0105 0.0131 0.0128 0.0023 0.0225 0.0986 0.0082 ‐0.0094 ‐0.0858 ‐0.0027 0.0003 ‐0.0203 ‐0.0761 0.0176 0.0764
(3.2899) (3.4285) (5.7054) (0.5109) (3.1855) (2.6900) (2.6426) (‐1.3304) (‐2.3463) 0.2968 0.4731 0.0082 0.0221 0.0121 0.0214
0.0077 0.0122 0.0117 ‐0.0004 0.0202 0.0778 0.0081 ‐0.0080 ‐0.0660 ‐0.0046 0.0005 ‐0.0206 ‐0.0575 0.0161 0.0580
(3.0246) (4.0067) (6.5888) (‐0.1197) (4.2251) (3.3802) (3.6977) (‐1.5951) (‐2.8751) 0.1250 0.4433 0.0003 0.0080 0.0020 0.0076
0.0045 0.0123 0.0110 0.0010 0.0164 0.0681 0.0034 ‐0.0042 ‐0.0571 ‐0.0078 0.0013 ‐0.0154 ‐0.0517 0.0076 0.0530
(2.1473) (4.7370) (7.6052) (0.3397) (4.7610) (4.0091) (1.7681) (‐1.0939) (‐3.3522) 0.0099 0.3369 0.0005 0.0018 0.0388 0.0015
0.0110 0.0167 0.0146 0.0112 0.0170 0.2340 ‐0.0001 ‐0.0003 ‐0.2194 ‐0.0056 0.0021 ‐0.0058 ‐0.2171 0.0002 0.2191
(1.4269) (2.2231) (2.9002) (1.1128) (1.6145) (1.1392) (‐0.0133) (‐0.0291) (‐1.0660) 0.3010 0.4099 0.3447 0.1470 0.4945 0.1452
0.0086 0.0178 0.0132 0.0085 0.0147 0.1382 0.0001 0.0030 ‐0.1250 ‐0.0092 0.0045 ‐0.0062 ‐0.1235 ‐0.0030 0.1280
(1.5258) (2.9672) (3.5700) (1.1238) (1.9648) (1.4653) (0.0091) (0.4021) (‐1.3264) 0.1333 0.2613 0.2812 0.0975 0.3856 0.0895
0.0072 0.0178 0.0124 0.0068 0.0157 0.1543 0.0003 0.0021 ‐0.1419 ‐0.0106 0.0054 ‐0.0089 ‐0.1386 ‐0.0018 0.1440
(1.5724) (3.3533) (4.0143) (1.0316) (2.4330) (1.8170) (0.0551) (0.3181) (‐1.6692) 0.0649 0.1902 0.1691 0.0535 0.4206 0.0473
0.0043 0.0154 0.0117 0.0013 0.0152 0.1048 0.0031 0.0003 ‐0.0931 ‐0.0111 0.0038 ‐0.0139 ‐0.0896 0.0028 0.0934
(1.4107) (3.7770) (5.1498) (0.3140) (3.4924) (2.7610) (0.9708) (0.0605) (‐2.4497) 0.0156 0.2104 0.0103 0.0105 0.3096 0.0083
0.0025 0.0146 0.0112 ‐0.0002 0.0157 0.0889 0.0027 ‐0.0011 ‐0.0777 ‐0.0121 0.0034 ‐0.0159 ‐0.0732 0.0038 0.0766
(1.0839) (4.2587) (6.4908) (‐0.0671) (4.6079) (3.6978) (1.2048) (‐0.2867) (‐3.2266) 0.0020 0.1862 0.0004 0.0016 0.1920 0.0011
0.0014 0.0136 0.0108 0.0020 0.0121 0.0731 ‐0.0006 0.0015 ‐0.0624 ‐0.0122 0.0028 ‐0.0100 ‐0.0610 ‐0.0021 0.0639
(0.6410) (4.8586) (7.6026) (0.6704) (4.2682) (4.1838) (‐0.3017) (0.4858) (‐3.5593) 0.0004 0.1861 0.0084 0.0004 0.2841 0.0003
0.0118 0.0188 0.0185 0.0131 0.0240 0.1217 ‐0.0013 ‐0.0052 ‐0.1032 0.4843 0.1239 0.1553 ‐0.0071 0.0003 ‐0.0110 ‐0.0976 0.0039 0.0980
(14.3613) (19.3418) (12.7607) (7.3982) (19.5975) (11.9284) (‐1.0284) (‐5.1515) (‐9.7906) (8.1302) (4.7725) (5.2889) (‐7.4970) (0.3377) (‐9.7893) (‐9.8566) (2.3215) (9.3822)
Average
t‐statisitc
9 0.0035 0.0000 0.0000
12 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000
12
1 0.8421 0.3208 0.3248




6 0.0486 0.0019 0.0026
0.0039 0.0037
9
1 0.9280 0.3357 0.3325
2 0.9955 0.2099 0.2052
3
9 0.3695 0.0002 0.0004





1 0.5886 0.3430 0.3245
2 0.6854 0.2104 0.2003
3
9 0.8397 0.0003 0.0004




1 0.9449 0.3580 0.3461
2 0.5279 0.3785 0.5482
3
9 0.4337 0.0049 0.0111
12 0.1742 0.0023 0.0062
0.4854 0.1580 0.2260
6 0.3709 0.0247
12 0.0651 0.0242 0.1849
3 0.4273 0.1337 0.1768
6 0.2496 0.0678 0.2981
Portfolio W‐L
1
1 0.4304 0.3708 0.3623










Portfolio W Portfolio L Portfolio W‐L Portfolio W Portfolio L
9 0.1352 0.0330 0.1974
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Table 5: W/L Portfolio Returns by Different Periods. It shows that in all periods, the entire period, pre and during the
financial crisis, the three groups have monotonically decreasing momentum for Portfolio Ws. It further confirms that
investor heterogeneity among the three groups is decreasing. The ANOVA p‐values show very low explain power,
which indicates that momentum differences have to be found in the longer holding periods. In general, the momentum
effect is decreasing from 2000 to 2017, this effect can be explained by the advert of Internet makes information
asymmetry less significant, and the under‐reaction over the short run and overreaction in the long run of prices have
diminishing. Portfolio Ls show monotonically increasing returns except the post‐financial crisis.







High/Low Low/US High/Low Low/US High/Low Low/US
Entire Horizon 2000‐2017 0.0477 0.0231 0.0172 0.0297 0.0328 0.4764 0.0180 ‐0.0096 ‐0.4592 0.2360 0.0709 0.0541 0.0246 0.0059 ‐0.0030 ‐0.4437 0.0276 0.4496
Pre‐Financial Crisis 2000‐2007 0.0971 0.0387 0.0249 0.0440 0.0485 0.1755 0.0532 ‐0.0097 ‐0.1506 0.1533 0.1683 0.0821 0.0584 0.0138 ‐0.0045 ‐0.1271 0.0629 0.1409
Financial Crisis 2007‐2009 ‐0.0597 ‐0.0548 ‐0.0404 ‐0.0442 ‐0.0545 11.1476 ‐0.0155 ‐0.0003 ‐11.1880 0.5762 0.3963 0.3904 ‐0.0050 ‐0.0144 0.0103 ‐11.2021 ‐0.0153 11.1877





Portfolio W Portfolio L Portfolio W‐L Portfolio W Portfolio L
Sampling Period
151
Table 7: Momentum Test Results using trading volume turnover as a grouping measure. This table reports the momentum test results using trading volume turnover as an
alternative investor heterogeneity filter, instead of individualism scores. Group One has the highest trading volume, and group five has the lowest. Higher trading volume
turnover indicates higher participation rates and hence higher investor heterogeneity.
Starting Dat 1/3/2000 End Date 12/29/2017 No.of Firms in each g 10% Rolling Period  21 days





































0.0234 0.0201 0.0259 0.0150 0.0115 0.4009 0.0357 0.0333 0.1650 0.0468 ‐0.3774 ‐0.0156 ‐0.0074 ‐0.1500 ‐0.0353 0.0033 ‐0.0058 0.3651 0.0024 ‐0.3618 ‐0.0082 0.0108 0.0036 ‐0.1320 0.1182 0.1428 ‐0.1146
(3.7858) (4.3585) (2.4242) (2.9577) (2.9235) (1.3131) (3.8207) (4.2789) (1.4688) (4.2592) (‐1.2349) (‐2.0216) (‐0.6543) (‐1.3364) (‐3.4149) 0.3340 0.3097 0.1166 0.4215 0.1190 0.2747 0.1801 0.2901 0.1212 0.1481 0.1034 0.1551
0.0217 0.0201 0.0245 0.0134 0.0128 0.3735 0.0300 0.0305 0.1558 0.0381 ‐0.3518 ‐0.0099 ‐0.0060 ‐0.1424 ‐0.0253 0.0016 ‐0.0044 0.3435 ‐0.0005 ‐0.3419 ‐0.0039 0.0109 0.0006 ‐0.1257 0.1177 0.1366 ‐0.1171
(5.1699) (5.4360) (2.7373) (3.7194) (3.7583) (1.7479) (4.0207) (4.0676) (1.9029) (4.9567) (‐1.6469) (‐1.6962) (‐0.5848) (‐1.7465) (‐3.6420) 0.3874 0.3249 0.0548 0.4812 0.0556 0.3707 0.1274 0.4555 0.0639 0.0770 0.0489 0.0769
0.0229 0.0213 0.0222 0.0140 0.0129 0.2900 0.0266 0.0305 0.1662 0.0333 ‐0.2672 ‐0.0053 ‐0.0083 ‐0.1522 ‐0.0204 0.0016 ‐0.0009 0.2634 ‐0.0039 ‐0.2618 0.0030 0.0082 0.0011 ‐0.1358 0.1329 0.1439 ‐0.1318
(6.1241) (6.6317) (3.4220) (4.4456) (4.7456) (1.9193) (4.4034) (4.6019) (2.2029) (5.1360) (‐1.7669) (‐1.1917) (‐1.0141) (‐2.0262) (‐3.5201) 0.3725 0.4495 0.0415 0.3329 0.0425 0.3752 0.1288 0.3939 0.0372 0.0404 0.0291 0.0409
0.0223 0.0213 0.0194 0.0153 0.0135 0.3328 0.0271 0.0252 0.1411 1.6728 ‐0.3105 ‐0.0058 ‐0.0057 ‐0.1258 ‐1.6593 0.0010 0.0019 0.3057 0.0020 ‐0.3047 ‐0.0001 0.0041 0.0018 ‐0.1161 ‐1.5317 0.1201 1.5335
(6.7926) (7.7718) (4.8774) (5.6923) (6.2154) (2.0692) (4.7792) (5.4644) (2.5632) (1.7623) (‐1.9299) (‐1.3389) (‐1.2150) (‐2.2951) (‐1.7473) 0.4108 0.3498 0.0294 0.3944 0.0299 0.4941 0.1989 0.3004 0.0184 0.0543 0.0150 0.0542
0.0227 0.0204 0.0146 0.0168 0.0132 0.2332 0.0264 0.0280 0.1148 2.1442 ‐0.2105 ‐0.0060 ‐0.0134 ‐0.0980 ‐2.1310 0.0023 0.0057 0.2069 ‐0.0017 ‐0.2045 0.0074 ‐0.0024 0.0037 ‐0.0871 ‐2.0293 0.0847 2.0330
(7.0695) (8.4670) (6.3951) (6.2416) (7.4785) (2.5960) (5.1491) (4.0832) (2.8987) (2.4199) (‐2.3389) (‐1.5380) (‐2.0651) (‐2.4778) (‐2.4035) 0.2795 0.0420 0.0112 0.4222 0.0121 0.1642 0.2522 0.1274 0.0157 0.0116 0.0178 0.0115
0.0226 0.0201 0.0133 0.0157 0.0125 0.4319 0.0278 0.0490 0.1205 1.0856 ‐0.4093 ‐0.0076 ‐0.0357 ‐0.1047 ‐1.0731 0.0024 0.0068 0.4041 ‐0.0213 ‐0.4017 0.0281 ‐0.0024 0.0032 ‐0.0714 ‐0.9652 0.0690 0.9684
(7.0814) (9.1677) (6.5776) (6.8123) (8.1448) (1.3999) (5.8574) (3.0364) (3.6388) (2.1469) (‐1.3264) (‐1.9951) (‐2.2170) (‐3.1825) (‐2.1201) 0.2646 0.0112 0.0959 0.1038 0.0972 0.0456 0.2132 0.1239 0.0266 0.0291 0.0303 0.0288
0.0217 0.0189 0.0274 0.0159 0.0122 0.4103 0.0336 0.0440 0.1656 3.0522 ‐0.3885 ‐0.0147 ‐0.0166 ‐0.1497 ‐3.0399 0.0029 ‐0.0085 0.3767 ‐0.0104 ‐0.3738 0.0019 0.0114 0.0037 ‐0.1223 ‐2.8866 0.1337 2.8903
(3.4756) (3.9231) (2.4702) (3.2955) (3.1348) (1.3252) (3.7382) (3.4502) (1.4550) (1.0160) (‐1.2537) (‐1.9226) (‐1.0630) (‐1.3163) (‐1.0118) 0.3579 0.2414 0.1126 0.2530 0.1146 0.4566 0.1711 0.2776 0.1432 0.1690 0.1226 0.1688
0.0190 0.0187 0.0249 0.0155 0.0115 0.3838 0.0276 0.0313 0.1598 3.0450 ‐0.3647 ‐0.0089 ‐0.0064 ‐0.1443 ‐3.0335 0.0003 ‐0.0062 0.3561 ‐0.0036 ‐0.3558 ‐0.0026 0.0093 0.0040 ‐0.1288 ‐2.8852 0.1381 2.8892
(4.4945) (5.2911) (2.6852) (4.3307) (4.0585) (1.7699) (3.8434) (4.2299) (1.9082) (1.4372) (‐1.6838) (‐1.5316) (‐0.6041) (‐1.7303) (‐1.4313) 0.4756 0.2664 0.0511 0.3620 0.0510 0.4159 0.1739 0.1885 0.0635 0.0875 0.0509 0.0873
0.0205 0.0198 0.0177 0.0152 0.0121 0.2936 0.0257 0.0263 0.1692 3.3625 ‐0.2731 ‐0.0059 ‐0.0086 ‐0.1540 ‐3.3504 0.0006 0.0021 0.2679 ‐0.0006 ‐0.2673 0.0027 0.0025 0.0031 ‐0.1431 ‐3.1933 0.1455 3.1964
(5.5030) (6.2899) (4.4996) (4.8418) (4.8985) (1.9163) (4.3220) (4.8420) (2.2129) (1.7458) (‐1.7810) (‐1.2715) (‐1.6555) (‐2.0202) (‐1.7388) 0.4476 0.3388 0.0410 0.4695 0.0415 0.3483 0.3132 0.2199 0.0317 0.0496 0.0291 0.0495
0.0198 0.0192 0.0156 0.0152 0.0127 0.3385 0.0276 0.0460 0.1646 3.2689 ‐0.3187 ‐0.0083 ‐0.0304 ‐0.1495 ‐3.2562 0.0005 0.0036 0.3109 ‐0.0184 ‐0.3104 0.0220 0.0004 0.0025 ‐0.1187 ‐3.1042 0.1191 3.1067
(6.2724) (7.4505) (6.0331) (5.7073) (6.2838) (2.0739) (4.8992) (2.7321) (2.7982) (2.4132) (‐1.9530) (‐1.8572) (‐1.7950) (‐2.5460) (‐2.4024) 0.4479 0.1600 0.0292 0.1505 0.0293 0.1047 0.4535 0.2301 0.0268 0.0115 0.0262 0.0115
0.0199 0.0189 0.0133 0.0151 0.0118 0.2361 0.0303 0.0700 0.1567 2.5982 ‐0.2162 ‐0.0114 ‐0.0567 ‐0.1416 ‐2.5865 0.0010 0.0056 0.2058 ‐0.0397 ‐0.2048 0.0453 ‐0.0018 0.0033 ‐0.0867 ‐2.4415 0.0849 2.4448
(6.7231) (8.3328) (6.4756) (6.3141) (7.1913) (2.5943) (5.6048) (3.0040) (3.4237) (2.7613) (‐2.3742) (‐2.5977) (‐2.4146) (‐3.0935) (‐2.7468) 0.3931 0.0342 0.0125 0.0493 0.0129 0.0297 0.2892 0.1282 0.0462 0.0051 0.0499 0.0051
0.0195 0.0181 0.0125 0.0150 0.0107 0.4409 0.0321 0.0667 0.1530 1.2602 ‐0.4214 ‐0.0140 ‐0.0542 ‐0.1380 ‐1.2495 0.0014 0.0056 0.4088 ‐0.0346 ‐0.4074 0.0402 ‐0.0025 0.0042 ‐0.0863 ‐1.1072 0.0838 1.1115
(6.8495) (8.5051) (6.3032) (6.6835) (7.4968) (1.4087) (6.3628) (3.0814) (4.1272) (2.3816) (‐1.3465) (‐3.3633) (‐2.4895) (‐3.7363) (‐2.3590) 0.3480 0.0264 0.0965 0.0603 0.0972 0.0354 0.2011 0.0558 0.0225 0.0190 0.0257 0.0188
0.0166 0.0167 0.0126 0.0170 0.0103 0.1995 0.0324 0.0811 0.1179 0.1575 ‐0.1829 ‐0.0156 ‐0.0684 ‐0.1009 ‐0.1472 ‐0.0002 0.0041 0.1671 ‐0.0487 ‐0.1673 0.0528 ‐0.0044 0.0067 ‐0.0372 ‐0.0396 0.0328 0.0463
(8.1652) (9.4230) (8.3614) (7.5658) (9.2503) (1.9814) (8.7512) (3.6413) (4.7661) (1.7466) (‐1.8175) (‐4.9164) (‐3.0870) (‐4.0825) (‐1.6291) 0.4742 0.0393 0.0493 0.0160 0.0491 0.0097 0.0510 0.0041 0.1315 0.3360 0.1615 0.3107
0.0158 0.0169 0.0128 0.0171 0.0108 0.1634 0.0367 0.1179 0.0931 0.0637 ‐0.1477 ‐0.0198 ‐0.1051 ‐0.0760 ‐0.0530 ‐0.0011 0.0041 0.1267 ‐0.0812 ‐0.1279 0.0853 ‐0.0044 0.0063 0.0242 0.0294 ‐0.0286 ‐0.0230
(8.9127) (10.4256) (9.9206) (6.7324) (10.8403) (1.9067) (9.2763) (3.9453) (5.3664) (6.0921) (‐1.7227) (‐5.4752) (‐3.5564) (‐4.3675) (‐4.9706) 0.3209 0.0236 0.0706 0.0038 0.0688 0.0023 0.0616 0.0105 0.2414 0.0740 0.2016 0.1300
0.0254 0.0203 0.0292 0.0187 0.0153 0.4113 0.0337 0.0337 0.1738 3.1104 ‐0.3859 ‐0.0135 ‐0.0045 ‐0.1551 ‐3.0951 0.0051 ‐0.0090 0.3776 0.0000 ‐0.3724 ‐0.0090 0.0105 0.0034 ‐0.1401 ‐2.9366 0.1505 2.9400
(4.0276) (4.2883) (2.6187) (3.9076) (3.7704) (1.3096) (3.6677) (4.3478) (1.5008) (1.0154) (‐1.2273) (‐1.7556) (‐0.3808) (‐1.3370) (‐1.0103) 0.2584 0.2302 0.1155 0.4997 0.1189 0.2639 0.1947 0.2931 0.1145 0.1696 0.0990 0.1694
0.0203 0.0183 0.0181 0.0162 0.0140 0.3868 0.0290 0.0478 0.1708 3.1448 ‐0.3665 ‐0.0108 ‐0.0297 ‐0.1547 ‐3.1307 0.0020 0.0002 0.3577 ‐0.0187 ‐0.3557 0.0190 0.0019 0.0021 ‐0.1231 ‐2.9739 0.1250 2.9761
(4.8123) (5.2221) (4.4720) (4.6016) (4.7394) (1.7585) (3.8669) (2.2596) (1.9998) (1.4371) (‐1.6661) (‐1.7132) (‐1.4224) (‐1.8138) (‐1.4302) 0.3564 0.4817 0.0528 0.2023 0.0538 0.1927 0.3619 0.3211 0.0817 0.0880 0.0780 0.0879
0.0196 0.0183 0.0152 0.0150 0.0123 0.2996 0.0268 0.0692 0.2140 3.4496 ‐0.2800 ‐0.0084 ‐0.0540 ‐0.1990 ‐3.4373 0.0013 0.0031 0.2729 ‐0.0424 ‐0.2716 0.0455 0.0002 0.0026 ‐0.1452 ‐3.2356 0.1454 3.2382
(5.4834) (5.8984) (5.0879) (4.7477) (5.0482) (1.9272) (4.3871) (2.0938) (2.5007) (1.7493) (‐1.7977) (‐1.6704) (‐1.6292) (‐2.3305) (‐1.7423) 0.3929 0.2352 0.0405 0.1041 0.0414 0.0877 0.4785 0.2539 0.0572 0.0514 0.0567 0.0513
0.0180 0.0180 0.0137 0.0144 0.0121 0.3465 0.0301 0.1019 0.2274 3.3837 ‐0.3286 ‐0.0122 ‐0.0882 ‐0.2130 ‐3.3716 0.0000 0.0042 0.3164 ‐0.0718 ‐0.3164 0.0760 ‐0.0006 0.0023 ‐0.1255 ‐3.1563 0.1249 3.1586
(6.1686) (7.3506) (5.7324) (5.5492) (6.1930) (2.0939) (5.2355) (2.9432) (3.3908) (2.4194) (‐1.9848) (‐2.6167) (‐2.5271) (‐3.1887) (‐2.4093) 0.4984 0.1095 0.0287 0.0210 0.0287 0.0160 0.4292 0.2425 0.0487 0.0126 0.0493 0.0126
0.0183 0.0169 0.0118 0.0138 0.0106 0.2391 0.0320 0.1047 0.2001 2.6983 ‐0.2208 ‐0.0152 ‐0.0929 ‐0.1863 ‐2.6877 0.0014 0.0050 0.2071 ‐0.0727 ‐0.2057 0.0778 ‐0.0020 0.0032 ‐0.0953 ‐2.4983 0.0934 2.5014
(6.5961) (7.6610) (6.0831) (5.9917) (6.7754) (2.5908) (5.8714) (3.2491) (3.9687) (2.7887) (‐2.3914) (‐3.4673) (‐2.8671) (‐3.7034) (‐2.7755) 0.3452 0.0434 0.0131 0.0136 0.0136 0.0092 0.2574 0.1277 0.0560 0.0053 0.0598 0.0053
0.0180 0.0165 0.0120 0.0149 0.0099 0.4578 0.0324 0.1105 0.1820 1.3161 ‐0.4398 ‐0.0159 ‐0.0985 ‐0.1671 ‐1.3062 0.0016 0.0045 0.4254 ‐0.0781 ‐0.4238 0.0826 ‐0.0029 0.0050 ‐0.0715 ‐1.1341 0.0686 1.1391
(7.4298) (8.2801) (6.3965) (6.5587) (7.4714) (1.4414) (6.6335) (3.2977) (4.5825) (2.3914) (‐1.3847) (‐3.9990) (‐2.9263) (‐4.2201) (‐2.3711) 0.3076 0.0516 0.0910 0.0110 0.0918 0.0078 0.1643 0.0291 0.0848 0.0206 0.0937 0.0202
0.0169 0.0151 0.0120 0.0163 0.0099 0.2019 0.0364 0.1299 0.1362 0.1658 ‐0.1851 ‐0.0213 ‐0.1178 ‐0.1198 ‐0.1559 0.0017 0.0031 0.1655 ‐0.0934 ‐0.1638 0.0965 ‐0.0043 0.0064 ‐0.0063 ‐0.0297 0.0020 0.0361
(8.5964) (9.6129) (8.4252) (7.5972) (9.2656) (1.9772) (8.7035) (4.1470) (5.1873) (1.7660) (‐1.8125) (‐5.8515) (‐3.7761) (‐4.5693) (‐1.6575) 0.2453 0.0723 0.0535 0.0017 0.0553 0.0012 0.0483 0.0039 0.4387 0.3806 0.4804 0.3560
0.0167 0.0149 0.0122 0.0162 0.0104 0.1664 0.0385 0.2009 0.1107 0.0695 ‐0.1497 ‐0.0236 ‐0.1887 ‐0.0946 ‐0.0591 0.0017 0.0028 0.1278 ‐0.1623 ‐0.1261 0.1651 ‐0.0041 0.0058 0.0891 0.0413 ‐0.0932 ‐0.0355
(9.0990) (10.5466) (10.1749) (6.9429) (11.0071) (1.9131) (8.6284) (4.0485) (6.0003) (6.3764) (‐1.7213) (‐5.8670) (‐3.8226) (‐5.1093) (‐5.3282) 0.2278 0.0664 0.0718 0.0007 0.0745 0.0005 0.0601 0.0112 0.0460 0.0275 0.0385 0.0505
0.0201 0.0186 0.0173 0.0155 0.0120 0.3199 0.0308 0.0672 0.1572 1.7803 ‐0.2998 ‐0.0123 ‐0.0499 ‐0.1417 ‐1.7684 0.4616 0.1161 0.1176 0.3732 0.1571 0.1530 0.0015 0.0013 0.2891 ‐0.0363 ‐0.2876 0.0376 0.0017 0.0036 ‐0.0902 ‐1.6231 0.0920 1.6267


















1 0.7229 0.2370 0.2391








9 0.1244 0.0181 0.0204
12 0.0816 0.2096 0.2160
0.8547 0.0485 0.0505
6 0.5152 0.0344 0.0361
0.0284
1 0.7394 0.2384 0.2369
2 0.7314 0.0704 0.0673
6
1 0.8645 0.2382 0.2398
2 0.8749 0.0771 0.0763
3
9 0.0881 0.0057 0.0074

















































Table 8. Momentum test results by TV turnover 2009‐2017.
Starting Dat3/10/2009 End Date 12/29/2017 No.of Firms in each g 10% Rolling Period  21 days



















0.0157 0.0162 0.0139 0.8365 0.0300 0.0507 ‐0.8208 ‐0.0138 ‐0.0368 ‐0.0005 0.0023 0.8065 ‐0.0206 ‐0.8070 0.0229
(2.5675) (3.1476) (3.0931) (1.0333) (3.8346) (2.9447) (‐1.0133) (‐2.3615) (‐2.1965) 0.4732 0.3698 0.1608 0.1384 0.1608 0.0992
0.0175 0.0142 0.0131 0.5368 0.0248 0.0433 ‐0.5193 ‐0.0106 ‐0.0302 0.0033 0.0011 0.5120 ‐0.0185 ‐0.5087 0.0197
(4.1896) (4.0792) (4.3370) (1.6103) (4.5250) (4.1686) (‐1.5560) (‐2.7264) (‐3.1117) 0.2712 0.4034 0.0639 0.0583 0.0653 0.0312
0.0161 0.0126 0.0147 0.3321 0.0184 0.0388 ‐0.3160 ‐0.0057 ‐0.0241 0.0035 ‐0.0021 0.3137 ‐0.0205 ‐0.3102 0.0184
(5.2603) (5.0303) (6.4602) (2.2444) (5.0100) (5.1934) (‐2.1342) (‐2.5592) (‐3.5264) 0.1893 0.2703 0.0183 0.0076 0.0194 0.0060
0.0153 0.0116 0.0153 0.2404 0.0151 0.0291 ‐0.2251 ‐0.0035 ‐0.0138 0.0037 ‐0.0037 0.2253 ‐0.0140 ‐0.2216 0.0103
(5.9352) (6.0451) (7.7444) (2.5977) (5.0435) (6.1083) (‐2.4294) (‐1.7689) (‐3.0949) 0.1269 0.0914 0.0084 0.0069 0.0093 0.0178
0.0143 0.0107 0.0144 0.1792 0.0130 0.0382 ‐0.1649 ‐0.0023 ‐0.0238 0.0036 ‐0.0037 0.1662 ‐0.0252 ‐0.1626 0.0216
(6.6955) (7.5205) (8.8008) (2.6579) (5.6044) (3.8261) (‐2.4386) (‐1.4306) (‐2.3508) 0.0835 0.0465 0.0077 0.0077 0.0090 0.0190
0.0170 0.0154 0.0135 0.8571 0.0307 0.0479 ‐0.8401 ‐0.0153 ‐0.0344 0.0015 0.0020 0.8264 ‐0.0171 ‐0.8248 0.0191
(2.3410) (3.1596) (3.0203) (1.0272) (3.3355) (2.6394) (‐1.0063) (‐1.8619) (‐1.9188) 0.4311 0.3822 0.1622 0.2003 0.1628 0.1670
0.0149 0.0106 0.0142 0.5474 0.0239 0.0377 ‐0.5325 ‐0.0132 ‐0.0235 0.0043 ‐0.0036 0.5235 ‐0.0138 ‐0.5192 0.0103
(3.6319) (3.4158) (4.6422) (1.5935) (3.7778) (3.6051) (‐1.5494) (‐2.3950) (‐2.2793) 0.2037 0.2070 0.0654 0.1294 0.0671 0.1907
0.0139 0.0114 0.0145 0.3378 0.0171 0.0308 ‐0.3239 ‐0.0057 ‐0.0164 0.0025 ‐0.0030 0.3207 ‐0.0137 ‐0.3182 0.0107
(4.9338) (4.8438) (5.7588) (2.2143) (4.1896) (4.3526) (‐2.1229) (‐1.6697) (‐2.4489) 0.2513 0.1903 0.0191 0.0479 0.0199 0.0782
0.0126 0.0105 0.0137 0.2446 0.0139 0.0403 ‐0.2320 ‐0.0035 ‐0.0267 0.0021 ‐0.0032 0.2307 ‐0.0264 ‐0.2286 0.0232
(5.5770) (6.1317) (6.5366) (2.5664) (4.5844) (3.1982) (‐2.4346) (‐1.4316) (‐2.0663) 0.2245 0.1181 0.0087 0.0221 0.0092 0.0400
0.0114 0.0094 0.0132 0.1832 0.0124 0.0643 ‐0.1718 ‐0.0030 ‐0.0511 0.0020 ‐0.0038 0.1707 ‐0.0519 ‐0.1688 0.0481
(6.4053) (7.4791) (7.8118) (2.6379) (5.7145) (3.2057) (‐2.4746) (‐1.6626) (‐2.4990) 0.1817 0.0370 0.0079 0.0058 0.0085 0.0106
0.0173 0.0135 0.0158 0.8780 0.0203 0.0400 ‐0.8608 ‐0.0068 ‐0.0242 0.0038 ‐0.0023 0.8577 ‐0.0197 ‐0.8539 0.0174
(2.3544) (2.6146) (3.1711) (1.0195) (2.7761) (2.1627) (‐0.9987) (‐1.1023) (‐1.3149) 0.3374 0.3729 0.1610 0.1622 0.1622 0.1866
0.0149 0.0127 0.0155 0.5628 0.0182 0.0303 ‐0.5479 ‐0.0055 ‐0.0148 0.0022 ‐0.0028 0.5446 ‐0.0121 ‐0.5424 0.0093
(3.6167) (3.8045) (4.8616) (1.5870) (3.6295) (3.2283) (‐1.5428) (‐1.5263) (‐1.6575) 0.3389 0.2735 0.0640 0.1288 0.0651 0.1684
0.0120 0.0116 0.0139 0.3477 0.0138 0.0479 ‐0.3358 ‐0.0022 ‐0.0340 0.0003 ‐0.0023 0.3339 ‐0.0341 ‐0.3336 0.0318
(4.0882) (4.9645) (5.6118) (2.2108) (4.2131) (2.5614) (‐2.1327) (‐0.9809) (‐1.8002) 0.4630 0.2512 0.0182 0.0377 0.0184 0.0488
0.0110 0.0096 0.0138 0.2522 0.0120 0.0784 ‐0.2412 ‐0.0023 ‐0.0646 0.0014 ‐0.0042 0.2403 ‐0.0664 ‐0.2389 0.0623
(4.9455) (5.7223) (6.6473) (2.5683) (4.5822) (2.9010) (‐2.4578) (‐1.2651) (‐2.3777) 0.3135 0.0602 0.0082 0.0081 0.0084 0.0122
0.0117 0.0095 0.0132 0.1900 0.0117 0.0800 ‐0.1783 ‐0.0022 ‐0.0668 0.0022 ‐0.0037 0.1783 ‐0.0683 ‐0.1761 0.0646
(5.8139) (7.0632) (8.8882) (2.6584) (5.7494) (3.5824) (‐2.4955) (‐1.4589) (‐2.9994) 0.1779 0.0321 0.0072 0.0015 0.0078 0.0024
0.0135 0.0112 0.0133 0.4079 0.0172 0.0436 ‐0.3944 ‐0.0060 ‐0.0303 0.5641 0.0978 0.0991 0.0022 ‐0.0021 0.3907 ‐0.0264 ‐0.3884 0.0243
(23.7567) (20.5801) (60.1308) (6.2338) (10.4729) (10.5546) (‐6.0656) (‐5.0150) (‐7.0971) (8.5881) (2.5518) (2.5733) (6.4357) (‐3.6799) (6.1042) (‐5.4315) (‐6.0638) (5.2074)
Portfolio W‐L
6










Portfolio W Portfolio L Portfolio W‐L Portfolio W Portfolio L
3 0.6610 0.1047 0.1088
6 0.6417 0.0158 0.0169
9 0.3871 0.0043 0.0047
12 0.2459 0.0062 0.0073
9
1 0.9083 0.3839 0.3866
3 0.6446 0.1062 0.1087
6 0.6752 0.0155 0.0159
0.3836
3
9 0.5248 0.0062 0.0065











Table 9: Regression statistics for trading volume turnover. The regression equation is 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖 𝛼𝑖
𝛽𝑖|𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖| 𝜀𝑖 . For each firm group, the coefficient is beta, and its next columns are beta’s t‐statistic and p‐value
respectively. R‐square is the Goodness of fit of the regressions. Average TV turnover is the average monthly trading
volume turnover over the corresponding periods. As mentioned in Section III, trading volume turnover self represents
investor heterogeneity from another dimension. The last two columns show the differences in means and the p‐values
of the tests between groups.
0.7834 3.1730 0.1443 0.0898 0.1851 0.2672 3.0092 0.1713 0.0730 0.0976 0.4052 4.0067 0.0900 0.1034 0.1599 0.5163 ‐0.1381
(2.0771) (14.8997) (6.6333) (10.0137) (3.9150) (7.4187) (16.2671) (8.7197) (12.9281) (13.1004) (26.3021) (56.8462) (18.8635) (40.3921) (42.0193) 0.0890 0.0003
0.2859 1.4848 0.3246 0.1140 0.1595 0.1300 1.3807 0.3145 0.0773 0.0787 0.2079 2.0317 0.2435 0.0964 0.1288 0.1559 ‐0.0778
(3.2213) (4.3801) (10.9230) (5.6557) (3.6021) (4.0711) (9.4082) (12.9660) (8.0802) (8.7217) (17.7954) (35.3290) (31.2839) (27.3773) (38.6094) 0.0503 0.0115
0.1318 1.3990 0.3046 0.1653 0.1701 0.1215 1.4593 0.3055 0.1571 0.0901 0.2765 1.4757 0.3054 0.1627 0.1905 0.0104 ‐0.1550
(2.6226) (9.5401) (10.8929) (10.7124) (4.6872) (7.3286) (12.9073) (13.6040) (13.2719) (9.9429) (25.6230) (34.4100) (38.8625) (36.8932) (42.8272) 0.4226 0.0000
0.3029 1.5499 0.3024 0.1494 0.1819 0.2500 1.5610 0.3029 0.1433 0.1683 0.4449 3.4403 0.1042 0.1269 0.1699 0.0529 ‐0.1949























Table 10.Regression Analysis with 5% omitted each stock category.
0.7982 3.1989 0.1459 0.0923 0.1868 0.2870 2.9992 0.1773 0.0749 0.1051 0.4011 3.9704 0.0907 0.1026 0.1591 0.7112 ‐0.1141
(1.9193) (14.1159) (6.2651) (9.4134) (3.6536) (7.2053) (14.8541) (8.3277) (12.0948) (12.9787) (25.5019) (55.6865) (18.6522) (39.5224) (41.0299) 0.0082 0.0000
0.2481 1.6778 0.2996 0.1260 0.1291 0.1423 1.4673 0.2936 0.0839 0.0852 0.2070 2.0339 0.2450 0.0974 0.1272 0.1958 ‐0.0647
(3.5537) (4.4609) (9.9852) (5.5969) (6.2845) (3.9945) (9.1928) (11.6686) (7.9430) (8.5902) (17.2312) (34.4448) (30.7523) (26.7431) (37.8763) 0.0503 0.0020
0.1119 1.3527 0.3130 0.1649 0.1432 0.1226 1.4699 0.2994 0.1598 0.0937 0.2643 1.4313 0.3126 0.1584 0.1876 ‐0.0107 ‐0.1417
(2.1246) (8.4999) (10.4684) (9.9440) (7.1852) (6.8853) (12.2348) (12.9444) (12.7882) (9.5721) (24.3725) (32.9152) (38.8233) (35.6074) (41.6421) 0.0042 0.0000
0.3030 1.5335 0.3048 0.1497 0.1827 0.2518 1.5412 0.3064 0.1441 0.1700 0.4397 3.4187 0.1050 0.1259 0.1697 0.3511 ‐0.1879

















High Order Foreign Listed Firms Low Order Foreign Listed Firms Pure US Foreign Listed Firms t‐Tests Between 
Coefficient
Table 11. Regression analysis around earnings announcements
‐0.0135 0.0367 0.4963 0.1029 0.0091 ‐0.0035 0.0550 0.5011 0.1021 0.0063 ‐0.0023 0.0350 0.4961 0.1028 0.0081 ‐0.0101 ‐0.0011
(‐1.5436) (2.6470) (148.6035) (67.9868) (14.1761) (‐0.6153) (3.6223) (185.6746) (82.3403) (24.0881) (‐1.0073) (5.9196) (531.2334) (242.7924) (123.0417) 0.1669 0.4266
0.0028 0.0558 0.4905 0.1067 0.0073 0.0056 0.0755 0.5104 0.1013 0.0052 0.0006 0.0464 0.4956 0.1029 0.0067 ‐0.0028 0.0050
0.513107041 2.070288 76.09373 35.60092 11.21015 1.360573899 3.332377 104.8806195 43.79399 17.59368 0.361046 2.890854 289.998256 132.54042 84.71918272 0.3411 0.1313
0.0100 0.1188 0.4996 0.1016 0.0103 ‐0.0007 0.0386 0.5224 0.0981 0.0055 ‐0.0019 ‐0.0007 0.4923 0.1041 0.0097 0.0107 0.0012
1.232080156 2.584708 45.246214 19.6078 9.150302 ‐0.18737185 1.04927 56.71143885 23.40321 21.56283 ‐0.6753275 ‐0.05351 150.442726 69.865484 72.99669391 0.1151 0.4098
‐0.0237 0.0170 0.4979 0.1016 0.0097 ‐0.0086 0.0471 0.4928 0.1032 0.0071 ‐0.0038 0.0341 0.4969 0.1025 0.0086 ‐0.0151 ‐0.0048










High Order Foreign Listed Firms Low Order Foreign Listed Firms Pure US Foreign Listed Firms t‐Tests Between 
Coefficient t‐statistic p‐value R Square
Average 
TV 
Low‐USCoefficient t‐statistic p‐value R Square
Average 
TV 
Table 12: Tightness and Individualism Scores. Equal weighted R2 is the R2 calculated from the regression from Eun et
al. (2015), which represents the stock comovement or synchronicity. Tightness scores are from Gelfand et al.(2010).
Individualism scores are from Hofstede (2001).
Country Period for R2 Estimation Equal‐weighted R2 Tightness Individualism
United States 1990‐2010 0.17 5.1 91
Australia 1990‐2010 0.17 5.1 91
United Kingdom 1990‐2010 0.261 6.9 89
Canada 1990‐2010 0.249 80
Germany 1990‐2010 0.249 80
Netherlands 1990‐2010 0.316 3.3 80
Hungary 1994‐2010 0.334 2.9 80
Italy 1990‐2010 0.381 6.8 76
Belgium 1990‐2010 0.275 23 75
Denmark 1990‐2010 0.255 74
France 1990‐2010 0.264 6.3 71
Sweden 1990‐2010 0.32 71
Ireland 1990‐2002 0.255 70
Norway 1990‐2010 0.305 9.5 69
Switzerland 1990‐2010 0.3 68
Finland 1991‐2010 0.315 63
Luxembourg 1992‐2009 0.254 60
Poland 1995‐2010 0.35 6 60
Czech Republic 1994‐2007 0.256 58
155
South Africa 1994‐2007 0.256 58
New Zealand 1994‐2007 0.256 58
Austria 1990‐2010 0.297 6.8 55
Israel 1990‐2010 0.315 3.1 54
Spain 1990‐2010 0.366 5.4 51
India 1990‐2010 0.3 11 48
Japan 1990‐2010 0.361 8.6 46
Argentina 1993‐2010 0.38 46
Russian Federation 1997‐2010 0.263 39
Brazil 1992‐2010 0.255 3.5 38
Turkey 1990‐2010 0.452 9.2 37
Greece 1990‐2010 0.387 3.9 35
Philippines 1990‐2010 0.288 32
Mexico 1990‐2010 0.314 7.2 30
Portugal 1990‐2010 0.288 7.8 27
Malaysia 1990‐2010 0.391 11.8 26
Hong Kong 1990‐2010 0.319 6.3 25
Chile 1990‐2010 0.275 23
Thailand 1990‐2010 0.333 20
Singapore 1990‐2010 0.37 10.4 20
China 1993‐2010 0.549 7.9 20
South Korea 1990‐2010 0.365 10 18
Taiwan 1990‐2010 0.45 17
Peru 1991‐2010 0.262 16
Pakistan 1993‐2010 0.296 12.3 14
Indonesia 1990‐2010 0.297 14
Columbia 1992‐2010 0.311 13
Venezuela 1994‐2009 0.324 12
Market Efficiency
Investor Heterogeneity
Figure 13: Investor Heterogeneity Spectrum. Momentum and trading volume increase as investor heterogeneity increases.








































!i = 1 'iteration counter
!numberofiterate={numberofstocks} '!numberofiterate is a temp variable equals to number of stocks.






'Read the returns in the formation period, and rank stock number and return in decending order.
vector rank_identifier = @ranks(@columnextract(For_{firmgroup}, 2),"d","i")




Matrix ({N_c_{firmgroup}}, 3 ) Pf_W_{firmgroup}
Matrix ({N_c_{firmgroup}}, 3 ) Pf_L_{firmgroup}
!num1={N_c_{firmgroup}}
!num2={N_V_R_{firmgroup}}
































R_{for_length}_{hol_length}.setlines(a1:c3) +a -h -v


























































R_{for_length}_{hol_length}.setlines(l1:o6) +a -h -v
endsub
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Appendix III: Eviews Code for the Trading Volume Reactions and the






































setcell (Areg_stat,3,6,"Average Trading Volume Turnover","l")
162
for !f=1 to !numberoffirms
equation EQ_temp.ls tv_{%firmgroup}_!f c abs(r_{%firmgroup}_!f)














































'the starting date of 2007-2009 financial crisis is Oct 11, 2007 (1953) and the ending date is Mar 9, 2009
(2306).
'pre financial crisis: 1 to 1953,
'financial crisis: 1954 to 2306
'post-financial crisis 2307 to 4258
scalar lc=3
for !i=1 to !numberoffirms
!k=@ilast(@columnextract(ea_{%firmgroup},!i)) '!k is the number of EAs for each firm
'scalar numberofeas=!k
setcell (EAreg_{%firmgroup},lc,1,!i,0,"l")























































'the starting date of 2007-2009 financial crisis is Oct 11, 2007 (1953) and the ending date is Mar 9, 2009
(2306).
'pre financial crisis: 1 to 1953,
'financial crisis: 1954 to 2306
'post-financial crisis 2307 to 4258
scalar lc=3
for !i=1 to !numberoffirms
!k=@ilast(@columnextract(ea_{%firmgroup},!i)) '!k is the number of EAs for each firm
'scalar numberofeas=!k
setcell (EAreg_{%firmgroup},lc,1,!i,0,"l")






















Appendix IV. Internet Appendix
Additional test results of momentum and trading volume including the original data from
Bloomberg can be found at:
https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1ZMXBu1NZ4gMPC6f_ehWXBngOVR1KQXXP?usp=shari
ng
